Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph of Palisades

Decision Date30 December 1997
Parties, 122 Ed. Law Rep. 1249 Lillian RESTIVO, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH OF the PALISADES, North Hudson Community Action Corporation, Defendants/Respondents, and Township of North Bergen, Hackensack Water Company, and United Water Resources, Defendants.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Cynthia M. Maurer, for plaintiff/appellant (Jacoby and Meyers, attorneys, Clifton; Ms. Maurer, on the brief).

William A. Cambria, Newark, for defendant/respondent Church of Saint Joseph of the Palisades (Theresa E. Mullen, on the brief).

William O. Crutchlow, Morristown, for defendant/respondent North Hudson Community Action Corporation (Giblin & Combs, attorneys; Mr. Crutchlow, on the brief).

Before Judges CONLEY, WALLACE and CARCHMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CONLEY, J.A.D.

Plaintiff, a pedestrian who slipped and fell on ice on a public sidewalk adjacent to property owned by the Church of St. Joseph of the Palisades and leased to defendant North Hudson Community Action Corporation (North Hudson), a nonprofit organization, sued the Church and North Hudson. 1 North Hudson runs a Head Start community action program on the leased premises. The Church also rents several residential apartments, most at below fair market value and some for no rent at all, to various needy individuals and Church employees. Finding the Church and North Hudson to be non-commercial entities and thus not subject to Stewart 2 sidewalk liability, the trial judge granted summary judgments in their favor. On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS THE DEFENDANT CHURCH OF ST. JOSEPH OF THE PALISADES IS A COMMERCIAL ENTITY.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS THE DEFENDANT NORTH HUDSON COMMUNITY ACTION CORPORATION IS A COMMERCIAL ENTITY.

We reverse.

The Church admitted to owning the property abutting the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. Precisely where the fall occurred seems not to have been crucial below. Suffice it to say that the parties were content to focus upon the entire expanse of the sidewalk, that is properties located at 7607, 7611, 7615, 7621 and 7623 Broadway. A chapel is located at 7615 Broadway. The other properties are improved with commercial-type buildings with the buildings being almost three stories high. Except for the chapel, the entire ground floor and portions of the second floor of each building, including classrooms, office space and a kitchen, are leased to North Hudson for $43,443.91 annually (adjusted yearly to meet Consumer Price Index increases). The Church is organized as a nonprofit corporation and uses the money received as rent from North Hudson to pay heat, water, municipal utilities authority tax, water tax, maintenance and upkeep for all of the buildings. Father Rose, the Administrator of the Church, stated in his deposition that he did not recall the Church ever having a surplus at the end of the year.

The remainder of the space in these buildings consists of apartments that are leased to individual families for nominal rent, significantly less than fair market value (approximately $700 to $800 per month), or for no rent at all. Specifically, at 7607, the Bowers family has rented the first floor apartment by verbal agreement for thirteen years for $375 per month. The Church rents the second floor to Mrs. Nunez, the parish secretary, for $400 per month "in an effort to help her and her family out." Her rental agreement is not part of her income. At 7611, in an effort to help a family in need of housing, the Church rents the first floor to the Bendian family for $200 per month. It leases the second floor to the MacDonald family, a tenant for a little over two years, for $200 per month. At 7621, the Church rents the first floor to the DeLaney family, very active Church members and tenants for sixteen years, for $350 per month in an effort to help them continue their ministry. It has rented the second floor to the Tran family for $100 per month since their immigration from Viet Nam sixteen years ago when they needed housing. Finally, at 7623, Mr. and Mrs. Garcia, part-time church employees, have lived on the first floor with their son for approximately five years but have never paid any rent. Juan Escotto, head of maintenance for the Church, needed housing and lived on the second floor for approximately six years paying no rent, but recently moved out.

Father Rose stated that the Church allows the tenants to live rent free or at nominal rents "because of their need and because of the nature of the Church in general, to help wherever it can." Regarding the rent charged to North Hudson, he stated that the nature of its nonprofit enterprise, the Head Start program, is a factor in setting the rent level, thus the rent is not profit oriented. "We are ... the Catholic Church in this case, and that the people to whom we rent this facility is a group of people who do great social good, that partnership creates the sense of what the rent is going to be."

