Renville v. Fredrickson

• Decision Date: 16 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-170,03-170
• Citation: 2004 MT 324,101 P.3d 773,324 Mont. 86
• Parties: JANICE RENVILLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHARLA MAY FREDRICKSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of SHERLEE YORK FREDRICKSON, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2004 MT 324

324 Mont. 86

101 P.3d 773

JANICE RENVILLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHARLA MAY FREDRICKSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of SHERLEE YORK FREDRICKSON, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 03-170

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: January 26, 2004

Decided: November 16, 2004

For Appellant: Dane J. Durham, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana; Joseph C. Engel, III, P.C., Attorney at Law, Great, Falls, Montana.

For Respondent: Robert F. James, Mark D. Meyer, Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick & Higgings, P.C., Great Falls, Montana; Todd A. Stubbs, Graybill, Ostrem & Crotty, PLLP, Great Falls, Montana.

Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 This Court issued its original Opinion in this case on August 31, 2004. See Renville v. Frederickson, 2004 MT 239, 323 Mont. 503, ___ P.3d ___ (Renville I). Frederickson filed a Petition for Rehearing on September 15, 2004. Renville filed her Objections to the Petition for Rehearing on September 23, 2004. In her Petition, Frederickson raised an issue that was neither briefed nor argued in the original briefs submitted to this Court. While the failure to raise this issue initially on appeal would normally justify a summary denial of the Petition for Rehearing, we conclude that, in the interest of clarity and uniformity of case law, we must address the issue raised in the Petition, and affirm the District Court's ruling. On November 9, 2004, we issued an Order withdrawing our Opinion in Renville I. We replace it with this superseding Opinion.

¶2 Janice Renville (Renville) sued the Estate of Sherlee York Frederickson (Frederickson or the Estate) seeking damages for emotional distress and loss of consortium arising out of the death of Renville's adult son who was killed in an automobile accident while a passenger in a car driven by Frederickson. Renville appeals the District Court's Order granting the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. As indicated above, we affirm.

ISSUE

¶3 We restate the issue as follows: Did the District Court err in concluding that Renville's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and loss of consortium failed as a matter of law?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 On September 1, 2001, forty-four year old Gary Sorenson (Sorenson) died in an automobile accident. The car in which Sorenson was a passenger was driven by Sherlee York Frederickson (Frederickson). Frederickson also died in the accident.

¶5 The record is unclear on Sorenson's marital status at the time of his death, but we know he was survived by two children, numerous siblings, and his mother. His son, Jason Sorenson, was named Personal Representative of his father's estate. Jason prosecuted a wrongful death claim against Frederickson's estate. That action was settled in November 2001.

¶6 Sorenson's mother, Renville, learned of her son's death when a sheriff arrived at her home in the early morning hours of September 2, 2001, and notified her that Sorenson had died as a result of injuries sustained in the automobile accident. Renville reacted very emotionally. She began to scream and her body shook. She claims that she had to take tranquilizing medicine for several days and that six months after his death, she had no interest in her home and had repeated crying spells.

¶7 In March 2002, Renville filed suit against the Frederickson Estate, asserting that Frederickson's negligence had caused Sorenson's death. She sought damages for emotional distress and loss of consortium.

¶8 The Estate moved for summary judgment arguing that Renville's emotional distress claim failed as a matter of law because Renville's allegations of emotional distress did "not rise to the level set forth by the Montana Supreme Court as necessary to establish a claim for emotional distress." Additionally, the Estate maintained that Renville's loss of consortium claim must fail because Montana does not recognize a loss of consortium claim for the death of an adult child. The District Court agreed and, in January 2003, granted Frederickson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Renville appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Our standard in reviewing a district court's summary judgment ruling is de novo. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144, ¶ 16, 321 Mont. 432, ¶ 16, 92 P.3d 620, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). Accordingly, such review affords no deference to the district court's decision and we independently review the record, using the same criteria used by the district court, i.e., Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Moreover, all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the offered proof must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Watkins Trust, ¶ 16.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Renville argued to the District Court that she suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of her son's death which she alleged was caused by Frederickson's negligence. The Estate countered Renville's allegations with a two-fold argument: 1) because Renville did not contemporaneously witness the underlying accident that killed her son or its immediate aftermath, under Montana law she may not prosecute an independent claim for NIED; and 2) Renville's emotional distress from the loss of her son was not "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it."(quoting Sacco v. High Country Independent Press (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 234, 896 P.2d 411, 426). The District Court did not address Frederickson's "contemporaneous witness" argument. Rather, it held that, under Sacco, her emotional distress was insufficiently severe to support her NIED claim.

¶11 The State of Montana has long recognized "negligent infliction of emotional distress" as a compensable tort and an independent cause of action. In Sacco, we engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the historical development of emotional distress claims; therefore, we need not do so again here. As the District Court recognized, we set forth in Sacco a threshold level of emotional distress that must be met for such claims to be compensable. We said:

Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquillity is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved. . . . (emphasis added).

Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.

¶12 We acknowledge that "severe" and "serious" emotional distress may manifest in various and subtle ways. In Henricksen v. State, we reiterated that the guidance provided in the Restatement 2nd of Torts, § 46, comment k, was one commonly-used method for identifying sufficiently severe and serious emotional distress:

In cases where there is a physical manifestation of bodily harm resulting from emotional distress, such as PTSD, this bodily harm is sufficient evidence that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff is genuine and severe. As explained in the Restatement 2nd of Torts, § 46, comment k, `[n]ormally, severe emotional distress is accompanied or followed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm, which in itself affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe.' (Emphasis inoriginal.) This manifestation assures that only genuine harm, not fraudulent claims, will be compensated.

Henricksen v. State, 2004 MT 20, ¶ 79, 319 Mont. 307, ¶ 79, 84 P.3d 38, ¶ 79.

¶13 In Sacco, we also noted that serious mental distress could be found "where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Sacco, 271 Mont. at 231, 896 P.2d at 424 (citation omitted). Other factors to be considered in determining the severity of emotional distress are the intensity and duration of the distress, circumstances under which the infliction occurred, and the party relationships involved. By evaluating these factors, one may determine when and where a reasonable person should or should not have to endure certain kinds of emotional distress. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426 (citation omitted).

¶14 Our de novo review of the record leads us to conclude that Renville has not presented evidence establishing that the distress caused by her son's death was so severe "that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it." The only substantive testimony in the record on this issue is Renville's sworn statement dated March 6, 2002. In this statement, Renville testified that when the officer notified her of Sorenson's death, her adult daughter, who was living with her at the time, began to scream and cry and she began to scream and cry and her body shook. She stated that while she had been taking Valium for approximately fifteen years (since her brother's death), she was required to take several additional pills during the time between Sorenson's death and his funeral. She also testified that her need for Valium has increased "a little at times" since Sorenson's death but that "sometimes [it is] the same as it was before." She indicated that she took anti-depressants for about two weeks after his death but stopped taking them because she did not like to take pills. Renville further related that over the months after Sorenson's death,...