republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n
| Decision Date | 26 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 08-1953 (BMK)(RJL)(RMC). |
| Citation | 698 F.Supp.2d 150 |
| Parties | REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, California Republican Party, Republican Party of San Die go County, and Michael Steele, Plaintiffs,v.FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant,Democratic National Committee and Representative Christopher Van Hollen, Jr., Intervenors. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
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James Bopp, Jr., Kaylan L. Phillips, Richard E. Coleson, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, IN, Charles H. Bell, Jr., Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, L.L.P., Sacramento, CA, Bobby Roy Burchfield, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Adav Noti, David Brett Kolker, Kevin Deeley, Federal Election Commission, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Donald Jay Simon, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP, Francesco Valentini, Randolph D. Moss, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP, Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, Marc Erik Elias, Andrew H. Werbrock, Perkins Coie, LLP, Washington, DC, Joseph Gerald Hebert, Alexandria, VA, Monica Youn, Sidney Samuel Rosdeitcher, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, NY, for Intervenors.
Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge; LEON, District Judge; and COLLYER, District Judge.
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence establishes several principles regarding the regulation of campaign finance. First, Congress may impose some limits on contributions to federal candidates and political parties because of the quid pro quo corruption or appearance of quid pro quo corruption that can be associated with such contributions. Second, Congress may not limit expenditures by candidates and political parties. And third, Congress may not limit non-connected entities-including individuals, unincorporated associations, non-profit organizations, labor unions, and for-profit corporations-from spending or raising money to support the election or defeat of candidates. See Citizens United v. FEC, ---U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 876, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2010); Davis v. FEC, ---U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); EMILY's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2009).1
This case involves regulation in the first category-in this instance, statutory limits on contributions to political parties.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, known as BCRA, limits contributions to national, state, and local political parties. With respect to national political parties, BCRA's limits apply regardless of how a national party might want to use the money-for example, even if the party wishes to use the money to fund issue ads or state and local election activities. BCRA's limits on contributions to political parties are known as the soft-money bans. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld those provisions against a facial First Amendment challenge. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619.
Here, the Republican National Committee, the California Republican Party, the Republican Party of San Die go County, and the RNC Chairman bring a number of as-applied challenges to BCRA's restrictions on political-party fundraising. We conclude that plaintiffs' claims conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United did not disturb McConnell's holding with respect to the constitutionality of BCRA's limits on contributions to political parties. See 130 S.Ct. at 910-11 ( ) (citations omitted). As a lower court, we do not possess the authority to clarify or refine McConnell in the manner suggested by plaintiffs. We therefore GRANT the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment, DENY plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and DISMISS AS MOOT the Federal Election Commission's motion to dismiss.
We begin by briefly summarizing the challenged provisions of BCRA, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
Congress has long imposed source and amount limits on contributions to federal candidates. Congress also has long limited contributions to political parties to the extent the contributions are made for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, sec. 112(2), § 320(a)(1), 90 Stat. 475, 487 (); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (); id. at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 ().
Before enactment of BCRA in 2002, federal law permitted national political parties to accept and use large, unlimited contributions-referred to as “soft-money” contributions-to help fund issue ads, purely state and local election activities, and mixed-purpose activities (for example, get-out-the-vote and voter registration in years when federal, state, and local candidates are all on the ballot). Some of those activities by the national parties could simultaneously influence federal elections even though they did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a federal candidate. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-24, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003).
Congress enacted BCRA in part to plug this “soft-money loophole” that had “enabled parties and candidates to circumvent ... limitations on the source and amount of contributions [made] in connection with federal elections.” Id. at 126, 133, 124 S.Ct. 619. Among other changes, BCRA added § 323(a) and (b) to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
Section 323(a) applies to national political parties, as well as to officers or agents acting on their behalf. Under § 323(a), national parties may not solicit, receive, direct, or spend contributions over $30,400 annually from an individual donor, regardless of whether the national party might want to spend some of its money on non-federal-election activity such as issue ads or state and local activities. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a); see id. § 441a(a)(1)(B); Price Index Increases for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 74 Fed.Reg. 7435, 7437 (Feb. 17, 2009).
In part to prevent circumvention of the limits on contributions to national parties, § 323(b) limits contributions to state and local political parties. The goal was to prevent unlimited donations to state and local party committees that those committees would then use to support the election or defeat of a federal candidate. Under § 323(b), with certain exceptions not at issue here, state, district, and local parties may not use any contributions over $10,000 received from an individual donor in a calendar year for any “Federal election activity.” 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b); see id. § 441a(a)(1)(C). As relevant here, federal election activity under § 323(b) includes (1) any “voter registration activity” that occurs in the 120 days before a federal election; (2) any “voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign activity” that is conducted “in connection with” an election in which a federal candidate appears on the ballot; and (3) any “public communication” that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a clearly identified federal candidate. Id. § 431(20)(A)(i)-(iii). “Generic campaign activity” means activity that promotes a political party without promoting any specific candidate. Id. § 431(21). The provision applies to state and local political parties, as well as to officers or agents acting on their behalf.
Shortly after BCRA took effect in March 2002, a number of groups and individuals, including some of the parties here (the Republican National Committee and the California Republican Party), filed suit challenging the constitutionality of § 323 and other provisions of BCRA. The Supreme Court upheld § 323 in its entirety against a facial First Amendment challenge. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133-85, 124 S.Ct. 619.
The plaintiffs in this suit are the Republican National Committee, a national party committee subject to § 323(a); the California Republican Party, a state party committee subject to § 323(b); the Republican Party of San Die go County, a local party committee subject to § 323(b); and Michael Steele, the Chairman of the RNC, who is subject in his official capacity to the solicitation restrictions of § 323(a). See Amended Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 11-14.2 The defendant is the Federal Election Commission. Intervenors in support of the defendant are the Democratic National Committee and Representative Christopher Van Hollen, the Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.
The RNC produced evidence that it seeks to raise and spend unlimited soft money in order to (1) support state candidates in elections where only state candidates appear on the ballot; (2) support state candidates in elections where both state and federal candidates appear on the ballot; (3) support state parties' redistricting efforts following the 2010 census; (4) support “grassroots lobbying efforts” aimed at educating and mobilizing voters around “legislation and issues”; (5) pay the fees and expenses attributable to this case and “other litigation not involving federal elections”; and (6) pay maintenance and upkeep expenses associated with...
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