Reshard v. Stevenson
| Docket Number | Civil Action TDC-21-1135 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Parties | CONNIE RESHARD, Plaintiff, v. BARBARA J. STEVENSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Connie Reshard, a self-represented attorney, has filed this civil action against Barbara Stevenson, who is also self-represented, in which she asserts claims related to a years-long dispute arising from Reshard's rental and occupancy from 2004 to 2018 of a Washington, D.C. condominium unit owned by Stevenson. Pending before the Court is Stevenson's Motion to Dismiss. The Motion is fully briefed, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED.
On May 3, 2004, Reshard entered into a lease agreement with Stevenson for 1435 4th Street, S.W., Unit B714, in Washington, D.C. (“the Unit”). In 2011, the lease became a month-to-month tenancy. As relevant to the current action, Reshard asserts that throughout the lease period Stevenson failed to make or facilitate timely repairs related to water damage. As a result, Reshard withheld rent payments beginning in November 2014.
' On April 3, 2015, Stevenson filed an eviction case in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”) based on non-payment of rent (“the First Eviction Action”). Reshard filed a counterclaim for a rent abatement based on an alleged reduction in services and facilities. After trial was held on March 30 and 31, 2016, the court granted judgment in favor of Stevenson and required Reshard to pay the full amount of unpaid rent and late fees, with no abatement.
In April 2017, Reshard again withheld rent based on some prior repair issues and a new repair issue that arose in 2016. On June 7, 2017, Stevenson filed a second eviction case in the D.C. Superior Court for non-payment of rent (“the Second Eviction Action”). On June 20, 2017, Stevenson attempted to serve Reshard with a 90-Day Notice to Vacate for Personal Use and Occupancy, a step in the process of securing an order that Reshard move out of the Unit so that the owner, Stevenson, could move into the Unit herself. This 90-Day Notice was invalidated on September 11, 2017 because Stevenson did not comply with the proper service rules. On or before the September 26, 2017 trial date, Reshard paid all rent owed, and the court dismissed the second eviction case. On October 2, 2017, Stevenson served a second 90-Day Notice on Reshard.
On January 18, 2018, Stevenson filed a third eviction case in the D.C. Superior Court, Landlord and Tenant Branch, this time seeking eviction to enforce the 90-Day Notice served in October 2017 (“the Third Eviction Action”). On February 8, 2018, the court held an initial hearing. Although Reshard had requested a continuance in order to obtain counsel, the court dented the continuance and instead entered a default against Reshard. On February 12, 2018, Reshard filed an unsuccessful Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment and for Reconsideration of the Motion to Continue the Initial Hearing. After the necessary paperwork was filed, a non-redeemable Judgment of Possession was entered in favor of Stevenson on February 16, 2018, and a non-redeemable Writ of Restitution for possession of the Unit was entered on March 7, 2018. After Reshard unsuccessfully sought to have the Writ of Restitution stayed, the United States Marshal executed the Writ on May 11, 2018, thereby evicting Reshard from the premises.
Meanwhile, on January 17, 2018, Reshard filed an administrative complaint with the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), Office of the Rent Administrator, in which she alleged violations of the Rental Housing Act of 1985, including that the services or facilities available to her as a tenant had been reduced or eliminated; that Stevenson had retaliated against her; and that service of the 90-Day Notice was improper. On May 10, 2018, Stevenson filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication to resolve the OAH case. On July 12, 2018, Administrative Law Judge William L. England, Jr. granted the motion and dismissed all but two of Reshard's claims. Specifically, Judge England found that the doctrine of res judicata barred Reshard's claims relating to the alleged reduction in services and facilities between November 1, 2014 and September 26, 2017, as well as her claim for retaliation, because these claims could have been asserted before the D.C. Superior Court, Landlord and Tenant Branch, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the OAH over claims of housing code violations, reductions in services and facilities, and retaliation, the latter of which could have been brought as a defense to a possessory action. Reshard then filed a motion to dismiss voluntarily her remaining claims, including the claim that services and facilities available to her had been reduced after September 26, 2017. On July 13, 2018, the OAH granted the motion and dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice.
On April 5, 2018, Reshard filed a complaint against Stevenson in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which was dismissed without prejudice on October 5, 2018 for failure to effectuate service of process. See Reshard v. Stevenson (Reshard I), No. 18-cv-775, 2018 WL 10667526, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2018). On May 8, 2020 Reshard filed a second federal case in the same court, which was dismissed on March 23, 2021 based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction after the court determined that no diversity jurisdiction existed. See Reshard v. Stevenson (Reshard II), No. 20-CV-1212, 2021 WL 1110713, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021).
On May 10, 2021, Reshard filed the present Complaint in this Court in which she has alleged eight causes of action, numbered as follows: (1) Breach of Lease Agreement; (2) Retaliation; (3) Wrongful Eviction; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Declaratory Judgment Related to Primary Jurisdiction and Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies; (6) Assault and Battery; (7) Defamation, Slander, and Libel; and (8) Lack of Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Stevenson seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on the grounds that there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, and alternatively pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), on the grounds that Reshard fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted and that her claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Stevenson first argues that Reshard's Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because both parties are citizens of Maryland. Reshard argues that subject matter jurisdiction exists on the grounds that: (1) there is diversity jurisdiction because Reshard is a citizen of Washington, D.C. and Stevenson is a citizen of Maryland; and (2) there is federal question jurisdiction because Reshard has asserted claims under the United States Constitution.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because questions of subject matter jurisdiction relate to the court's power to hear the case, they must be resolved before the court can turn to the sufficiency or merits of a claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) . Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil cases, with some exceptions not relevant here, only in two instances: (1) under federal question jurisdiction, where the case involves an issue of federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018); or (2) under diversity jurisdiction, where the parties in the case are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
It is the plaintiffs burden to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., Div. of StandexInt'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move for dismissal when it believes that the plaintiff has failed to make that showing. When a defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true under the same standard as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and “the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When a defendant asserts that facts outside of the complaint deprive the court of jurisdiction, the Court “may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. The court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Evans, 166 F.3d at 647' (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)).
In her May 10, 2021 Complaint,...
To continue reading
Request your trial