Renzi v. Connelly School of the Holy Child

• Decision Date: 02 May 2000
• Docket Number: EHLERS-RENZI,SEVENTH-DAY,No. 99-2352,99-2352
• Citation: 224 F.3d 283
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) BIRGIT; VINCENT RENZI, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CONNELLY SCHOOL OF THE HOLY CHILD, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant. THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS; THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE DIOCESEOF WASHINGTON; GENERAL CONFERENCE CORPORATION OFADVENTISTS; NATIONAL JEWISH COMMISSIONON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON; UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATION OF AMERICA; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA, Amici Curiae. Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 283

224 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000)

BIRGIT EHLERS-RENZI; VINCENT RENZI, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CONNELLY SCHOOL OF THE HOLY CHILD, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS; THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE DIOCESEOF WASHINGTON; GENERAL CONFERENCE CORPORATION OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS; NATIONAL JEWISH COMMISSIONON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON; UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATION OF AMERICA; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA, Amici Curiae.

No. 99-2352

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Argued: May 2, 2000

Decided: August 14, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge. (CA-99-1512-JFM) COUNSEL ARGUED: John G. Roberts, Jr., HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Vincent D. Renzi, Potomac, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gregory G. Garre, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; William K. Wilburn, Sara Beiro Farabow, SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER & GERALDSON, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Kevin J. Hasson, Eric W. Treene, Roman P. Storzer, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Jewish Congress, et al. Arthur B. Spitzer, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA, Washington, D.C.; Dwight H. Sullivan, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Curiae Unions.

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Widener joined. Judge Murnaghan wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Birgit Ehlers-Renzi and her husband, Vincent Renzi, Montgomery County, Maryland, homeowners who live across from a Roman Catholic school which is constructing improvements and additions to the school without obtaining a "special exception," challenge the constitutionality of Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance§ 59-G-2.19(c), which exempts such schools from the special exception requirement. The Renzis contend that the ordinance violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court, agreeing with the Renzis, declared the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoined the school from continuing construction, except to complete a parking lot and sediment pond, on which construction had already begun. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I

The Connelly School of the Holy Child, Inc. ("Connelly School") operates a non-profit, college-preparatory school for young women in grades 6 through 12, under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. In the school, according to its catalog,"Christian values are not only taught in the classroom but put into practice," and students are required to take religion courses and attend masses. Connelly School opened in 1961 and is situated on ten acres of land on Bradley Boulevard in Potomac, Maryland. The school and the land are owned by the Society of the Holy Child Jesus, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, which also operates under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. The school, which had an enrollment of 413 students during the 1999-2000 academic year, operates from a large main building, two modular classrooms located in trailers, and a home with an attached chapel. The property also includes athletic fields and parking lots.

After initiating a fund-raising campaign and hiring an architectural firm, Connelly School finalized plans to remove two existing structures, as well as the trailers, and to construct a 30,000 square-foot, two-story building to contain classrooms, a library, facilities for music and art programs, and other educational areas. The plans also provide for the construction of additional parking areas.

Before beginning construction, Connelly School informed neighboring landowners that it would not seek a special exception for its construction plans because § 59-G-2.19(c) of the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance") exempts from the special exception requirement parochial schools located on land owned or leased by a church or religious organization. After receiving that notice, the Renzis, who live across the street from Connelly School, requested that Montgomery County determine whether Connelly School was indeed exempt from the requirement to obtain a special exception. When the County ruled that Connelly School was exempt from the special exception requirement, the Renzis filed an administrative appeal with the Montgomery County Board of Appeals. They subsequently withdrew that appeal, however, and instead filed this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the exemption and the school's reliance on the exemption violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) violated the Establishment Clause. See Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Md. 1999). Applying the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the court determined that the exemption in the Zoning Ordinance did not have a secular legislative purpose, rejecting Connelly School's argument that it encouraged the private use of under-utilized public-school facilities, promoted education, and alleviated governmental interference with religion. The court reasoned that even if the exemption did minimize such interference, "that purpose would be constitutionally insufficient" because it is "wholly conjectural and does not relate to any identified risk of `significant' governmental interference with religious affairs." The district court also ruled that the exemption impermissibly advanced religion because it allowed religious schools to escape the density restrictions in the Zoning Ordinance that were applicable to secular schools and thereby more easily increase their enrollment and fulfill their financial obligations.

This appeal followed.

II

The Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance ordinarily requires private educational institutions and other nonresidential uses in residential areas to obtain a "special exception" before constructing improvements and additions, such as those planned by Connelly School. Zoning Ordinance § 59-C-1.31. To obtain a special exception, a private school is required to file a petition containing specified information, including a statement explaining "in detail how the special exception is proposed to be operated," and supported by a plat, drawings, and a site plan for the proposed construction. Id. §§ 59-A4.22(a), 59-G-2.19(b). The petition may be granted only after public notice and hearing, see id. § 59-A-4.41(a), during which residents may testify on the petition, and the Board of Appeals may grant a special exception petition only if it finds that the private school's use "will not constitute a nuisance"; that it will be "housed in buildings architecturally compatible with other buildings in the surrounding neighborhood"; that it will not "affect adversely or change the present character or future development of the surrounding residential community"; and that it "can and will be developed in conformity with" various specified requirements, id. § 59-G-2.19(a). The Zoning Ordinance provides, in addition, that the special exception use must be inspected annually for compliance with restrictions imposed in connection with the special exception, that the special exception holder must respond to any ongoing complaints of noncompliance, and that the special exception use is subject to revocation. See id. § 59-G1.3(a), (b), (e).

The requirement to obtain a special exception, however, does not apply to all nonresidential uses. In particular, Zoning Ordinance § 59G-2.19(c) provides the following exemption:

The requirements of this section shall not apply to the use of any lot, lots or tract of land for any private educational institution, or parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any church or religious organization, the government of the United States, the State of Maryland or any agency thereof, Montgomery County or any incorporated village or town within Montgomery County.

While Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) exempts from the special exception requirement private schools located on property owned or leased either by the national, state, or local government or by a church or religious organization, it is the portion exempting a "parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any church or religious organization" that the Renzis challenge as improperly establishing religion.

Connelly School argues that the exemption created by Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) represents an appropriate effort by Montgomery County to accommodate religion "by simply excusing religiously-affiliated entities from regulatory burdens placed on others." It maintains that the exemption's purpose is to alleviate government interference with the ability of religious organizations to fulfill their religious missions; that its effect is to"make it easier" for religious organizations to advance religion; and that it avoids the entanglement "that would follow from subjecting religious schools to the special exception process."

The Renzis contend, on the other hand, that Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) evinces no secular legislative purpose and that it does not "remove a burden from the free exercise of religion" as required for Connelly School's "`accommodation of religion' argument." They argue that the exemption also indirectly aids religion. While they acknowledge that such aid is permissible if it arises from a neutral and generally...