Restucci v. Spencer, CIV.A.01-11693-WGY.
| Decision Date | 03 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.01-11693-WGY.,CIV.A.01-11693-WGY. |
| Citation | 249 F.Supp.2d 33 |
| Parties | William RESTUCCI, Petitioner, v. Luis SPENCER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
William Restucci, MCI Norfolk, Norfolk, MA, pro se.
Annette C. Benedetto, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Luis Spencer.
Petitioner William Restucci ("Restucci") has brought a pro se petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Construing his petition liberally, as the Court must, Restucci's claims are threefold: 1) he argues that his guilty plea to manslaughter was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; 2) he submits that his lawyer's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea phase; and 3) he argues that the state court abused its discretion when it did not grant his motion to sever the co-defendant (who also pled guilty) from his trial.
On November 14, 1995, Restucci pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter before the Massachusetts Superior Court sitting in and for the County of Suffolk. He was sentenced to not less than fifteen nor more than twenty years in custody. An exposition of the facts of the case underlying this plea, how the plea was taken, the procedural history of Restucci's appeals since he was sentenced, and the purported basis of his claims for habeas relief follows.
The grand jury testimony excerpts, police reports, and the remarks of the prosecutor as to what the Commonwealth was prepared to prove (made at Restucci's plea colloquy), paint a picture of a man savagely beaten and kicked to death by three assailants.
On July 21, 1994, George Singleton ("Singleton"), the victim, and his friend, Mark Pettengill, ("Pettengill"), went to La-Bella's, a bar in the North End section of Boston. Resp't List of Exhibits [Docket No. 32], Ex. 2, Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 9. At the bar, the bartender informed one of the patrons, Julio Nason ("Nason"), that he would not be served more alcohol because of his boisterous behavior. Id., Ex. 3, Grand Jury Proceedings at 21.
Angry that he had been refused service, Nason approached Pettengill's and Singleton's table as he was leaving the bar, and his friends, Restucci and Eitan Grinspon ("Grinspon"), followed him. Id., Ex. 2 at 9. At this point, Nason, uninvited, took Petengill's and Singleton's pitcher of beer, poured a glass out of it, and drank it. Id. Singleton, while offended, apparently remained silent. Id. Nason then left the bar, accompanied by Restucci and Grinspon. Id.
The manager of LaBella, Michael Goss ("Goss"), and Pettengill counseled Singleton to forget about the affair, saying it was not worth a fight. Id., Ex. 3 at 22. Pettengill then went to the restroom. Id., Ex. 2 at 9. After his friend was inside the restroom, Singleton apparently decided to go outside and confront Nason. Id., Ex. 2 at 10.
A security guard, Michael Riley ("Riley"), was changing a flat tire across the street from the bar. Id., Ex. 3 at 39. Riley noticed Nason, Restucci, and Grinspon immediately because one was boisterous as they left the bar, and one conversed with a man who was passing by on a bicycle. Id., Ex. 2 at 10. Then Riley saw Singleton come out of the bar. Id., Ex. 2 at 11.
According to Riley, Singleton approached Nason and accused him of disrespect. Id., Ex. 3 at 41. At this point, Nason, Restucci, and Grinspon attacked Singleton. Id. According to Riley, Singleton attempted to retreat and stated he did not want any trouble, but the attackers persisted. Id. at 42. Riley testified that, despite Singleton's protestations, the three men repeatedly punched and kicked Singleton about the head and body. Id.
At some point during the attack, Pettengill emerged from the bar and attempted to assist his friend. Id., Ex. 2 at 11. As Pettengill approached, Grinspon brandished a knife, threatened Pettengill, and ordered him to back away. Id. Pettengill retreated to the bar and the police were summoned. Id.
Arthur McKenzie ("McKenzie"), another security guard who had been called to assist Riley with his vehicle, arrived on the scene to help change the flat tire. Id., Ex. 3 at 43. Riley and McKenzie then crossed the street to help. Id. Upon seeing McKenzie, clad in a security guard uniform, Nason and Restucci fled. Id., Ex. 2 at 12. Grinspon remained and told McKenzie and Riley that Singleton had initiated the altercation. Id., Ex. 3 at 44.
