Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Luster
| Citation | 192 Ala. 501,68 So. 358 |
| Decision Date | 15 April 1915 |
| Docket Number | 22 |
| Parties | REPUBLIC IRON & STEEL CO. v. LUSTER. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Appeal from City Court of Bessemer; J.C.B. Gwin, Judge.
Action by John Luster against the Republic Iron & Steel Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Transferred from the Court of Appeals under section 6, p. 449, Acts 1911.
Count A is as follows:
Plaintiff claims of defendant *** as damages for that *** defendant owned and operated an ore mine near, *** and on said date that plaintiff was rightfully at work in said mine assisting one John Goode, who was employed by defendant to mine ore in said mine; the plaintiff being employed by said Goode to assist in and about the work of mining ore therein and he avers that, while he was so engaged in the discharge of his duties in said mine, a chain broke which was used in and about the business of mining ore therein, and which chain was provided by defendant, and as a proximate consequence thereof the plaintiff was cut, bruised, scarred, lacerated and contused in his legs, hands, arms, and other parts of his body, one of his legs was badly crippled, he was injured in his breast, made sore and sick, lost a great deal of time from his work, suffered great mental and physical pain and anguish, and that his health and physical stamina were permanently injured, and he is permanently disabled; hence this suit. Plaintiff avers that he was injured on the occasion aforesaid and suffered said injuries and damage by reason and as a proximate consequence of the negligence of defendant in failing to exercise reasonable skill and care in providing a reasonably safe chain for use in said mine, as it was its duty to do.
Percy Benners & Burr, of Birmingham, for appellant.
Mathews & Mathews, of Bessemer, for appellee.
This case went to the jury on count A of the complaint, demurrer to which was overruled. The count, as a sufficient statement of a cause of action, finds support in Sloss-Sheffield Co. v. Stewart, 172 Ala. 516, 55 So. 785, where the same general averments of duty under similar circumstances was upheld. Plaintiff does not declare as an employé of defendant. His averment is that he was rightfully on the premises of defendant as an employé of one Goode, who was employed by defendant to operate the mine. Plaintiff stood to defendant in the relation of an invitee upon defendant's premises to whom, in general, defendant owed only the duty of ordinary care and prudence to keep the premises under its control reasonably safe. T.C.I. Co. v. Burgess, 158 Ala. 519, 47 So. 1029; Lookout Mountain Iron Co. v Lea, 144 Ala. 169, 39 So. 1017. Or, as Cooley, C.J., states the doctrine in Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N.W. 257, 51 Am.Rep. 154:
"A person giving such a license, especially when he gives it wholly or in part for his own interest as was the case here, and thereby invites others to come upon his premises, assumes to all who accept the invitation the duty to warn them of any danger in coming, which he knows of, or ought to know of, and of which they are unaware." Bright v. Barnett Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418, 26 L.R.A. 524.
The chain was an instrumentality rather than a place, and it would ordinarily be assumed against the pleader that it was furnished to plaintiff's employer, not directly to plaintiff, in which case without more, as we shall see, the responsibility of plaintiff's employer stood between plaintiff and defendant. But defendant may have assumed, by convention or by implication arising out of its practice in the premises, to care for the condition of the chain in use, and, if so, it assumed the duty of ordinary diligence in that regard; and to the averment of such responsibility the general language of the complaint, it seems, has been held sufficient.
The case was tried upon the count considered above and defendant's general denial. There was judgment for the plaintiff.
On the evidence defendant, appellant, contends that plaintiff's employer, Goode, was an independent...
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