Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v. City of Walker
Decision Date | 22 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 3,Docket No. 5442--3,3 |
Citation | 17 Mich.App. 92,169 N.W.2d 175 |
Parties | REPUBLIC FRANKLIN INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. CITY OF WALKER, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. James M. MOORE and Hazel D. Moore, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF WALKER, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Thomas G. Vanden Bosch, Alexander S. Jarosz, Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Calvin R. Danhof, Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids, for appellee.
Before LEVIN, P.J., and DANHOF and HOLBROOK, JJ.
The plaintiffs James M. and Hazel Moore commenced one action and their liability insurer, Republic Franklin Insurance Company, a separate action against the defendant, City of Walker, in an effort to recover for personal injuries and property damage suffered in an automobile collision alleged to have been caused by the negligent driving of an automobile owned by the city and operated by one of its employees. The city's automobile collided with an automobile owned and operated by plaintiff James M. Moore.
The city moved for accelerated judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had not filed a written claim with the city clerk within 60 days after the date of the alleged injuries, as required by § 9.11 of the city's charter. 1
The trial judge entered an accelerated judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaints on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the charter provision. They appeal from that judgment.
The defendant's supplemental brief, filed after oral argument in our Court, concedes on the authority of Northrup v. City of Jackson (1935), 273 Mich. 20, 262 N.W. 641, that it may have been error to have granted the accelerated judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to file a claim with the city within 60 days after the accident. But, says the city, while Northrup held invalid a time limitation for giving notice to a municipality of a claim against it shorter than the applicable statute of limitations prescribed by State law, 2 a charter provision requiring presentment of claim as a precondition to commencement of suit was expressly approved in Northrup. Thus, says the city, while the 60-day requirement appears to be invalid, 3 the city may require, consistently with the Northrup decision, notice of claim before the commencement of suit. 4
Although the city's automobile was apparently engaged in a governmental function at the time it collided with Moore's automobile, since the enactment of P.A.1945, No. 127 (C.L.1948, § 691.151 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 9.1708(1))) no political subdivision, including a municipal corporation, of the State may resist a civil action brought to recover damages resulting from negligent operation by one of its employees of a motor vehicle owned by the political subdivision on the ground that it was engaged in a governmental function. 5
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1945 act was to make the liability of political subdivisions with regard to the operation of motor vehicles the same as their liability for undertaking a proprietary function and rely on the opinions in Borski v. City of Wakefield (1927), 239 Mich. 656, 215 N.W. 19, and Marks v. City of Battle Creek (1959), 358 Mich. 114, 99 N.W.2d 587, which declared that charter provisions requiring notice as a precondition to suit were invalid as to actions based upon injuries sustained as a result of the city's exercise of a proprietary function.
The recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Meredith v. City of Melvindale (1969), 381 Mich. 572, 165 N.W.2d 7, makes it unnecessary for us to decide the question so posed by the plaintiffs. In that case, as here, the defendant city conceded on the authority of Northrup that a charter provision requiring notice of injury was invalid insofar as it required that notice be given within 60 days of the accident. The question considered and decided by the Supreme Court in Meredith concerned the sufficiency of the notice actually given in that case. The charter provision in that case 6 parallels that of the city of Walker regarding the information required to be contained in the notice.
Two notices had been given prior to the commencement of suit in the Meredith case. The first notice, from the father of the injured plaintiff, stated simply that the child was participating in a supervised program at a school playground and was injured at a time when the supervisor was not on the premises, the father stating that he did not feel that the accident would have occurred had the supervisor been on the job when it happened. The injuries were described, and request was made for an appointment to discuss the matter. The second notice, a letter from plaintiff's attorney, makes reference to the accident and the nature of the injuries and stated that it was impossible to state all the witnesses to the accident other than the name of one person which was given.
The first notice did not state the names of any witnesses and neither notice was served upon the mayor or city clerk or any member of the common council as required by Melvindale's charter. Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court declared in Meredith that the (p. 581, 165 N.W.2d p. 12) 'two notices, taken together or considered individually, constitute substantial compliance with the charter requirement of notice to defendant city.'
The following notice was sent by an attorney for the plaintiffs in this case to the city of Walker:
'Jarosz & Garlington
'Attorneys at Law
'Grand Rapids, Michigan
'May 10, 1966
'City of Walker
4243 Remembrance Road
Walker, Michigan
'Attn: City Clerk
'Re: JAMES MOORE & REPUBLIC FRANKLIN INSURANCE CO. vs. CITY OF WALKER & RONALD D. VAN SWEDEN
'Gentlemen:
'This is to advise that we represent Mr. James Moore and the Republic Franklin Insurance Company, relative to any claim they may have for damages arising out of Mr. James Moore's automobile accident with you of your police cruisers on the above captioned date.
'As a result of said collision, Mr. Moore sustained serious personal injury, which has disabled him since his involvement in this collision. In addition, his automobile, 1965 Chevrolet, was extensively damaged, for which, the Republic Franklin Insurance Company, pursuant to the terms of their policy paid $890.42 toward its repair.
'Our investigation discloses our clients' damages were sustained as a result of the negligent operation of the City's vehicle driven by Officer Ronald Van Sweden. On the basis of the liability thus established, claim is hereby made on behalf of Mr. Moore against the City of Walker in the amount of $30,000.00. In addition, claim is made herewith on behalf of Republic Franklin Insurance Company in the amount of their subrogated interests of $890.42. We should appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience regarding your intention to honor said claims and we shall be guided accordingly.
'Sincerely yours,
'Alexander S. Jarosz'
We note that the notice so given the city of Walker did not state the place where the collision occurred. Under the circumstances that cannot be regarded as a fatal defect. Doubtless few of the defendant city's police cruisers were involved in collisions in the month of May, 1965, and it is most unlikely that more than one was involved in a collision on May 24, 1965. The notice stated the name of the officer operating the cruiser at the time of the accident.
We are persuaded that the notice given in this case constituted substantial compliance with Walker's charter requirements and so hold on the authority of Meredith.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
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