Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration

Decision Date20 September 1979
Docket NumberNo. 144,144
Citation405 A.2d 744,286 Md. 104
PartiesRENTALS UNLIMITED, INC. v. ADMINISTRATOR, MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Barnett Rosenberg, Chevy Chase (Peter J. Messitte & Messitte & Rosenberg, P. A., Chevy Chase, on brief), for appellant.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and William M. Huddles, Baltimore and Robert R. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Glen Burnie, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Maryland Code (1977) §§ 17-201 17-204 of the Transportation Article provides: 1

" § 17-201. 'Judgment' defined.

In this subtitle, 'judgment' means Any final judgment resulting from:

(1) A cause of action for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use on any highway or other property open to the public of any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this State; or

(2) A cause of action on an agreement of settlement for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use on any highway or other property open to the public of any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this State."

" § 17-202. Report of unsatisfied judgment to Administration.

If a person fails to satisfy a judgment within 30 days, the judgment creditor or his representative may send to the Administration a certified copy of the judgment and, on a form provided by the Administration, a certificate of facts relating to the judgment. The certificate of facts is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it."

" § 17-203. Duty of Administration as to nonresident judgment debtor.

If the judgment debtor named in a certified copy of a judgment or in a certificate of facts is a nonresident, the Administration shall send a certified copy of the judgment or certificate of facts to the Motor Vehicle Administrator of the State where the judgment debtor is a resident and of any other state where the vehicle of the judgment debtor is registered."

" § 17-204. Suspension of license and registration on nonpayment of judgment.

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, On receipt of a certified copy of a judgment and a certificate of facts, the Administration shall suspend:

(1) The license to drive of the judgment debtor; and

(2) The registration of all vehicles owned by the judgment debtor and registered in this State." (Emphasis added.) 2

This case presents four questions concerning this statute. The first is whether the statute authorizes the Motor Vehicle Administration to suspend the registration and license to drive (license) of a Maryland resident who has failed to satisfy a judgment rendered by a court of any state or of the United States, including a court of the District of Columbia, (hereinafter referred to as a foreign judgment). The second is whether the Motor Vehicle Administration's action in suspending the registration and license of such a Maryland resident violates the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 3 The third is whether the Motor Vehicle Administration's action violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 The fourth is whether the Motor Vehicle Administration's action is an improper exercise of judicial authority by an administrative agency which violates the Maryland Constitution, article IV, section 1. 5

The record shows that the appellant, Rentals Unlimited, Inc. (Rentals), is a Maryland corporation and a Maryland taxpayer with its principal place of business in Montgomery County. It leases equipment, including trucks, to individuals and companies, which are driven principally in the State of Maryland, but also in other jurisdictions. In July, 1977, an individual, driving one of Rentals' leased trucks, was involved in an accident in the District of Columbia. Rentals was sued in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but did not enter an appearance and did not contest the jurisdiction of that court or the merits of the claim. On 21 November 1977, judgment in the amount of $514.45 was entered against Rentals. The judgment was not paid.

On 15 February 1978, the Motor Vehicle Administration mailed Rentals a "Suspension Notice" stating that its "Maryland driving and registration privileges," for all of the vehicles which it owned or co-owned, would be suspended on 1 March 1978, and that if it could not satisfy the judgment by that date, it must return all its "tags and registration cards." 6 On 28 February 1978, the Motor Vehicle Administration, in response to a request from Rentals, stayed suspension until 1 April 1978. Rentals did not request an administrative hearing.

On 28 March 1978, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Rentals filed a petition seeking to enjoin the appellee, Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA), from suspending all of its registrations if it did not satisfy the District of Columbia judgment by 1 April 1978, and seeking a declaration of "the powers, rights and duties" of the parties. Although in its petition Rentals had alleged that it was challenging the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, it alleged no facts and adduced no evidence to show that that court lacked jurisdiction, nor did it allege that it had been deprived of due process of law because it had not been afforded an administrative hearing. On 29 March 1978, the trial court entered an order enjoining the MVA from suspending Rentals' registrations pending further order of that court. On 18 September 1978, the trial court entered an order dismissing Rentals' petition. Rentals appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The MVA agreed to stay suspension pending completion of judicial review. We issued a writ of certiorari before consideration by that Court. We shall affirm.

Rentals' initial contention, that Maryland Code (1977) §§ 17-201 17-204 of the Transportation Article does not expressly or by implication authorize the MVA to suspend its vehicle registrations and licenses because it had failed to satisfy a foreign judgment, is without merit. Section 17-201 expressly provides that in subtitle 2 of title 17, "judgment" means "any final judgment" which results, in essence, from a vehicular accident. It does not specify whether that definition is limited to final judgments rendered by Maryland courts or includes not only final judgments rendered by Maryland courts, but also final foreign judgments. We must determine, therefore, whether a foreign judgment is a "judgment" within the meaning of § 17-201.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. In determining this legislative intent a court must read the language of the statute in context and in relation to all of its provisions. Comptroller of Treasury v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 536-539, 404 A.2d 1045, 1052-1053 (1979). In addition, it may consider the statute's legislative history and must consider its purpose. Comptroller of Treasury v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. at 538, 404 A.2d at 1052 (1979); Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 495, 331 A.2d 55, 61-62 (1975); Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 93-97, 75 A.2d 343, 345-47 (1950).

The legislative history of title 17 shows that §§ 17-201 17-204 were preceded by Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Cum.Supp.) art. 66 1/2, §§ 7-201 7-204. 7 Article 66 1/2, § 7-201 defined "judgment" as follows:

"For the purpose of this subtitle The term 'judgment' means any enforceable judgment which has become final by expiration, without appeal, of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, Rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use upon a highway or property open to use by the public, of any vehicle of a type subject to registration under the laws of this State, for damages . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, art. 66 1/2, § 7-201, unlike its successor § 17-201, expressly authorized the MVA to suspend the license and registration of any person against whom a foreign judgment had been rendered.

The revisor's note to § 17-201 states:

"This section is new language derived without substantive change from former Article 66 1/2 § 7-201."

While the revisor's notes are not law and may not be considered to have been enacted as part of the act, ch. 14, § 7, Acts of 1977, they are entitled to weight. We conclude that this history establishes that the words "any final judgment" used in § 17-201 mean any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States.

This meaning effectuates the purpose of title 17. Title 17, "Vehicle Laws Required Security," is the most recent formulation of a consistent legislative policy designed to make certain that those who own and operate vehicles in Maryland are financially responsible. 8 The legislative objective of this statute, like the objective of its predecessors, is to achieve the remedial purpose of protecting the public from the reckless operation of vehicles by financially irresponsible drivers by assuring that operators and owners of vehicles against whom judgments might be entered on account of negligent driving, are financially able to pay damages to persons injured by such negligence. Amalgamated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 534, 212 A.2d 311, 315 (1965); National Indemnity Co. v. Simmons, 230 Md. 234, 238-39, 186 A.2d 595, 597 (1962); Keystone Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 676, 679, 26 A.2d 761, 762 (1942). To accomplish that purpose fully, the MVA must be authorized to suspend the license and registration of any financially irresponsible vehicle owner or driver whether that person's negligent driving occurred in Maryland or in some other jurisdiction.

Thus, the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of § 17-201 estab...

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