Republic of Hawaii v. Saku Tokuji

• Decision Date: 15 October 1894
• Citation: Republic of Hawaii v. Saku Tokuji, 9 Haw. 548 (Haw. 1894)
• Parties: REPUBLIC OF HAWAII v. SAKU TOKUJI.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

9 Haw. 548

REPUBLIC OF HAWAII v. SAKU TOKUJI.

Supreme Court of Republic of Hawai'i.

October 15, 1894

HEARING SEPTEMBER 27, 1894.

EXCRETIONS.

Syllabus by the Court

Circuit courts may grant new trials in criminal cases.

Verdict held supported by evidence of an extra-judicial confession corroborated by proof of the corpus delicti.

Evidence that a witness had previously lived under a different name is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of discrediting him.

A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence should be filed within ten days of the trial.

A new trial should not be granted merely because a witness for the prosecution stated afterwards that his testimony was false especially if there is no reason to believe that a new trial would result differently.

A. G. M. Robertson, Deputy Attorney-General, for the prosecution.

V. V. Ashford and W. A. Kinney, for defendant.

JUDD C.J., BICKERTON AND FREAR, JJ.

OPINION

FREAR, J.

This case comes here from the Second Circuit on defendant's exceptions to the overruling of his two motions for a new trial, he having been found guilty, by a unanimous verdict, of maliciously burning a field of cane.

Before argument on the merits it was moved for the prosecution that the exceptions be dismissed, on the ground that the circuit courts have no jurisdiction to entertain motions for new trials in criminal cases.

Such was the ruling of this Court in 1869 in The King vs. Cornwell, 3 Haw. 154, The King vs. Kaona, Ib., 118, and The King vs. Apuna, Ib., 166, and when after a uniform practice for twenty years in pursuance of those decisions, the question was again raised, the same court, though consisting of an entirely different personnel, followed the earlier cases in The King vs. Reeve, 7 Haw. 313, 336, and The King vs. Akana, Ib., 549. This practice was adhered to until the Act to Re-organize the Judiciary Department went into effect, January 1, 1893, since when, until the present time, although the practice was not expressly altered by that Act, the Circuit Judges have, we believe, entertained such motions whenever presented, and exceptions to their rulings thereon have been considered by this Court, without so much as a doubt having been suggested as to the propriety of doing so.

We do not feel at liberty to overrule the former decisions, although the reasoning upon which they were founded is not altogether satisfactory. They were not contrary to any express statute, and the court was then, as it is not now, free to disregard the common law, and to base its decisions, as it no doubt did largely in those cases, upon considerations of expediency and convenience in view of the then existing conditions.

But we are of the opinion that under the Judiciary Act of 1892, the circuit courts are courts of general and unlimited jurisdiction clothed with the powers inherent in such courts, one of which powers is that of granting new trials. Bartling vs. Jamison, 44 Mo. 141; Commonwealth vs. McElhaney, 111 Mass. 439.

In the leading case of The King vs. Cornwell, the court avoided passing in direct terms upon the question whether the circuit court had " general and unlimited jurisdiction in cases cognizable before them, " but it did hold that " their jurisdiction is precisely and fully defined in the statutes, " and that they had no right to hear motions for new trials in criminal cases, because such right was not " expressly granted" to them, thereby implying that they were not courts of general jurisdiction, which require no grant of such power. It was further held that the Supreme Court, although not the court holding the trial, and not expressly given the power by statute, might nevertheless grant new trials in such cases under its statutory " general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction." It is clear that the circuit courts were then regarded as, at least for some purposes, courts of inferior jurisdiction.

The Judiciary Act above referred to undoubtedly wrought a great change in the character of such courts. Prior to that Act the Supreme Court was a court of original as well as appellate jurisdiction. All the Justices thereof might sit together even in jury cases, and did in fact so sit until the year in which the Cornwell case was decided, since which time, except for a number of years in capital cases, it has, when sitting as a court of original jurisdiction, been presided over by a single Justice. When so sitting it was regarded as a court of unlimited jurisdiction (the only such court on this island) and as such exercised the power of granting new trials in criminal cases. The Circuit Court on this island had been abolished in 1864, and the office of Circuit Judge, who then had only limited appellate jurisdiction in chambers, was also abolished in 1874. On the other islands, the circuit courts were presided over by a Justice of the Supreme Court sitting with or without a Circuit Judge. Their jurisdiction was limited to some extent, though not so much so as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Judge when sitting alone in chambers. For instance, the circuit courts could not enforce maritime liens and hypothecations, or try suits against the Government. Their jurisdiction when first established was more limited than at the date of the Cornwell case. Until 1860, for instance, they could not try capital cases. The Supreme Court when sitting as an appellate court sat in banco and heard exceptions from the supreme and circuit courts...