Revak v. Revak

Decision Date11 May 2023
Docket Number1015 WDA 2022,J-A08035-23
PartiesAMY M. REVAK v. FRANK T. REVAK, JR. Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered August 5, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 234 of 2019 GD

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI J.[*]

MEMORANDUM

PELLEGRINI, J.

Frank T. Revak, Jr. (Husband) appeals from the August 5, 2022 equitable distribution order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (trial court) awarding 65% of the marital value of four certificates of deposit (CDs) to Amy M Revak (Wife). We affirm.

I.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. Wife initiated this divorce action in 2019 following over ten years of marriage to Husband. At the time of the divorce proceedings, Wife was 52 years old, in good health and had been employed as Chief Clerk in Fayette County for approximately nine years. She earned $50,000 per year with a net monthly income of $3,851 and received $400 in child support per month from Husband. Husband was unemployed and had been receiving a disability pension from his work as a tax technician for the Internal Review Service since approximately 2003. In addition, Husband received income from a rental unit on his property and monthly interest from four CDs, totaling a monthly income of approximately $4,800. Husband had purchased his property, which included the rental unit, in 1991, prior to his marriage to Wife.

The parties proceeded to a hearing in front of a Special Master to resolve the equitable distribution of the marital estate. A primary point of contention in the equitable distribution was the marital value of the CDs, valued at a total of $860,000 at the time of separation, as the parties disagreed about the extent to which Husband had funded the CDs with marital or premarital funds. After receiving evidence regarding Husband's assets at the time of the marriage, the Special Master found that Husband had purchased the CDs with $573,902 in premarital funds. Accordingly, the Special Master's report and recommendation valued the marital portion of the CDs at $286,098.

The Special Master awarded the marital components of various bank accounts and retirement accounts to the named owner of the accounts, awarded the marital component of the CDs and the marital residence to Husband, and divided other smaller assets such as vehicles and other personal property between the parties. He added the total value of all assets to reach an award of $241,880 to Wife and $395,740.85 to Husband. Finding that an equal distribution of the marital assets was appropriate under the circumstances, the Special Master required Husband to make a one-time payment of $76,930.42 to Wife, such that each party would receive $318,810.42 in marital assets.[1]

Wife filed exceptions to the Special Master's report challenging the Special Master's determination of the premarital value of the funds used to purchase the CDs. She argued that Husband had not produced sufficient evidence to establish the value of premarital assets used to purchase the CDs and that he had failed to establish valuation dates for certain accounts. She contended that the Special Master excluded too much of the value of the CDs as premarital without sufficient evidence.

Following oral argument, the trial court accepted the Special Master's determination of the premarital and marital values of the CDs. However, it modified the Special Master's recommendation to distribute 65% of the marital value of the CDs to Wife and 35% to Husband. It did so because "[i]n consideration of the estate of each of the parties, with Husband in possession of the premarital value of the certificates of deposit, in excess of $570,000.00, . . . it is equitable for Wife to receive a larger portion of the marital component of the certificates of deposit." Final Decree, 8/5/22, at 3 (pagination supplied). In all other respects, the trial court accepted the Special Master's recommendation and incorporated his findings as set forth in his report. Id. at 2. The marital assets were distributed as follows:

A. TO WIFE:
1. Marital component of Community Bank checking account -$51,552.00
2. Marital component of [W]ife's fidelity IRA - $53,814.00
3. Wife's Pension through Fayette County - $131,339.00
4. Wife's 2011 Honda Pilot - $5,000.00
5. Ruger pistol - $175.00
6. 65% of the marital component of 4 certificates of deposit -$185,963.70. (In order to effectuate this provision, Husband shall make a payment to Wife in the amount of $185,963.70)
B. TO HUSBAND:
1. 2254 and 2256 Masontown Road, Masontown - $95,000.00
2. 35% of the marital component of 4 certificates of deposit -$100,134.30
3. First National Bank checking account - $14,245.00
4. First National Bank checking account - $18,027.85
5. Guns - $370.00

Id. at 1-2. Husband timely appealed and he and the trial court have complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.[2]

II.
A.

Husband's first three issues on appeal are related and we address them together. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by altering the Special Master's division of the marital value of the CDs to award 65% of the value to Wife when she requested a 50% split of the marital assets in her exceptions. He contends that by awarding relief that Wife did not request, the trial court acted as her advocate. He further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fashioning an equitable distribution award that resulted in 65.25% of the marital estate being awarded to Wife in contravention of the Special Master's recommended of a 50% split. Husband's Brief at 30-42.

As to Husband's contention that the trial court's award of 65% of the marital value of the CDs was an abuse of discretion because Wife only requested a 50/50 split, this argument takes Wife's request out of context. In her exceptions, Wife argued for an equal split of the marital component of the CDs, but contended that the marital value was approximately $734,905, not $286,098. See Exceptions to Special Master's Report Filed March 9, 2022, 3/31/22, at 1-2 (pagination supplied); Suggested Findings of Fact, 11/12/21, Summary. By ordering a 65/35 split of $286,098, the trial court awarded Wife less than she had requested in her exceptions, not more. As discussed infra, the trial court was entitled to alter the Special Master's recommendation in this way, Morschhauser v. Morschhauser, 516 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. Super. 1986), and Husband's claims to the contrary have no merit.

Husband also complains that the trial court's award abused its discretion by fashioning a different remedy than the Special Master. When an equitable distribution action is referred to a hearing officer, after receiving evidence, the hearing officer must author and report a recommendation for the trial court that includes findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended disposition. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1920.53. Upon receipt of the report, the parties may file exceptions to the trial court, and any matters not covered therein are waived. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1920.55-2(b). After reviewing the report and recommendation and following argument on exceptions, the trial court enters a final decree resolving the economic claims between the parties. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1920.55-2(c). However, "the trial court is afforded great discretion in fashioning an equitable distribution order which achieves economic justice." Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

This Court has previously rejected Husband's argument that a trial court's authority to enter an equitable distribution order is cabined by the exceptions the parties raise to the hearing officer's report and recommendation:

Although the rules of procedure provide for the appointment of a master to conduct a hearing, prepare a report and make recommendations (Pa.R.C.P. 1920.51) this does not transfer the final responsibility of making the distribution to the master.
A master's report is entitled to great consideration, but the court is not bound by it. . . . The court is required to structure an equitable distribution of property in light of the factors set forth in [the Divorce Code]. If in its discretion the court determines it must deviate from the recommendation of the master it may do so regardless of whether either party has raised the issue in an exception. Our function then becomes one of determining if the court's action constituted an abuse of discretion under the statutory guidelines.

Morschhauser, supra, at 15 (Pa. Super. 1986) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654, 661 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion when trial court sua sponte considered tax ramifications of alimony award when it was not raised in either parties' exceptions). Accordingly, the trial court was well within its authority to alter the recommendation of the Special Master even when the specific award it fashioned was not requested by either party.

Further, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's reasoning for deviating from the Special Master's recommendation:

[I]n considering the types and values of the assets overall, this Court saw that almost all of the monetary assets awarded to [] Wife were not immediately accessible nor readily convertible to liquid assets (e.g., IRA, pension). In order to remedy this, this Court granted a larger portion of the marital component of the CD assets to [] Wife, and it did so in alignment with the distribution already recommended by the hearing officer for the other marital assets. Although [] Wife would have accepted a fifty-fifty division (an equal result), the
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT