Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 04-086.

Decision Date21 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 04-086.,04-086.
PartiesMaria RENVILLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: William J. Gregoire and Stephanie A. Hollar, Smith Walsh Clark & Gregoire, Great Falls, Montana.

For Respondent: Dennis P. Conner and Daniel E. Shannon, Conner & Shannon, Great Falls, Montana.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) appeals the Eighth Judicial District Court's October 2003 Order granting summary judgment in favor of Maria Renville (Renville) and requiring Farmers to pay Renville's medical expenses and attorney fees. Farmers also appeals the District Court's December 2003 determination of the attorney fees award. We affirm.

ISSUES

¶ 2 A restatement of the issues before this Court is:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in granting Renville's Motion for Summary Judgment?

¶ 4 Did the District Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees to Renville?

¶ 5 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in its determination of the amount of attorney fees awarded to Renville?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 This is the third time this matter has come before this Court. See Renville v. Taylor, 2000 MT 217, 301 Mont. 99, 7 P.3d 400 (Renville I)

, and Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2003 MT 103, 315 Mont. 295, 69 P.3d 217 (Renville II). For purposes of this Opinion, it is adequate to note that Renville was injured in a car accident in 1995 when the car in which she was a passenger was rear-ended by a car driven by Ursula Taylor. Taylor, who was insured by Farmers at that time, admitted negligence. Renville's claim against Taylor proceeded to trial in December 1998 on the limited issues of causation and damages. Prior to trial, Farmers had paid Renville or her healthcare providers $13,040.78 in pre-trial medical expenses.

¶ 7 At trial Renville presented evidence of her injuries and Taylor countered that Renville's alleged injuries were less severe than Renville claimed or were not related to the accident. The jury determined that Taylor's negligence caused Renville's injuries and awarded Renville $17,553.00 in damages. At some time after the trial, Farmers paid an additional $3,070.51 to some of Renville's care providers. As a result, Farmers had paid a total of $16,111.29 toward Renville's medical bills by the time the Renville I appeal went forward.

¶ 8 Renville appealed, asserting that the verdict compensated her for past medical bills only, without regard to her future medical expenses. Taylor defended the jury verdict. This Court, in Renville I, set aside the jury verdict and remanded the case back to the District Court for a new trial limited to the issue of damages. Renville I, ¶ 28. We concluded that the jury award was for past medical expenses exclusively, and that in addition to past expenses Maria was entitled to an award for pain and suffering and for future medical expenses to be determined by the jury upon remand.

¶ 9 Shortly after we rendered our August 2000 decision in Renville I, Renville, it appears, requested payment of the difference between the $16,111.00 Farmers had paid and the amount the jury awarded her, $17,553.00. She also requested payment of approximately $7,736.00 in additional medical expenses incurred between December 1998 and September 2000. Farmers denied the request. It explained that because two physicians had testified at the December 1998 trial that not all of Renville's complaints and claims were causally related to the accident, it would not advance-pay any further claims prior to the retrial.

¶ 10 In October 2001, Renville requested payment from Farmers for $7,897.02. These charges (referred to hereinafter as "ongoing expenses") represented medical expenses incurred by Renville from December 1998 until October 2001. Farmers again denied the claim, disputing the causal relation between the accident and Renville's ongoing expenses, based on testimony presented during the December 1998 trial. While the retrial was pending, Renville brought a declaratory action against Farmers in January 2002.

¶ 11 Renville sought a declaration that Farmers was required under Renville I to pay the balance between the $16,111 already paid and the jury award of $17,533, plus interest accrued from December 10, 1998. She also sought a declaratory judgment that Farmers pay $7,897.02 for ongoing medical care costs incurred from December 1998 through October 2001. In addition, she sought compensatory and punitive damages for Farmers' bad faith failure to make these payments. To support her claims for ongoing expenses, Renville presented the March 2002 deposition testimony of three expert physicians who testified that her ongoing expenses were causally related to the accident.

¶ 12 On April 12, 2002, Renville filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her request for declaratory judgment for past and ongoing medical expenses. Farmers filed counter-motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. The District Court concluded that the retrial would address the issue of damages as well as the factual issues that remained regarding Renville's past medical expenses. Accordingly, it granted Farmers' Motion and dismissed Renville's Complaint.

¶ 13 In September 2002, Renville appealed the court's dismissal of her declaratory action. She argued that the Renville I Decision established that her past medical expenses were $17,553.00 and that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to follow the Renville I holding. Farmers argued that under Ridley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. (1997), 286 Mont. 325, 951 P.2d 987, an insurer may dispute a medical expense if it is not reasonably clear that the expense is causally related to the accident in question. Farmers maintained that the physicians' testimony at the December 1998 trial established that not all of Renville's claims presented at trial were causally related.

¶ 14 We agreed with Renville and held that the District Court had abused its discretion in denying Renville summary judgment on certain of her declaratory claims. Renville II, ¶¶ 17 and 25-26. We reiterated our holding in Renville I, explaining that in Renville I we concluded that the jury had established that Renville's past medical expenses totaled $17,553.00 and that these expenses were causally related to the accident. Therefore, this was the law of the case and Renville's past medical expenses were no longer in dispute and were owed to Renville by Farmers. Renville II, ¶¶ 12, 15. We further expounded that the "law of the case doctrine precludes subsequent evidentiary hearings on issues finally adjudicated by this Court." Renville II, ¶ 17. In other words, the issue of Renville's past medical expenses and the cause of those expenses could not be revisited or relitigated on remand. We concluded that Farmers could not continue to rely on physician testimony that was obviously rejected by the jury. It must pay the past expenses of $17,553.00.

¶ 15 We also addressed the issue of Renville's ongoing expenses in Renville II. Citing §§ 33-18-201(6) and (13), MCA, and Ridley, 286 Mont. 325, 951 P.2d 987, we concluded that Farmers was required to pay Renville's ongoing third party medical expenses incurred before final settlement because the December 1998 trial had established liability. Renville II, ¶ 22.

¶ 16 Importantly, we conceded that under Ridley, an insurer may dispute a medical claim but it must have some factual basis for doing so. Renville II, ¶ 23. Farmers failed during the declaratory judgment proceedings to submit evidence to support its claim that Renville's ongoing medical expenses of $7,897.02 were not causally related to the accident. It offered nothing to dispute the post-trial deposition testimony of Renville's three expert witnesses; rather, it continued to rely on testimony from the original trial — causation testimony already rejected by the jury. Renville II, ¶ 24.

¶ 17 We therefore concluded that the District Court's denial of Renville's summary judgment motion and its dismissal of her request for declaratory judgment on the issue of past and ongoing medical expenses was an abuse of discretion. Renville II, ¶ 25. As a result, our Decision in Renville II reversed and remanded the matter of Renville's declaratory judgment action to the District Court.

¶ 18 On remand, Renville filed a motion seeking to recover attorney fees incurred to obtain declaratory relief. The District Court granted the motion and subsequently held a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of attorney fees. The court subsequently issued its Order awarding Renville $27,750.00 in attorney fees. Farmers appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 19 We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. The moving party must prove that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once the movant demonstrates this, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to prove that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. After a district court determines that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the district court must then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This is a legal conclusion which we review for correctness. Gentry Mont. Enters. v. McDonald, 2004 MT 322, ¶ 12, 324 Mont. 67, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d 767, ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted).

¶ 20 We have held that the grant of attorney fees pursuant to § 27-8-313, MCA, is within the discretionary province of the district court. Trustees of Indiana University v. Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97, 315 Mont. 210, 69 P.3d 663 ("Buxbaum"). We therefore review a court's decision to award such fees for an abuse of discretion. Additionally, in circumstances where a court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine the reasonableness of requested attorney fees, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Gendron v. Mont. Univ. Sys.
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • April 7, 2020
    ...judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. Talcott Constr. , ¶ 62 (citing Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exchange , 2004 MT 366, ¶ 24, 324 Mont. 509, 105 P.3d 280 ). ¶9 Whether a party is entitled to post-judgment interest is a conclusion of law which we r......
  • JRN Holdings, LLC v. Dearborn Meadows Land Owners Ass'n
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • August 17, 2021
    ...Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 426, ¶ 43, 354 Mont. 50, 221 P.3d 1230); Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 MT 366, ¶¶ 27-28, 324 Mont. 509, 105 P.3d 280. A. Application of the UDJA ¶50 JRN first asserts that the District Court erred by allowing the DMLOA to petition for attorney fees wh......
  • W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of State
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 27, 2012
    ...“tangible parameters test” to determine whether an award of fees is necessary or proper as required by § 27–8–313, MCA. Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 MT 366, ¶ 27, 324 Mont. 509, 105 P.3d 280.2 The District Court concluded that, although the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provided......
  • United Nat. Ins. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • August 14, 2009
    ...National Cas. Co., ¶ 13. ¶ 13 We review a district court's decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 MT 366, ¶ 20, 324 Mont. 509, 105 P.3d 280. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without employment of consc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT