Reutzel v. Spartan Chemical Co.
| Decision Date | 06 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. C 92-3075.,C 92-3075. |
| Citation | 903 F. Supp. 1272 |
| Parties | Sharon L. REUTZEL and Myron O. Reutzel, Plaintiffs, v. SPARTAN CHEMICAL COMPANY, A Corporation, Defendant. Emcasco Insurance Company, (XX-XXXXXXX), Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
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Michael J. Carroll of Dwight W. James & Associates, Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiffs.
L.W. Rosebrook of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie, Smith & Allbee, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendant Spartan Chemical.
Jill M. Augustine of Employers Mutual Insurance Company, Des Moines, Iowa, for intervenor Emcasco Insurance Co.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................... 1275
II. FINDINGS OF FACT .......................................................... 1276
III. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................ 1276
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................ 1278
A. The Preemption Doctrine ................................................ 1278
B. The History of FIFRA and Preemption under FIFRA ........................ 1279
C. Prior Case Law on FIFRA Preemption ..................................... 1279
D. Claims Preempted by FIFRA .............................................. 1280
1. The Reutzels' Claims for Relief under Strict Liability .............. 1281
2. The Reutzels' Claims for Relief Alleging Negligence ................. 1282
3. The Reutzels' Claims for Breach of Warranty ......................... 1282
E. Estoppel ............................................................... 1283
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................ 1284
The sole issue raised by Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. preempts all of Plaintiff's state law claims because they are allegedly premised on inadequate labeling of a product whose label is approved under FIFRA. Plaintiffs' resistance to the motion raises the related issue of whether a party may be estopped from asserting FIFRA preemption to the extent that it withheld material facts from the regulating agency.
Plaintiffs Sharon L. Reutzel and Myron O. Reutzel ("The Reutzels") filed their complaint against Defendant Spartan Chemical Company, Inc. ("Spartan Chemical") on September 11, 1992. First, in count I of the complaint, the Reutzels allege a state law claim for strict liability concerning several unnamed Spartan Chemical cleaning products. Count II of the complaint contains a state law negligence claim concerning the same unnamed Spartan Chemical cleaning products. In count III, the Reutzels assert a state law claim for breach of warrant concerning a number of unnamed Spartan Chemical cleaning products.
Spartan Chemical filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Reutzels' state law claims on the ground that these claims are premised upon a showing of inadequate labeling. Spartan Chemical argues that such claims are expressly preempted by FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136v. Since the filing of the motion for summary judgment, the scope of Plaintiffs' case has been narrowed to Spartan Chemical's product SparCling, an acid cleaner formulated for cleaning ceramic tile and grout. The Reutzels assert in their resistance that Spartan Chemical has withheld information required of it concerning its product SparCling and therefore should be estopped from receiving preemption protection.
A hearing on Spartan Chemical's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was held on September 29, 1995. At the hearing the Reutzels were represented by Michael J. Carroll of Dwight W. James & Associates, Des Moines, Iowa. Defendant Spartan Chemical was represented by L.W. Rosebrook of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie, Smith & Allbee, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa. Intervenor Emcasco Insurance Company was represented by Jill M. Augustine of Employers Mutual Insurance Company, Des Moines, Iowa. This matter is now deemed fully submitted.
For the purposes of this summary judgement motion only, the court finds the following facts:
Since the early the 1970's, pursuant to FIFRA, Spartan Chemical has been required to apply to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for registration and approval of all of its chemical products making claims to be bacteriocidal, virucidal, or fungicidal. One of Spartan Chemical's products required to be registered with the EPA is SparCling. SparCling was first registered with the EPA in 1982, and has been continually registered since that time. Until 1986, Spartan Chemical used BBA Vielex Mint # 805104 as the fragrance in SparCling. In 1986 Spartan Chemical switched to Alpine's Mint Fragrance # 139-983 as the exclusive fragrance for SparCling. Spartan Chemical itself has not performed any toxicity testing on Alpine's Mint # 139-983.
Plaintiff Sharon Reutzel commenced employment with the Sentral Community School District ("School District") in 1988. In the summer of 1990, the School District began to use Spartan cleaning products. In February 1991, Sharon suffered an allergic reaction after using Spartan Chemical cleaning products. In August 1991, Sharon was exposed to Spartan cleaning products while visiting the Spencer Community Hospital and suffered an allergic reaction. In late January 1993, after being exposed to Spartan Chemical cleaning products while visiting the Pudre Valley Hospital, Sharon suffered an allergic reaction.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years "motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992).
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir.1995); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).1 A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here the Reutzels, and give them the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir.1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992).
Procedurally, the moving party, Spartan Chemical, bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). Spartan Chemical is not required by Rule 56 to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id.
"When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. The Reutzels are required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325. Although "direct proof is not...
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