The police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and quickly apprehended Nason and Restucci. Id., Ex. 2 at 12. Riley, McKenzie, and Pettengill positively identified Restucci as an assailant in the attack. Id. at 12-13. Paramedics were unable to revive Singleton and he was pronounced dead. Id. at 13.
Restucci and Nason were jointly charged with first degree murder as coventurers and were set to be tried together. Restucci moved on the eve of trial to sever his case from Nason's, but the motion was denied. Id., Ex. 1, Docket Sheets at 4. On November 14, 1995, after a jury had been empaneled and a motion to suppress evidence had been denied, Restucci and Nason pled guilty to manslaughter in the first degree before Judge Robert Banks, and Restucci was sentenced. Id., Ex. 2 at 24.
Before considering their offers to plead guilty, Judge Banks asked both men their names, addresses, places of birth, and how far each had gone in school. Id., Ex. 2 at 3-4. Restucci stated that he had attended school up to the tenth grade. Id., Ex. 2 at 4. Restucci responded affirmatively when asked whether he could read, write, and understand English, and he stated that he was not suffering from any mental defect or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. Restucci acknowledged that he was charged with murder, that the government alleged that he had beaten Singleton with intent to murder him, that, by doing so, he did kill and murder him, and that he was "offering to plead guilty to so much of that offense that encompasse[d] manslaughter." Id., Ex. 2 at 4-5. Judge Banks informed Restucci of his rights to a trial by jury or judge and told him that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving these rights, as well as the right to confront his accusers and the witnesses against him. Id., Ex. 2 at 6. The judge further advised Restucci that he was waiving his right against self-incrimination and the right to appeal adverse rulings on suppression motions. Id., Ex. 2 at 7. Restucci responded that he understood each of the judge's warnings. Id., Ex. 2 at 8. Restucci was asked if he wanted to plead guilty, and he responded "yes." Id. When the clerk read the indictment and asked him his plea, Restucci replied, "Guilty." Id.
Restucci was then asked by the court to listen to the government regarding the facts and to "determine whether or not [he] agree[d] with what [the Assistant District Attorney ("A.D.A.")] ha[d] to say and whether or not [he admitted his] guilt ...." Id. at 8-9. After the government's allocution, Judge Banks asked Restucci if he had heard what the A.D.A. had said. Id., Ex. 2 at 14. Restucci responded affirmatively, and agreed that what had been stated to the court was true. Id. He acknowledged his participation in the beating of Singleton and admitted he was guilty of manslaughter. Id. At this point the trial judge inquired as to the voluntariness of Restucci's plea:
Q (Judge Banks): Are you pleading guilty freely, willingly and voluntarily?
Do you have any questions that you wish to ask me regarding this plea?
Id., Ex. 2 at 15-17. The trial judge then accepted the plea and found that it was offered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id., Ex. 2 at 17. Restucci later signed a waiver of his rights. Id., Ex. 2 at 23.
Restucci's counsel, Oliver Mitchell ("Mitchell"), then spoke on Restucci's behalf and pointed out unfortunate circumstances in his life, including abandonment by his mother at a young age. Id., Ex. 2 at 18-19. Mitchell asked the court for leniency. Id. Restucci did not speak on his own behalf. After reviewing Restucci's probation record and acknowledging that Restucci had never materially run afoul of the law, Judge Banks sentenced the petitioner to not less than fifteen years, nor more than twenty years in prison, as defense counsel and the government had agreed. Id., Ex. 2 at 23.
Restucci claims that he was coerced into pleading guilty by Mitchell, by Nason's counsel, Tom Horgan ("Horgan"), and by members of Restucci's own family, making his plea involuntary. As support for these claims, Restucci has submitted memoranda from Mitchell's office, in which a paralegal summarizes meetings between Restucci, his counsel, and Nason's lawyer, which appear to...
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