Rentz v. BNSF Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200074,20200074 |
| Parties | David Phillip RENTZ, Plaintiff and Appellee v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Foreign For-Profit Corporation, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Grant L. Davis (argued), John S. Carroll (appeared), Thomas C. Jones (on brief), Timothy C. Gaarder (on brief), Kansas City, MO, and Steven A. Lautt (appeared), James E. Nostdahl (on brief), David J. Hogue (on brief), Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Dale M. Schowengerdt (argued), Helena, MT, and Michael C. Waller (appeared), Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") appeals from a jury verdict and money judgment entered in favor of David Rentz. BNSF asserts it was denied a fair trial for the following reasons: (1) BNSF's designated representative at trial was allowed to be questioned beyond the scope of his knowledge; (2) video and audio clips taken from discovery depositions of BNSF's designated representatives were improperly played during opening and closing arguments; (3) BNSF's internal operating procedures were improperly used to modify the standard of care; and (4) opinion testimony of the investigating highway patrol trooper was excluded from evidence. Because we conclude the questioning of BNSF's representative at trial exceeded his personal knowledge and affected a substantial right, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for a new trial.
[¶2] In July 2012, a tractor-trailer driven by Rentz was struck by a train operated by BNSF and train engineer, Reinaldo Guitian, Jr. The collision occurred at a public railroad grade crossing. In December 2015, Rentz sued BNSF and Guitian for personal injuries sustained during the vehicle/train collision. Guitian was subsequently dismissed as a named defendant in the action.
[¶3] In January 2019, the district court held an eleven-day jury trial on Rentz's negligence claim. Guitian was designated as BNSF's party representative under N.D.R.Ev. 615 and was not sequestered from the courtroom. The jury returned a verdict finding Rentz 15% at fault and BNSF 85% at fault. A money judgment was entered in favor of Rentz.
[¶4] In July 2019, BNSF filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied BNSF's motion for a judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. On appeal of the denial of its motion for a new trial, BNSF asserts the following errors occurred during the trial: (1) the court improperly allowed Guitian, BNSF's designated party representative during the trial, to be examined outside the scope of his actual knowledge and to make binding statements on behalf of BNSF; (2) the court improperly allowed deposition video and audio clips of BNSF representatives to be played during opening statements and closing arguments; (3) federal law preempts BNSF's internal policies and the court improperly allowed the internal policies to alter the standard of care for negligence; and (4) the court improperly prevented a North Dakota highway patrol trooper from offering expert opinion testimony. BNSF argues the errors prejudiced a substantial right and had a significant probability of effecting the jury's verdict.
[¶5] Prior to the start of the trial, the court ordered the sequestration of witnesses pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 615. As provided by N.D.R.Ev. 615(b), BNSF was allowed to designate one person to represent the corporation and remain in the courtroom throughout the trial. BNSF designated Guitian, the engineer operating the train at the time of the collision, as BNSF's representative during the trial.
[¶6] Central to Rentz's claim was whether vegetation obstructed the view of the railroad crossing where the collision occurred and, if so, whether BNSF was negligent in failing to properly control the vegetation. Guitian was called as a witness by BNSF. During the cross examination of Guitian, Guitian was questioned about BNSF's internal vegetation control policies and related corporate decision making regarding cutting the vegetation at the crossing where the accident occurred. Guitian testified he was not familiar with the policies or the decision regarding cutting the vegetation at the crossing where the accident occurred. Over BNSF's objection, Guitian was allowed to be examined regarding the policies and the decision-making. The court determined the examination was proper because Guitian had been designated as BNSF's N.D.R.Ev. 615(b) representative. BNSF asserts the court erred when it determined the designation of Guitian as BNSF's N.D.R.Ev. 615(b) representative eliminated the need for Guitian to have personal knowledge of the policies and decision-making regarding the cutting of vegetation at the crossing where the accident occurred.
[¶7] Rule 615, N.D.R.Ev., serves the twin purposes of (1) preventing one witness’ testimony from influencing the testimony of other witnesses; and (2) aiding in detecting false testimony and credibility issues. Nesvig v. Nesvig , 2006 ND 66, ¶ 20, 712 N.W.2d 299 (); State v. Buchholz , 2004 ND 77, ¶ 24, 678 N.W.2d 144 (). Our statement of the purpose of Rule 615 is consistent with Fed.R.Evid. 615 which served as the model for our rule. See , e.g. , United States v. Collins , 340 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir. 2003) ().
[¶8] Guitian testified as a lay witness. The testimony of lay witnesses is governed by N.D.R.Ev. 602 which provides "[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." This Court has not previously interpreted N.D.R.Ev. 615 as eliminating the need for a lay witness to have personal knowledge of the matter upon which the witness is testifying. Rentz has not directed us to any authority or decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting an equivalent to our rule which would support elimination of the need for a lay witness to have personal knowledge of the matter upon which the witness is testifying.
[¶9] During the parties’ discussion with the court regarding BNSF's objection to the scope of Rentz's examination of Guitian, several references were made to the designation of corporate representatives pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) for the purpose of deposing an organization. Rule 30(b)(6) requires a party seeking to depose a "public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity" to "describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination." The "organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify." N.D.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). Additionally, the individuals designated to testify during the deposition "must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization."
[¶10] While the designation of a representative to remain in the courtroom during trial pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 615 and the designation of an organizational representative for the purpose of a deposition pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) appear similar on their face, they serve a different purpose. There is no requirement in Rule 615 that the representative designated to remain in the courtroom during trial "must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization" as required in the process provided within Rule 30(b)(6). Rule 615 does not act as a substitute for the process described in N.D.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) and does not require the organization to expose its trial representative to examination regarding all information known or reasonably available to the organization.
[¶11] BNSF timely objected to the examination of Guitian on BNSF's vegetation control policies and BNSF's decision not to follow those policies at the location of the accident in this case. Prior to the objection, Guitian had testified he did not have personal knowledge regarding those matters. We conclude the court erred in requiring Guitian to testify on matters outside his personal knowledge when he was cross examined on BNSF's vegetation control policies and whether those polices were followed at the location of the accident in this case.
[¶12] Having found the trial court erred in permitting Guitian to testify to matters outside his personal knowledge, we next consider whether the error constitutes grounds to grant a new trial. The decision to grant or deny a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be set aside on appeal absent an affirmative showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. See , e.g. , Sathren v. Behm Propane, Inc. , 444 N.W.2d 696, 697 (N.D. 1989) ; Roberts v. Hail Unlimited, a Div. of Int'l Bus. & Mercantile Re-Assurance Co. , 358 N.W.2d 776, 780 (N.D. 1984) ; Cullen v. Williams Cty. , 446 N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D. 1989). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably, when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or when it misapplies or misinterprets the law. Haider v. Moen , 2018 ND 174, ¶ 6, 914 N.W.2d 520.
[¶13] Pursuant to the "harmless error" rule, Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P., only errors or defects which affect substantial rights of the parties will warrant a new trial. Haider, at ¶ 6 ; Sathren , 444 N.W.2d at 698. Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P., states our harmless-error standard in civil cases and reads as follows:
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence,...
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