As we have said, North Hudson, a nonprofit corporation, uses the rental premises to operate a Head Start community action program. That program provides underprivileged children and their families with preschool education and coordinated health, medical and social services. North Hudson does not charge tuition for the services it renders. It is wholly funded from federal, state and local funds. From that funding, it employs an Executive Director, teachers, staff and purchases supplies for the operation of the preschool. Michael Leggerio, the Executive Director, stated in his deposition that there are a total of 200 paid employees and that North Hudson, which leases other premises, has leased the premises at issue here from the Church for the past 10 to 15 years.

Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The issue essentially is, giving the opposing party the benefit of all legitimate inferences from the proofs, " 'the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.' " Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536, 666 A.2d 146 (1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 214 (1986)).

Resolution of the issue here rests upon undisputed facts. The essential question is the correctness of the motion judge's analysis of the applicable law, that is, sidewalk liability law as it relates to property owned by religious and/or nonprofit entities. In this respect, the motion judge said as to the Church:

The question presented is whether a church or other religious organization is deemed commercial and therefore may be liable for injury to a non-beneficiary in a slip and fall on its abutting sidewalk. Commercial landowners are responsible for maintaining, in a reasonably good condition, sidewalks abutting their property and are liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so. Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, 87 N.J. 146, 147 (1981). Non-commercial landowners, on the contrary, as at common law, are not subject to liability for conditions of abutting sidewalks.

To inculpate the church, defendant Township of North Bergen relies on Brown v. St. Venantius School, 111 N.J. 325 (1988), wherein the court extended Stewart to a not-for-profit religious school and held that this school, although religious, may be characterized as commercial for purposes of tort liability. Id. at 333 . Such a holding was appropriate because the school participated in many business-like activities, such as "charging tuition, paying teachers and buying supplies." Thus, this religious not-for-profit school was a commercial landlord which is subject to tort liability.

Brown does not control here, rather Lombardi v. First United Methodist Church, 200 N.J.Super. 646 [491 A.2d 1350 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 315, 501 A.2d 970] (1985) provides the applicable rule. New Jersey does not impose on a charitable or religious institution an affirmative duty to maintain public sidewalks abutting property or risk money damages for injuries caused to the public by unrepaired defects. Id. at 647 . The rationale for this rule is that a religious institution which does not perform any businesslike functions, such as those listed in Brown, 111 N.J. at 328 , is not commercial, but is non-commercial.

The record in the instant case is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that the Church of Saint Joseph of the Palisades engages in any conduct of a business nature. Therefore, it is a non-commercial entity which is not subject to liability for an injury suffered by a passerby on its abutting sidewalk.

On plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the judge wrote:

The facts at bar were put in juxtaposition to those in Pelaez v. Rugby Laboratories, Inc., 264 N.J.Super. 450 (Law Div.1993) ("charitable purpose"), Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 243 N.J.Super. 201 (Law Div.1990) (sidewalk law and fraternity house), and Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Dev. [Corp., Inc.], 243 N.J.Super. 317 (App.Div.1990) (sidewalk law and low income housing project).

The court has reconsidered its decision of December 11, 1995 and examined supplementary material.

The church is not subject to liability. It is not a commercial establishment. Occupancy by a Community Action Corporation, a non-profit charitable entity, is within its own charitable non-commercial religious umbrella. The church furthers its own function in extending itself...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Nash v. Lerner
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • April 20, 1998
    ...be subject to the rules set forth in Yanhko, supra, and, thus, are subject to the direct use exception. Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph, 306 N.J.Super. 456, 703 A.2d 997 (App.Div.1997). Courts in other jurisdictions with similar sidewalk negligence laws have utilized the direct use exceptio......
  • Ellis v. Hilton United Methodist Church
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • May 22, 2018
    ...purposes" does not constitute a commercial use for determining sidewalk liability); Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph of the Palisades, 306 N.J. Super. 456, 468, 703 A.2d 997 (App. Div. 1997) (finding a church's leasing of its property constituted a commercial use); Christmas v. City of Newar......
  • Allen v. Krause
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • December 30, 1997
  • Restivo v. Church of Saint Joseph of Palisades, C-901
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1998
    ...Action Corporation NOS. C-901 SEPT.TERM 1997, 45,421 Supreme Court of New Jersey April 24, 1998 Lower Court Citation or Number: 306 N.J.Super. 456, 703 A.2d 997 Disposition: ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT