RESPUBLICA v. SPARHAWK
| Decision Date | 01 September 1788 |
| Citation | 1 U.S. 357 |
| Parties | Respublica v. Sparhawk |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This was an appeal from the Comptroller General's decision, on the trial of which, by consent of the Attorney General, Sparhawk was considered as Plaintiff.
There was a verdict and judgment nisi for the Commonwealth, when Ingersol obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.
The case was this: Congress, perceiving that it was the intention of the British army to possess themselves of Philadelphia, and being informed that considerable deposits of provisions &c. were made in that city, entered into a resolution on the 11th of April, 1777, that 'a Committee should be appointed to examine into the truth of their information; and, if it was found true, to take effectual measures, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Board of War, to prevent such provisions from falling into the hands of the enemy,'
On the 13th of the same month, the Pennsylvania Board of War, in aid of this resolution, addressed a circular letter to a number of citizens in each ward of the city, requesting them 'to obtain from every family a return of the provisions &c. then in possession, and the number of persons that composed the families respectively, in order that proper measures might be pursued for removing any unnecessary quantity of supplies to a place of security.' At the same time, it was mentioned, that 'this proceeding was not intended to alter or divest the property in the articles removed; but, on the contrary, that the same should be at all times liable to the order of the respective owners, provided they were not exposed to be taken by the enemy.'
That no precaution might be omitted upon this occasion, the Pennsylvania Board of War, on the succeeding day, desired General Schuyler to prevent the introduction of further supplies, and to adopt the most effectual means for preventing the departure of the waggons which were then in the city, and for procuring as many more as
would be necessary to transport, not only the public stores, but also such private effects, as it might be thought expedient to remove. Several intercepted letters having encreased the apprehensions of Congress, on the 16th of April, 1777, they resolved, 'that it be recommended to the President and Members of the executive authority of this State, to request the commanding officer of the continental forces in this city, to take the most effectual means, that all provisions, and every other article, which, by falling into the hands of the enemy, may aid them in their operations of war against the United States, or the loss of which might distress the continental army, be immediately removed to such places, as shall be deemed most convenient and secure.' This recommendation was transmitted by the Executive Council to the Pennsylvania Board of War, who, on the 18th of April, passed an order, that 'houses, barns, stores, &c. should be hired or seized, for the reception of such articles, as should be sent out of the city by their direction or that of Congress;' and, accordingly, a very considerable quantity of property was soon removed to Chesnut Hill, and placed under the care of Messrs. Loughead and Barnhill; who gave receipts to the owners, promising 'to restore what belonged to them respectively, or to deliver the same to their respective orders.' The enemy, not approaching so rapidly as was expected, a considerable part of this property had, accordingly, been re-delivered to the order of the owners, before the city was entered by the British troops; when, however, the depot at Chesnut Hill fell, likewise, into their hands, and, with it, 227 barrels of flour, belonging to Sparhawk; being the remainder of 323 barrels that had been originally removed thither, in consequence of the above mentioned proceedings. For the price of these 227 barrels of flour, with interest from the time of their being taken, Sparhawk exhibited an account, amounting to L919 6 6 against the public; upon which the Comptroller General reported to the Executive Council, that 'neither the principal, the interest, nor any part of either, could be allowed;' and against this decision the present appeal was entered. The question, therefore, on the motion for a new trial, was, whether this claim, under all the circumstances, ought to be admitted? and it was argued on the 28th of April, by Ingersol, for the Appellant; and the Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. On the part of the Appellant, it was premised, that, in a season of peace, the law had so great a regard for private property, that it would not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. 1 Black. Com. 139. And, it was contended, that, although a state of war entitled one nation to seize and lay waste the property of another, and their respective subjects to molest the persons, and to seize the effects of their opponents, yet, as between a state and its own citizens, the principle, with respect to the rights of property, is immutably the same, in war as well as peace. Sometimes, indeed, the welfare of the public
may be allowed to interfere with the immediate possessions of an individual; but these must be cases of absolute necessity, in which every good citizen ought chearfully to acquiesce: Yet, even then, justice requires, and the law declares, that an adequate compensation should be made for the wrong that is done. For, the burthen of the war ought to be equally borne by all who are interested in it, and not fall disproportionately heavy upon a few. These general principles are fortified by the explicit language of the Declaration of Rights, Sect. 8. which provides, that 'no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal Representatives.' In the present case the Appellant did not voluntarily surrender his property, nor was it taken from him by any legislative sanction.
That there are, however, some instances where an individual is not entitled to redress for injuries committed on his property in the prosecution of public objects, must be admitted; but these instances are carefully distinguished by the writers on the law of nations; Vatt. B. 3. Sect 232. and are in no degree analogous to the foundation of the Appellant's claim. If, indeed, the property in question had remained in Philadelphia, and had there been seized by the enemy, there could have been no reason to claim an indemnification from the public; but, when it was taken out of the possession of the owner by the executive authority of the State, and removed to a distant place, with a promise of restoring it on demand, the subsequent capture being clearly a consequence of this interference, the government is bound to indemnify the Appellant for his loss.
It is unnecessary to travel into an investigation of the various modes, by which an individual may seek for redress and compensation, where his property has been divested for the use of the public. The right is clear, and that every right must have a remedy, is a principle of general law, which the Legislature of Pennsylvania has expressly recognized; directing, by an early Act of Assembly, the settlement of the accounts of the Committee and Council of Safety; and prescribing in what manner the claims of individuals should be settled and discharged. 2 State Laws 144. To these bodies, the Pennsylvania Board of War succeeded; the business of the Board was transacted in the same way; and there can be no good reason, why the obligations which they incurred, should not be as fairly and fully adjusted and satisfied. The Legislature, indeed, must have regarded the matter in the same light; for, finding that the former law was inadequate to its objects, another was enacted to appoint a Comptroller General, and to authorize him 'to liquidate and settle, according to law and equity, all claims against the Commonwealth, for services performed, monies advanced, or articles furnished, by order of the legislative, or executive powers, for the use of the same, or for any other purpose whatever.' This authority embraced the Appellant's claim, and the Comptroller General has erred in deciding against it.
The Attorney General, for the Commonwealth, stated the case to be briefly this; that the Pennsylvania Board of War, acting under the recommendations of Congress, removed, among other things, a quantity of flour belonging to the Appellant, in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy: declaring, however, that the removal was not intended to divest the property, but that the flour...
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...The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 S.Ct. Rev. 281 (quoting Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 1 Dall. 357, 363, 1 L.Ed. 174 (Pa.Sup.Ct.1788)). Scott v. Harris follows inexorably from the preemptive purpose of the doctrine and wisely calibrates John......
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...Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849, 850 (1973) (doctrine of sovereign immunity arrived in Pennsylvania in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 1 Dall. 357, 1 L.Ed. 174 (1788), in which Court denied recovery to plaintiff seeking value of flour relocated by Commonwealth War Board pursuant ......
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