Revell v. Morrison Supply Co.
Citation | 501 S.W.3d 255 |
Decision Date | 29 August 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. 02-15-00195-CV,02-15-00195-CV |
Parties | Terry Revell, Appellant v. Morrison Supply Company, LLC, Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Brandy M. Austin, Brandy Austin Law Firm, PLLC, Arlington, TX, for Appellant.
Russell E. Wilson, Werstein Cartwright & Wilson, Addison, TX, for Appellee.
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.
Appellant Terry Revell appeals the trial court's take-nothing judgment in favor of appellee Morrison Supply Company, LLC (Morrison Supply). In two issues, he contends that the trial court erred by granting Morrison Supply's traditional motion for summary judgment on the basis of his alleged lack of standing. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case to that court for further proceedings.
Revell sued Morrison Supply. In his original petition, he pled that in February 2013, while he was at Morrison Supply's business, one of Morrison Supply's employees caused 4,000 pounds of pipe to fall on him, which caused him to suffer severe injuries. He brought a claim for negligence and sought damages.
Morrison Supply answered the suit by pleading that Revell lacked standing. Specifically, Morrison Supply pled in its first amended answer that Revell had previously filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy;1 that his negligence claim against Morrison Supply, which was based on an injury occurring during the bankruptcy case, was property of the bankruptcy estate; and that he therefore had no standing to pursue the claim.
To its summary judgment motion, Morrison Supply attached evidence showing that Revell filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in December 2012, that he filed an amended bankruptcy plan that same month, that creditors objected to the confirmation of the plan, that the trustee filed a motion to dismiss for Revell's failure to obtain timely confirmation of the plan in February 2013, and that the bankruptcy court dismissed the case in April 2013 while explicitly stating that Revell's debts were not discharged.2 The evidence also showed that Revell never formally disclosed his potential claim against Morrison Supply as an asset in any document he filed with the bankruptcy court even though one schedule asked him to list "contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature."
Finally, Revell contended that a federal statute—11 U.S.C.A. § 349(b)(3) (West 2015)—unambiguously revested all assets (including all potential claims) in him upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case.
In its reply to Revell's response, Morrison Supply contended, in part, that although Revell may have disclosed his injury during the bankruptcy case, he had not disclosed a potential cause of action formally through schedules as required. Morrison Supply also argued that section 349(b)(3) did not revest the potential claim in Revell after the bankruptcy's dismissal because the potential claim arose during the pendency of the bankruptcy (rather than before its commencement) and because section 349(b)(3) does not apply when a party fails to disclose an asset in the bankruptcy court.
The trial court granted Morrison Supply's summary judgment motion and ordered that Revell take nothing. Revell brought this appeal.
In his two issues, Revell contends that the trial court erred by granting Morrison Supply's summary judgment motion based on his alleged lack of standing because his chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed,4 the property subject to the bankruptcy revested in him, there is no prejudice to the creditors or Morrison Supply by allowing him to proceed on his claim in this suit, and a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether he adequately disclosed his potential claim in the bankruptcy case by verbally informing the trustee about his injuries. Morrison Supply contends that Revell's negligence claim is the property of his bankruptcy estate and that he therefore lacks standing to assert the claim in this suit. Morrison Supply also contends that while Revell may have disclosed his injuries to the trustee, he did not properly disclose the potential claim in the bankruptcy case by amending his personal property schedule, and the dismissal of Revell's bankruptcy case did not revest in him property that he had failed to disclose.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.2010). A defendant that conclusively negates a plaintiff's standing is entitled to summary judgment. See Bland ISD v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex.2000) ; Duque v. Wells Fargo, N.A. , 462 S.W.3d 542, 550 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction that focuses on who may properly bring a claim. Lake v. Cravens , 488 S.W.3d 867, 885, 888 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); City of Arlington v. Centerfolds, Inc. , 232 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (). A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, and without it, the merits of a case may not be reached. Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co. , 362 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
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