Reutkemeier v. Nolte
Citation | 179 Iowa 342,161 N.W. 290 |
Decision Date | 14 February 1917 |
Docket Number | No. 30256.,30256. |
Parties | REUTKEMEIER v. NOLTE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Winneshiek County; A. N. Hobson, Judge.
Action for damages, actual and exemplary, by the plaintiff against the defendant for the alleged debauching of his minor daughter. Actual damages for expenses and loss of service are claimed under the provisions of Code, § 3471. The defense was a general denial. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $6,500, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Frank Sayre and E. W. Cutting, both of Decorah, for appellant.
William S. Hart, of Waukon, and Boice & Hook, of Decorah, for appellee.
The facts as contended by plaintiff briefly stated are that in September, 1912, the defendant, a man then 21 years of age, had carnal knowledge of the plaintiff's daughter Mary, then a child only 14 years of age. In June, 1913, she gave birth to a child alleged to be the result of such intercourse. The plaintiff was at the time a farmer living upon his own farm. He was a widower with three daughters and three sons, all living with him at his home. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff was quite abundant to sustain the verdict. The appeal is presented here on assignments of error assailing certain rulings in the admission of testimony and certain instructions of the court.
[1] The most important and doubtful question raised relates to an alleged privileged communication, the claim of privilege being based on Code, § 4608. Plaintiff's daughter was a member of the Presbyterian Church. In the month of March before her child was born she was asked to appear, and did appear, before the church session. Such session consisted of the pastor and the three ruling elders. She appears to have confessed her sin and to have made certain communication to the elders. On the trial of this case the defendant sought to show what such communication was. It is claimed for the defendant that such communication involved others as well as himself, and that at least it cast much uncertainty upon the paternity of the child. The plaintiff objected to such line of testimony both on the ground that it was not binding upon him as substantive testimony, and that in any event it was a privileged communication under the provisionof the statute. The first objection was clearly good as far as it went.
[2] The defendant, however, sought to lay a foundation in the cross-examination of the daughter Mary as a witness for her impeachment by calling her attention to such alleged communication. Of course if the communication was not privileged it was competent even as against the plaintiff to offer the same for the purpose of impeachment. On the other hand, if the communication was privileged it was no more available to the defendant for impeachment purposes than for any other purpose. If it was privileged, then under the view of the trial court it would be equally improper to lay a pretended foundation for its introduction as impeaching testimony. The question therefore was precipitated in the cross-examination of the witness Mary. The trial court exercised its discretion to stop temporarily the cross-examination, and to permit the parties in the absence of the jury to introduce evidence of such facts as were material to be considered to enable the court to determine whether the communication in question was privileged. It is not free from doubt upon the record before us whether the cross-examination of the witness at this point was justified by the state of her testimony at the time.
[3] In view of the fact, however, that the attention of both court and counsel appear to have been concentrated upon the question of privilege as decisive of that line of examination, we are disposed to meet that question as the one of larger merit. Code, § 4608, is as follows:
In applying this section to the case before us two questions naturally arise: (1) Was the communication a confidential one? (2) Were the recipients of such communication ministers of the gospel within the meaning of the statute? As to the first question it is apparent that the communication was of such a nature as would usually and naturally be deemed confidential if for no other reason than that it involved a confession of sin to a spiritual adviser. We feel no hesitancy in holding the affirmative on this question. The second question presents greater difficulty. What is a “minister of the gospel” within the meaning of this statute? The law as such sets up no standard or criterion. That question is left wholly to the recognition of the “denomination.” The word “minister,” which in its original sense meant a mere servant, has grown in many directions and into much dignity. Few English words have a more varied meaning. In the religious world it is often, if not generally, used as referring to a pastor of the church and a preacher of the gospel. This meaning, however, is not applicable to all Christian denominations. Some of them have no pastors and recognize no one as a minister in that sense, and yet all denominations recognize the spiritual authority of the church and provide a source of spiritual advice and discipline. The record herein contains a copy of the “Confession of Faith” of the Presbyterian Church, as well as other standard booklets setting forth the doctrine and policy of that denomination. The following excerpts therefrom will sufficiently indicate the same:
“That our blessed Saviour, for the edification of the visible church which is his body, appointed officers, not only to preach the gospel and administer the Sacraments, but also to exercise discipline, for the preservation both of truth and duty; and that it is incumbent upon these officers, and upon the whole church, in whose name they act, to censure or cast out the erroneous and scandalous, observing, in all cases, the rules contained in the word of God.”
“The ordinary and perpetual officers in the church are bishops or pastors; the representatives of the people, usually styled ruling elders; and deacons.”
* * *”
“To these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue thereof they have power respectively to retain and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent, both by the word and censures; and to open it unto penitent sinners, by the ministry of the gospel, and by absolution from censures, as occasion shall require.”
To the foregoing it may be added that the office of ruling elder is perpetual, and no person can be divested of it except by...
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Pardie v. Pardie
... ... We are satisfied this evidence should not have been admitted. See section 622.10, Code, 1966; Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 344--345, 161 N.W. 290, L.R.A.1917D, 273; Cimijotti v. Paulsen, D.C., 219 F.Supp. 621, 623--624; and Annos. 22 A.L.R.2d 1152 ... ...
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... ... damages by another in an action growing out of the same ... Reutkemeir ... v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290, L.R.A. 1917D 273; ... Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Ia. 315, 71 N.W. 223; ... Ward v. Ward, 41 Ia. 686; Luther v. Shaw, ... ...
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People v. Thompson
... ... Some light comes from out of state authorities. 2 In Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290, the court held the unordained elders of the Presbyterian church were subject to the clergyman-penitent ... ...