Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. The State

Citation66 N.E. 1005,160 Ind. 379
Decision Date08 April 1903
Docket Number19,785
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
PartiesRepublic Iron & Steel Company v. The State

From Delaware Circuit Court; J. G. Leffler, Judge.

Action by the State against the Republic Iron & Steel Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

S. N Chambers, S. O. Pickens, C. W. Moores, J. W. Ryan, W. A Thompson, F. C. Olive and R. F. Davidson, for appellant.

W. L Taylor, Attorney-General, Merrill Moores, C. C. Hadley and E. D. Salsbury, for State.

OPINION

Hadley, C. J.

Action in the name of the State to recover wages and a penalty under the provisions of §§ 1, 2 of the act approved February 28, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 193) commonly known as the weekly wage law.

It is averred in the complaint that the defendant, the Republic Iron & Steel Company, is a corporation engaged in operating a manufacturing plant at Muncie, Indiana, and employs therein a large number of persons to labor for hire; that the defendant is not a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce; that on the 1st day of February, 1900, and prior thereto, William Haverstick was engaged by the defendant to work in said plant; that on the 10th day of February, 1900, the defendant paid Haverstick for his services rendered up to and including the 31st day of January, 1900, but reserved and held back the wages due him for services rendered during the first ten days of February, 1900; that on the 17th day of February, 1900, the defendant was indebted to Haverstick for labor performed, in the sum of $ 96.95, which service is set forth in a bill of particulars filed as a part of the complaint; that subsequent to the 1st day of February, 1900, Haverstick was never absent from his regular place of labor in said plant at any time of stated payment of wages fixed by the defendant; that Haverstick was present at his regular place of labor on the 17th day of February, ready and willing to receive the wages due to him, and there was due him on said day said amount of $ 96.95, and which remains unpaid; that although the laws of the State of Indiana require the defendant to pay its employes each week all that is due, save only the right to withhold from an employe compensation for services for six days, said defendant wrongfully and unlawfully failed, neglected, and refused to comply with said laws, and to pay Haverstick each week what was due him. Prayer for judgment for Haverstick for amount due, with six per centum thereon, and for the State a judgment equal to fifty per centum of the unpaid wages. Appellant's demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and a proper exception reserved. Upon issues joined, there was a trial by the court, and a finding and judgment for the plaintiff for $ 48.45 for the use of the common schools, assessed against the defendant as a penalty on the amount due and unpaid Haverstick when the suit was commenced, and for all costs.

Appellant's assault upon the complaint questions the constitutional validity of the statute upon which the action is founded. It is conceded that the evidence supports the essential averments of the complaint, and is sufficient to entitle appellee to a recovery, if the statute in question is valid. The preamble and three material sections of the act follow: "An act providing for the weekly payment of wages due employes, making it unlawful for an employer to assess a fine against the wages of an employe, and regulating changes in rate of wages, prohibiting the assignment of future wages; providing for its enforcement and repealing all laws in conflict therewith. [Approved February 28, 1899.] Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, that every person, company, corporation or association employing any person to labor, or in any other service for hire, shall make weekly payments for the full amount due for such labor or service, in lawful money of the United States to within six days or less of the time of such payment; but if, at any time of stated payment, any employe as aforesaid shall be absent from his regular place of labor or service, he shall be paid in like manner thereafter on demand: Provided, that this act shall not apply to any employe engaged by a common carrier in interstate commerce: And provided, that the labor commissioners of the State, after notice and hearing, may exempt any of the aforesaid parties whose employes prefer a less frequent payment, from paying any of its employes weekly, if, in the opinion of the said commissioners, the interests of the public and of such employes will not suffer thereby. Section 2. The chief inspector of the department of inspection of this State, or any person interested, may bring suit in the name of the State in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the prosecuting attorney of any county wherein such suit is brought, shall prosecute the same against any person, company, corporation or association that neglects or refuses to comply with § 1 of this act, within ten days after such payment is due and left unpaid; and in case judgment is rendered in favor of said employe and against said defendant for the sum alleged to be due or any part thereof, six per centum of such sum shall be added to such judgment from the time when payment was due; and a penalty of fifty per centum of the amount of such judgment shall be assessed and collected from said defendant by said court and paid into the school fund of the State." "Section 6. It is hereby made the duty of the chief inspector and of the department of inspection to enforce the provisions of this act by the processes of the courts, and in the name of the State; and, upon their failure so to do, any citizen of the State is hereby authorized to do the same in the name of the State." Acts 1899, p. 193.

The amount of wages due Haverstick at the commencement of this suit, to wit, $ 96.95, having been subsequently, and before trial, fully paid, the judgment rendered was limited to an imposition of the fifty per centum penalty provided for by § 2 of the act. Hence, from the state of the record no other question is properly presented by the appeal than the validity of said sections.

1. It is first submitted that, because the title of the act makes no mention of penalties for the violation of its provisions, the penalty clause of § 2, supra, is void under article 4, § 19, of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title." The evident purpose in requiring a title to a legislative proposition was thereby to convey notice of the general subject to be affected to those who are called on to act upon it, and thus to prevent deception by the blending of incongruous subjects in the same act. It is only necessary that the general subject of the act be expressed--that is, be indicated--by the title. It is not essential that the means and methods provided in the act for the securing of intended results and ends shall be set forth in the title. The Constitution is satisfied if the constituent means embraced in the body of the act have a proper relation to each other and to the subject expressed in the title, and are consistent in tending to carry forward and to accomplish the general purpose indicated by the title and intended by the legislation. Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 87 Am. St. 228, 62 N.E. 40; Lewis v. State, 148 Ind. 346, 47 N.E. 675; Benson v. Christian, 129 Ind. 535, 29 N.E. 26; City of Indianapolis v. Huegele, 115 Ind. 581, 18 N.E. 172.

No act of the legislature can be made effective without some reasonable provision for its enforcement, and the assessment of a penalty for noncompliance has long and many times been recognized by the General Assembly and the courts of this State as an efficient and reasonable means of securing obedience. The subject of the act in question is "to provide for the weekly payment of wages due," and to secure performance of the duty thus imposed upon employers, a penalty is provided for nonperformance. The penalty provision of § 2, supra, is, therefore, not only connected with and germane to the subject of the act, but calculated to be an effective means in accomplishing the purpose indicated by the title. Hence the provision is not within the evil intended by the Constitution to be excluded.

2. It is not necessary to a disposition of the case that we determine whether appellant, being arraigned on a state statute, can demand protection of its liberty and property under the fifth amendment of the federal Constitution (see Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U.S. 490, 37 L.Ed. 252, 13 S.Ct. 594 S.Ct. [160 Ind. 384] 394, 37 L.Ed. 252; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 at 366-382, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780; State v. Boswell, 104 Ind. 541, 4 N.E. 675; Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378, 382), or whether, being a corporation, the right to sue and be sued, so invests it with citizenship as to entitle it to invoke the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution against an abridgement of its privileges and immunities. See Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 19 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.Ed. 552; Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co., 136 Mo. 382, 396, 38 S.W. 85, 58 Am. St. 638, 35 L. R. A. 227.

It is not denied that appellant, though a corporation, is a person, within the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States, and as such may demand that its liberty and property be safeguarded under the last two clauses of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, which declares, "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

It is furthermore conceded that appellant...

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    ...160 Ind. 37966 N.E. 1005REPUBLIC IRON & STEEL CO.v.STATE.Supreme Court of Indiana.April 8, Appeal from Circuit Court, Delaware County; Jos. G. Leffler, Judge. Action by the state of Indiana against the Republic Iron & Steel Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. ......
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