Reuss v. Balles
| Citation | 584 F.2d 461,189 U.S.App.D.C. 303 |
| Decision Date | 27 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1012,77-1012 |
| Parties | Henry S. REUSS, Appellant, v. John J. BALLES et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Grasty Crews, II, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Michael Kimmel, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard Schaitman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, and Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by TAMM, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Henry S. Reuss, a United States Congressman from Wisconsin, commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the Federal Open Market Committee, an integral component of the Federal Reserve System. The district court (Parker, J.) dismissed the complaint, finding that appellant lacked standing to sue, both in his capacity as a congressman and as an owner of certain marketable bonds. Reuss v. Balles, 73 F.R.D. 90 (D.D.C.1976). We affirm.
The Federal Reserve System was created by Congress in 1913 as this nation's central bank. Unlike similar institutions in other countries, it is not a single entity, but rather a composite of several parts, both public and private, organized on a regional basis with a central governmental supervisory authority. The System consists of a seven-member Board of Governors, twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Advisory Council, and approximately 6000 privately owned, commercial banks. 1 The key to success of the System is harmonious interaction between and among these component parts.
The function of the Federal Reserve System in the conduct of monetary policy is to assist in achieving national economic goals through its influence on the availability and cost of bank reserves, bank credit, and money. The three primary instruments employed by the System in the formulation and execution of general monetary policy are: 1) open market operations; 2) regulation of member bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve Banks; and 3) establishment of member bank reserve requirements. The most flexible, and perhaps the most important, of these monetary policy tools is the open market instrument. 2
Since the inception of the Federal Reserve System, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks have been statutorily empowered to participate in a wide variety of financial transactions in the open market. 3 In one of the earliest cases to discuss the functioning of the Federal Reserve, Judge Augustus N. Hand summarized these open market operations as follows:
(The Federal Reserve Banks may) purchase and sell in the open market at home or abroad cable transfers and bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange of the kinds and maturities eligible for rediscount. They may deal in gold coin and bullion at home and abroad; by and sell, at home and abroad, bonds and notes of the United States, and bills, notes, revenue bonds, and warrants with a maturity from date of purchase of not exceeding six months, issued by any state, county, district, political subdivision, or municipality in the United States . . .. They may purchase from member banks, and sell, bills of exchange arising out of commercial transactions, and may "establish from time to time, subject to review and determination by the Federal Reserve Board, rates of discount to be charged by the Federal Reserve Bank for each class of paper, which shall be fixed with a view of accommodating commerce and business." They may establish accounts with other Federal Reserve Banks . . . (and) may open accounts and establish agencies in foreign countries for the purpose of purchasing, selling, and collecting bills of exchange. They may purchase and sell in the open market, either from or to domestic banks, firms, corporations, or individuals, acceptances of Federal Intermediate Credit Banks and of national agricultural credit corporations . . ..
The foregoing provisions enable the Federal Reserve Banks, without waiting for applications from their member banks for loans or rediscounts, to adjust the general credit situation by purchasing and selling in the open market the class of securities that they are permitted to deal in. The power "to establish from time to time, subject to review and determination of the Federal Reserve Board, rates of discount to be charged by the Federal Reserve Bank," appears in the act . . . with the open market powers. The two powers are correlative and enable the Federal Reserve Banks to make their rediscount rates effective. The sale of securities does not lessen the total amount of credit available, but, by necessitating payment to the Federal Reserve Banks, increases available credit in their hands, "with a view of accommodating commerce and business," as provided by the act.
Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1929).
Four years after the Raichle decision, in recognition of the growing importance of open market operations as an element of national monetary policy, Congress created the FOMC. 4 The function of the FOMC was to initiate policy recommendations to the Board of Governors for the conduct of open market operations, and the Federal Reserve Banks were, for the first time, prohibited from transacting in the open market except in accordance with Board regulations. Each Reserve Bank was left free, however, to decline to participate in operations approved by the Board.
The permissive nature of this initial structure proved to be ineffectual, and, in 1935, Congress elevated the role of the FOMC to its present dominant position. 5 In unequivocal language, 12 U.S.C. § 263(b) (1976) states:
No Federal Reserve bank shall engage or decline to engage in open-market operations under sections 348a and 353 to 359 of this title except in accordance with the direction of and regulations adopted by the Committee. The Committee shall consider, adopt, and transmit to the several Federal Reserve banks, regulations relating to the open-market transactions of such banks.
Also since 1935, the FOMC has been composed of the seven members of Board of Governors, who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and five representatives of the Federal Reserve Banks, elected annually by the boards of directors of the Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1976). Initially, there were no restrictive qualifications for the appointment of these latter five members, but, in 1942, Congress mandated that they be either presidents or first vice presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, 6 individuals who are selected with the approval of the Board of Governors. Thus, the FOMC now consists of seven members who hold their offices by virtue of presidential appointments confirmed by the Senate, and five members who hold their offices subject ultimately only to the approval of the Board of Governors.
On June 21, 1976, appellant brought this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) is unconstitutional because the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC are not appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 7 He reasoned, in part, that, since these individuals are "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), they are thus "Officers of the United States" who are required to be appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation. He also sought an injunction prohibiting the Reserve Bank members from serving on the FOMC, and prohibiting the Federal Reserve Banks from complying with FOMC directives and regulations considered or adopted while any Reserve Bank member was serving on the FOMC. 8 Defendants to the action included the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC, and their alternates, and the twelve Federal Reserve Banks.
Appellant averred that he had standing to sue in two capacities. As a legislator, 9 he claimed that the power conferred on him by article I, section 2, of the Constitution to initiate impeachment proceedings against civil officers of the United States is diminished because the Reserve Bank members of the FOMC, as currently selected, are "jurisdictionally immune to the impeachment process;" 10 he also claimed that improper delegation of responsibilities to the FOMC resulted in a usurpation of his powers, under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, to coin and regulate the value of money, to regulate commerce, and to borrow money on the credit of the United States. 11 As owner of "certain marketable bonds" valued in excess of $20,000, he maintained that actions taken by the FOMC might result in his being deprived of property without due process of the law. 12
On motion by the Government, 13 Judge Parker dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. He found that appellant had failed to demonstrate standing either as a congressman or bondholder. With regard to the latter capacity, he stated, among other reasons, that appellant Reuss v. Balles, 73 F.R.D. at 98. Appellant's argument concerning his diminished legislative powers was rejected, in part, for identical reasons. See id. at 96-97; note 19 Infra, and accompanying text. Finally, his impeachment...
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