Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc.
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
| Citation | 7 A.3d 830 |
| Parties | Duane REOTT and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife, Appellants v. ASIA TREND, INC., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide, Appellees. Duane Reott and Patty Reott, v. Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide. Appeal of The Sportman's Guide. Duane Reott and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife, v. Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide. Appeal of Remington Arms Company, Inc. and RA Brands, LLC. Duane Reott and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife, v. Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide. Appeal of Asia Trend, Inc. |
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
Duane REOTT and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife, Appellants
v.
ASIA TREND, INC., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide, Appellees.
Duane Reott and Patty Reott,
v.
Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide.
Appeal of The Sportman's Guide.
Duane Reott and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife,
v.
Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide.
Appeal of Remington Arms Company, Inc. and RA Brands, LLC.
Duane Reott and Patty Reott, Husband and Wife,
v.
Asia Trend, Inc., Clam Corporation (As Successor-in-Interest to USL Outdoor Products, Inc.), USL Outdoor Products, Inc., Remington Arms Company, Inc., RA Brands, LLC and The Sportsman's Guide.
Appeal of Asia Trend, Inc.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued July 27, 2010.
Filed Sept. 21, 2010.
Reargument Denied Nov. 23, 2010.
David A. Neely, Pittsburgh, for Reott.
Philip J. Mohr, Winston-Salem, N.C., for Remington Arms and RA Brands.
Kate J. Fagan, Pittsburgh, for Sportsman Guide.
BEFORE: STEVENS, DONOHUE and OTT, JJ.
OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.:
Duane Reott ("Mr. Reott") and Patty Reott ("Mrs. Reott") (collectively, "the Reotts") appeal from the order entered on December 14, 2009, denying their motion for post-trial relief filed following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Asia Trend, Inc., Remington Arms Company and RA Brands, and The Sportsman's Guide (collectively, "Appellees"). After careful review, we reverse and remand for a new trial limited to damages.
The parties do not dispute the basic facts in this case. In January of 2003, Mr. Reott's brother, Douglas Reott ("Douglas"), ordered two identical Remington-branded tree stands from The Sportsman's Guide at Mr. Reott's request and gave them to Mr. Reott, who paid for them. Prior to September 25, 2005, Mr. Reott had used one of the tree stands numerous times, but had never taken the second one out of the box. On September 25, 2005, Mr. Reott went to the farm of his brother, Daniel Reott ("Daniel"), in Butler County, intending to install the second tree stand on a tree there. He assembled the tree stand in Daniel's house, then he and Daniel took it out into the woods. After they selected a suitable tree, Mr. Reott used a ladder stick to climb up about 20 to 25 feet and install the tree stand. He then cinched the locking strap to the tree trunk to secure the tree stand.
Mr. Reott then climbed onto the tree stand platform, and while bear hugging the tree he raised himself up on his toes and came down gently on his heels to take any remaining slack out of the locking strap, a maneuver he testified he had done hundreds of times and referred to as "setting the stand." On this occasion, however, the locking strap broke free and Mr. Reott fell to the ground, crushing one of
The Reotts brought suit against Appellees sounding in products liability, alleging that Mr. Reott's injuries were caused by a manufacturing defect in the tree stand. At trial, the Reotts produced an expert witness, David Bizzak, Ph.D. ("Dr. Bizzak"), who testified that the tree stand was rated for 300 pounds while Mr. Reott weighed only about 170 pounds. He further testified that Mr. Reott's motion of bobbing up and down on his heels to "set the stand" would have increased the amount of force on the tree stand by only about 10%, and that this force was "not a significant load as compared to the capacity of the stand." N.T., 8/25/09, at 33-34. Dr. Bizzak's expert testimony was uncontroverted.
After the Reotts rested, Appellees called no witnesses of their own, and only entered into evidence the tree stand's instruction manual and a video tape that came with it. The Reotts then moved for a directed verdict. In opposition, Appellees argued that the "setting" maneuver raised a question as to whether Mr. Reott's conduct was highly reckless. Appellees further argued that they did not have the burden of proving highly reckless conduct, and that as a result the issue of causation should go to the jury. The trial court granted the Reotts' motion for a directed verdict as to the defectiveness of the product, but declined to do so as to causation. On August 27, 2009, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. The Reotts filed a motion for post-trial relief asking for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"), and Appellees filed a motion for cross-post-trial relief on evidentiary issues. The trial court denied all of these post-trial motions.
Both the Reotts and Appellees filed timely appeals. The Reotts present three questions for our consideration:
I. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it granted a directed verdict in favor of [the Reotts] as to the defectiveness of the tree stand but refused to grant a directed verdict with respect to causation and, therefore, whether the trial court erred in not granting [the Reotts'] Motion for [JNOV] as raised in [the Reotts'] Motion for Post-Trial relief.
II. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it allowed Questions 1 and 2 on the verdict slip over the objection of counsel for [the Reotts] when these questions dealt with whether or not [Mr. Reott] failed to follow the instructions that came with the tree stand and, if so, whether said failure was a substantial cause of his injuries.
III. Did the trial court err when it allowed defense counsel to play a videotape which came with the tree stand when said videotape contained repeated instructions that one should always wear the safety harness that accompanied the tree stand. [Mr. Reott's] failure to wear the safety harness while installing the tree stand was, at most, negligence (even though [Mr. Reott] denies that he was negligent in not wearing the safety harness at the time the tree stand failed). However, negligence concepts are not permitted in an action based on
strict product liability, and the trial court had even granted [the Reotts'] Motion in Limine barring [Appellees] from introducing evidence of [Mr. Reott's] failure to wear the safety harness.Appellants' Brief at 3.
In their cross-appeals, Appellees raise a single issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in excluding proffered evidence that [Mr. Reott] failed to use the included safety harness at the time of the accident and failed to practice with the tree stand at ground level prior to installing it?Appellees' Briefs at 4.
We begin with the first issue raised by the Reotts, namely whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant them a directed verdict on causation when they rested their case or, in the alternative, in refusing to grant them JNOV after the verdict was entered. Id. Our standard of review for these two questions is well settled:
In reviewing a trial court's decision whether or not to grant judgment in favor of one of the parties, we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard[s] of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.
There are two bases upon which a judgment N.O.V. can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super.2006) (quoting Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d 75, 81-82 (Pa.Super.2004)).
The trial court denied the Reotts' motions for directed verdict and JNOV on causation based on its determination that in a products liability action the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff when a defendant introduces evidence of the plaintiff's alleged highly reckless conduct. This presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See, e.g., Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 982 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal granted in part on other grounds, 990 A.2d 724 (Pa.2010).
Before examining the trial court's ruling, it will be helpful first to review the relevant law on products liability: to state a products liability cause of action under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must prove two things: "(1) that the product was defective; and (2) that the defect was a substantial factor in causing the injury." Hadar v. AVCO Corp., 886 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)). A product is defective "when it is not safe for its intended use, i.e., the product left the supplier's control lacking any element
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