Republic Techs. (NA) v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 16 C 3401 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | REPUBLIC TECHNOLOGIES (NA), LLC, AND REPUBLIC TOBACCO, L.P., Plaintiffs, v. BBK TOBACCO & FOODS, LLP D/B/A HBI INTERNATIONAL, Defendant. |
Plaintiffs Republic Technologies (NA), LLC and Republic Tobacco, L.P. (“Republic”) brought this action against Defendant BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLB (“HBI”) in 2016. The parties went to trial in June 2021 and have various post-trial motions pending. Now before the Court is HBI's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). R. 820. That motion is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a party to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law previously made under Rule 50(a). Under Rule 50(a), a court should grant judgment as a matter of law against a party if the party “has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). When determining whether a legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists, the Court considers whether “the evidence as a whole, when combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drafted from that evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of” the non-moving party. Hall v. Forest River Inc., 536 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
A jury trial was held in this case beginning on June 9, 2021. Before the jury deliberated, the parties had a jury instructions conference that extended over a period of two days. Relevant to this motion, HBI proposed, and the Court agreed, as to Republic's false advertising claim under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IUDTPA”), to instruct the jury that it had to find HBI's false advertising occurred “primarily and substantially” in Illinois in order to find HBI liable. In the same instruction, the Court provided the jury with factors it could consider in determining whether the alleged conduct occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois, which include factors beyond just where the advertising occurred.[1] The parties agreed to include those factors. The same “primarily and substantially” language was included in the jury instruction for Republic's common-law unfair competition claim.
The jury returned a verdict on June 25, 2021. The jury found in favor of Republic on its IUDTPA false advertising claim and Illinois unfair competition claims. In finding for Republic on these claims, the jury necessarily found HBI's false advertising occurred “primarily and substantially” in Illinois, based on the agreed-upon instruction. The jury then found for HBI on its copyright infringement and trade dress infringement claims, as well as on Republic's federal Lanham Act claim.
Both sides moved for judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The Court did not rule on those motions before the verdict was reached. The Rule 50(a) motions were recently denied as moot, as Rule 50(b) motions and other post-trial motions were filed by the parties, where the same arguments were made, which reflected the jury verdict. The Court has considered all arguments made in HBI's 50(a) motion in its determination of HBI's 50(b) motion.
Neither party argues that the jury was improperly instructed in this case. Rather, HBI argues, despite the jury's finding, there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict against HBI on the IUDTPA claim. This is so, HBI argues, because Republic did not prove that the false advertising occurred “primarily and substantially” in Illinois, a required element of the claim. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 216 Ill.2d 100, 186-87 (2005). HBI argues the Court should vacate the jury's verdict for Republic on this basis. HBI properly preserved this issue by raising it in its Rule 50(a) motion and at the jury instruction conference. See R. 782 at 15, n.4; Tr. Trans. 2065-2069.
In Avery, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (“ICFA”) allows for a private cause of action by an injured plaintiff “if the circumstances that relate to the disputed transaction occur primarily and substantially in Illinois.” 216 Ill.2d at 187. The Court held that there is no single formula or bright-line test for determining when a transaction occurs primarily and substantially within Illinois, and that each case must be decided on its own facts. Id. Factors considered include the plaintiff's residence, where the deception occurred, where the damage to the plaintiff occurred, and whether the plaintiff communicated with the defendant or its agents in Illinois. Id. at 187-190.[2]
The Avery analysis has been applied to other Illinois statutory actions, including the IUDTPA. See LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 809 F.Supp.2d 857, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In LG, the plaintiff brought suit against Whirlpool alleging false advertising in violation of the IUDTPA. Whirlpool conducted business in Illinois via an extensive relationship with Kenmore, which was headquartered in Hoffman Estate, Illinois. Id. at 861. The jury found for LG, but the court granted Whirlpool's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 858. The court, after determining that the “primarily and substantially” standard in Avery applied to claims under the IUDTPA, granted Whirlpool's motion based on a finding that LG exclusively offered evidence of nationwide, as opposed to Illinois-specific, conduct. Id. at 861-62. | Specifically, the court used the Avery factors to guide its analysis: (i) the plaintiff's residence; (ii) where the deception occurred; (iii) where the damage to plaintiff occurred; and (iv) whether the plaintiff communicated with defendants or its agents in Illinois. Id. at 861 (citing Avery, 216 Ill.2d at 187-190). See also Morrison v. YTB Intern, Inc., 649 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011). In support of its IUDTPA claim, LG showed that Whirlpool conducted business in Illinois with Kenmore and Whirlpool sold dryers in Illinois. LG, 809 F.Supp.2d at 861. The court held, under Avery, this evidence did not demonstrate that Whirlpool's challenged advertising occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois.
The Court agrees with the LG Court that the “primarily and substantially” standard applies to IUDTPA claims. With regard to Republic's IUDTPA false advertising claim, HBI argues LG is on point. But there are important distinctions.
First, the plaintiff in LG was not an Illinois resident, and thus the court did not consider whether damages could have occurred in Illinois had Whirlpool been Illinois-based. Republic is an Illinois entity. Courts in this district have found that when the plaintiff resides in Illinois, damages are often suffered in Illinois. See, e.g., Greenlight Int'l, LLC v. Kent, 2018 WL 4384298, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2018) (); Specht v. Google, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 858, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ().
Further, as Republic points out, the jury in LG was not instructed that it had to find the conduct occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois in order to find Whirlpool liable under the IUDTPA. R. 875 at 3, n.2. Here, however, the jury was instructed exactly that. In particular, the jury was instructed that as to the IUDTPA claim, Republic needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the challenged advertising occurred primarily and substantially within the State of Illinois.” Tr. Trans. 2476. The jury was then instructed that it could consider the following factors to determine whether the alleged conduct occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois: “(1) the plaintiff's residence; (2) where the deception occurred; (3) where the damage to plaintiff occurred; and (4) whether plaintiff communicated with defendants or its agents in Illinois.” Id. Both parties agreed on this language. There is no reason to believe the jury did not consider these factors in making its determination, and HBI essentially ignores the fact that the jury was so instructed.
Turning to the Avery test, the Court finds there was enough evidence for the jury in this case to find in favor of Republic on its IUDTPA claim. Taking the first factor, the plaintiff's residence-Republic is an Illinois entity. The Court gives weight to Republic's place of business, and HBI does not cite any authority where an Illinois-based plaintiff was unable to satisfy the “primarily and substantially” test. As for the second factor (where the deception occurred), Republic alleged, and the evidence showed, that HBI's false advertising claims occurred nationwide, including in Illinois. Third, Republic suffered injury in Illinois, where it contended and proved it lost sales as a result of HBI's deceptive practices. R. 875 at 8. And fourth, because Republic is Illinois-based, the jury clearly had sufficient evidence to determine that communications between Republic and HBI occurred, at least in part, in Illinois. The evidence as a whole, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drafted from that evidence, was sufficient for the jury to find...
To continue reading
Request your trial