Republic Steel Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Petrisek)

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Before NIX, C.J., FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE, JJ., and MONTEMURO; CAPPY; PAPADAKOS; MONTEMURO; PAPADAKOS
• Citation: 640 A.2d 1266,537 Pa. 32
• Parties: REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (PETRISEK), Appellee.
• Decision Date: 27 May 1994

Page 1266

640 A.2d 1266 537 Pa. 32 REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant,
v.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (PETRISEK), Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted Sept. 21, 1993.
Decided April 22, 1994.
Reargument Denied May 27, 1994.

Page 1267

[537 Pa. 33] James M. Poerio, Christopher Pierson, Davies, McFarland & Carroll, P.C., Pittsburgh, for appellant.

John J. Bagnato, Spence, Custer, Saylor, Wolfe & Rose, Johnstown, PA, for amicus curiae, Barnes & Tucker and Pennsylvania Mines.

Jean Zeigler & Debra L. Henry, United Mine Workers Ass'n Dist. 5, Belle Vernon, PA, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE, JJ., and MONTEMURO, Senior Justice.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether a claimant who has voluntarily retired from the work place is entitled to receive benefits for an occupational disease claim under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1--1031. For the reasons that follow we find that a claimant who has voluntarily retired is not entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter the "Act").

This matter commenced on May 2, 1988 when the claimant filed an Employee's Claim Petition for Compensation under the Act. At the time he filed the Petition the claimant was 68 years of age. Claimant had worked in the coal mining industry in Pennsylvania from 1939 until March of 1981. Claimant had worked for the appellant, employer, from 1955 until he [537 Pa. 34] retired on March 26, 1981. The claimant learned that he was totally disabled as a result of coal worker's pneumoconiosis on May 20, 1985.

Hearings were held pursuant to the claimant's petition. Based upon the following findings of fact the referee rendered his decision awarding benefits to the claimant on March 21, 1989. The referee found that claimant had promptly given notice to the respondent of his disability claim on July 23, 1985. After receiving all the testimony the referee concluded that the medical testimony of claimant's expert was more persuasive and credible than that of the employer's expert. Thus, the referee concluded that the claimant was permanently disabled due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis and that his disability had resulted from his employment within the coal industry in Pennsylvania. Further, the referee found that the claimant's disability had occurred within 300 weeks of his last employment within the coal industry, where he was exposed to the hazards of the disease.

Page 1268

The decision of the referee was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the order of the Board. This Court granted the employer's Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 533 Pa. 615, 618 A.2d 404.

The standard of review of this Court on an appeal of an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is limited to determining whether a constitutional violation, an error of law or a violation of Board procedure has occurred and, whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments, 526 Pa. 25, 584 A.2d 301 (1990).

The employer contends that, as the claimant has voluntarily retired, and at the time he became totally disabled had no intention of returning to the work force, he has suffered no wage loss and is not entitled to benefits under the Act. The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument on the basis that the claimant did not unequivocally indicate that he had no plans to re-enter the work force, and further found that the [537 Pa. 35] employer had failed to establish the availability of suitable work. That Court then concluded that the claimant's retirement status would not preclude him from receiving benefits under the Act.

We disagree with the Commonwealth Court's characterization of the facts. First, the claimant unequivocally stated on direct examination that he was retired. The referee found as a fact that the claimant had retired as of March, 1981. In addition, the claimant was 68 years of age in 1988. After 42 years in the coal mining industry it is highly unlikely that the claimant intended to re-enter the work force. Second, focusing on the employer's failure to show available work begs the question when the claimant clearly admits voluntary retirement from the work force. Given these facts, the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that retirement is not a bar to receiving benefits under the Act was improper.

The fact that the claimant is disabled in a manner which is compensable under the Act is only one aspect of establishing entitlement to benefits under the Act. In Pennsylvania, disability under the Act has always been synonymous with loss of earning power. Kachinski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987); Petrone v. Moffat Coal Company, 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967); Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 377 Pa. 7, 104 A.2d 104 (1954); Woodward v. Pittsburgh Engineering and Construction Co., 293 Pa. 338, 143 A. 21 (1928).

In Unora this Court discussed the importance of establishing both the medical and the economic aspects of a disability claim in order to ascertain entitlement to benefits under the Act.

[T]he disability concept is a blend of...