Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville
| Decision Date | 12 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:11-00218,3:11-00218 |
| Parties | DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS, DAVID ERNESTO GUTIERREZ-TURCIOS, and ROSA LANDAVERDE, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, and UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement's ("ICE's") Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III (Docket No. 54). That Motion has been fully briefed by ICE and Plaintiffs. (Docket Nos. 55, 58 & 67). Also pending is Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Finding Defendants Liable Under Counts I and II (Docket No. 69), Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County's ("Metro's") Motion to Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Abeyance (Docket No. 72), and Metro's Motion to Open Case for Necessary Discovery (Docket No. 75). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant ICE's Motion to Dismiss Count III insofar as it alleges that ICE violated Plaintiffs' rights to due process, but deny ICE's Motion to Dismiss Count II. All remaining motions will be denied pending certification of the dispositive issue in this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
In a June 21, 2011, Order and Memorandum (Docket Nos. 43 & 44), the Court detailed theprocedural history and the factual allegations underlying this litigation. See, Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 2011 WL 2471585 at ** 1-4 (M.D. Tenn. June 21, 2011) (Renteria I). Basically, this case presents a challenge to an October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA" or "287(g) Agreement") between ICE and Metro pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), which authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to enter into written agreements to train and deputize local law enforcement officers to perform specified acts relating to immigration enforcement. The MOA empowers Davidson County Sheriff's Office ("DCSO") deputies to perform those immigration enforcement acts.
The case began when Plaintiff Renteria-Villegas ("Renteria"), a natural born United States citizen, filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court on January 7, 2011, against Metro, a city police Officer , and the Sheriff of Davidson County, Daron Hall ("Sheriff Hall"). Renteria's primary complaint was that the MOA violated the Nashville Metropolitan Charter ("Charter") and Poe v. Metro. Gov't. ofNashville & Davidson County, 383 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1964), a Tennessee Supreme Court decision interpreting the Charter. After an Amended Complaint was filed, and after the Chancery Court Judge found that ICE was an indispensable party to the MOA for purposes of declaratory relief, Renteria again amended his Complaint, adding David Gutierrez-Turcios ("Gutierrez"), a lawful permanent resident of the United States, as an additional Plaintiff and ICE as a Defendant. ICE then removed the case to this Court and the Court allowed Plaintiffs to once again amend their Complaint.
In the presently controlling Third Amended Complaint (Docket No. 45) (which will simply be referred to hereafter as "the Complaint"), Rosa Landaverde ("Landaverde"), a Davidson County resident holding temporary protected status, was added as a Plaintiff. Metro and ICE are the onlynamed Defendants. The Complaint sets forth four causes of action: In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that, by entering into the MOA, Metro violated the Charter. In Count II, Renteria and Gutierrez allege that ICE violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. In Count III, Renteria alleges that both Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, In Count IV, Renteria sets forth a state law claim for false imprisonment against Metro.
The four pending motions are, to an extent, interrelated in that the continued viability of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Metro's Motion to Hold in Abeyance, and Metro's Motion to Allow Necessary Discovery hinge on this Court's disposition of ICE's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court addresses the Motion to Dismiss first.
ICE seeks dismissal of Counts II and III, which are the only claims made against it. Prior to reaching the specific substantive arguments raised with respect to each Count, the Court first acknowledges that ICE moves to dismiss both Counts because Plaintiffs allegedly cannot "establish standing to challenge the 287(g) Agreement because neither of them can show that there is an imminent risk that they will be subject to the 287(g) program in the future." (Docket No. 55 at 8). In both the decision allowing Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, as well as a subsequent Order and Memorandum that denied Metro's request that it be allowed to take an interlocutory appeal of that ruling, the Court discussed Plaintiffs' standing in detail. See, Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at **5-10; Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson County, 2011 WL 2938428 at **1-3 (M.D. Tenn. July 19, 2011) ("Renteria II"). The Court finds no need to revisit those rulings, other than to address a couple of points raised by ICE in its Motion to Dismiss.
ICE states:
In its Memorandum granting plaintiffs' motion to file the TAC, the Court addressed and rejected Metro Government's challenge to Plaintiffs' standing to bring "state-law claims" in their proposed TAC. (See ECF No. 43 at 10). In their TAC, plaintiffs now sue ICE for allegedly violating federal law. As such, their standing to sue ICE is a "matter of federal law" that "does not depend on [their] prior standing in state court." Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiffs base their claims against ICE on violations of federal law, federal standing requirements necessarily apply to those claims.
(Docket No. 55 at 8 n.5). In the Court's view, ICE reads Renteria I too narrowly, relies upon an inapposite case, and neglects to consider that Plaintiffs have now added a claim under the APA.
In addressing standing in Renteria I, the Court began by observing that, because the action was removed to this Court by a federal agency, Metro erred in addressing standing only under Article III. However, the Court went on to write: Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at *9 (italics and footnote omitted). The Court then went on to amplify its reasons for that conclusion.
Indeed, a primary case upon which ICE relies, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983), was considered by the Court in Renteria I. However, this case - in which Plaintiffs allege they have been subjected to 287(g) investigations, and in which they allege that anyone who appears foreign-born is subjected to such an investigation upon entry into a DCSO facility - is markedly different from the allegations in Lyons that rogue police officers violated departmental policy by placing compliant motorists in unauthorized chokeholds.
Further, ICE's reliance on Coyne is misplaced. There, a group of citizens purported to represent the State of Ohio and Ohio taxpayers and sought to recover state monies that had been spenttreating citizens suffering from tobacco-related illnesses. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were "not direct or particularized," and they could not show that a favorable outcome would result in either the receipt of a tax refund by them or a reduction in the tax bill of Ohioans generally since "the power to decrease state taxes or issue a tax refund rests within the province of the legislative and executive branches of the State of Ohio." Coyne, 183 F.3d at 496. Here, at least insofar as Plaintiffs Renteria and Gutierrez are concerned, Plaintiffs have suffered a direct and particularized injury by virtue of being subjected to 287(g) investigations,1 and they would receive a favorable outcome were the Court to rule in their favor since, presumably, they would not again be subjected to the alleged indignities of such an investigation.
Moreover, as this Court ruled in both Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at *9 and Renteria II, 2011 WL 2938428 at **1-2, a plaintiff may amend a complaint to address standing issues, an allowance which seems particularly apropos where, as here, a state court plaintiff was effectively forced to litigate claims in federal court. When ICE removed the case, Plaintiffs added federal claims, including a claim under the APA.
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. To bring a claim under the APA in federal court a plaintiff "must not only meet the constitutional requirements of standing, but must also demonstrate prudential standing." Courtneyv. Smith, 297 F.36d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2002).
"To demonstrate constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the following three elements: (1) an allegation of an 'injury in fact,' which is a concrete harm suffered by the plaintiff that is actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a demonstration of 'causation,' which is a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant; and (3) a demonstration of 'redressability,' which is a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury." Friends of Tim Fords v....
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