Revell v. Port Auth. Of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-2029.,09-2029. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
| Parties | Gregg C. REVELL; Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK and NEW JERSEY; ScottErickson v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Third Party Plaintiff v. Continental Airlines; County of Essex; Essex County Jail; Essex County Prosecutor; John Does 1-10, Third Party Defendants. Gregg C. Revell, Appellant. |
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Richard E. Gardiner [Argued], Fairfax VA, Richard V. Gilbert, Evan F. Nappen Eatontown, NJ, for Appellant.
Donald F. Burke, Sr. [Argued], Port Authoi'ity of New York & New Jersey Jersey City, NJ, Shirley J. Spira, Sharon K. McGahee, Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, Law Dept., Opinions & Appeals Div., New York, NY, for Appellees.
Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and PADOVA *, District Court Senior Judge.
Gregg C. Revell appeals from the dismissal of his claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to impose liability upon the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("Port Authority") and Port Authority Police Officer Scott Erickson for arresting him under New Jersey's gun laws and seizing his firearm and ammunition. According to Revell, his arrest was unlawful because he was in compliance with a provision of the Firearm Owners' Protection Act ("FOPA"), 18 U.S.C § 926A, which allows gun owners licensed in one state to carry firearms through another state under certain circumstances. Because we conclude that, at the time of his arrest, Revell's conduct did not bring him within the protection of that statute, we will affirm both the dismissal of his § 926A-based claim and the grant of summary judgment to the Port Authority and Erickson on Revell's closely related Fourth Amendment claim. We will likewise affirm the grant of summary judgment against Revell on his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
On March 31, 2005, Revell, a resident of Utah, embarked on a flight from Salt Lake City to Allentown, Pennsylvania, via Minneapolis/St. Paul and Newark, New Jersey. When he arrived at the Northwest Airlines counter1 in the Salt Lake City Airport, he checked his luggage through to his final destination and declared that, in the luggage, he was carrying an unloaded firearm contained in a locked hard case and ammunition in a separate locked hard case. He signed an orange firearm declaration tag, which was placed inside the locked hard case containing the firearm. That was apparently the last thing on the trip that went as expected. The several mishaps that followed ultimately relate to the accessibility of the firearm and ammunition and are thus key to this dispute.
Because his flight into Newark was late Revell missed his connection from Newark to Allentown. He booked the next flight to Allentown, which was scheduled to leave Newark at 8 p.m. that evening, but, after the air-line changed arrangements, the passenger's scheduled for that flight were asked to board a bus, instead of a plane,
headed for Allentown. Revell got on the bus; however, when he learned that his luggage was not on board, he got off to locate it.2 By the time he retrieved his luggage, he had missed the bus, and no other connections to Allentown were available. He then went directly to the Newark Airport Sheraton Hotel in a hotel shuttle, taking his luggage with him. The driver of the shuttle van placed Revell's luggage, which contained the locked hard case containers, in the rear storage area of the van, which was not immediately accessible from the passenger compartment where Revell was seated. Revell stayed at the hotel overnight but did not open either of the locked containers during his stay.
The next morning, he took the hotel's airport shuttle back to the Newark Airport and, again, his luggage was placed out of his reach in the rear of the shuttle. Upon arriving at the airport around 8:30 a.m., he proceeded to the ticket counter to check his luggage and declared that he was carrying an unloaded firearm in a locked hard case and ammunition in a separate locked hard case. Revell was told to take his luggage to the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") area so that it could be x-rayed. After the luggage went through the x-ray machine, the TSA agent at the other end of the machine took the hard cases out and asked Revell for the key to them, which Revell provided. The TSA agent opened the cases using Revell's key and removed the firearm and ammunition. The orange declaration sheet from Salt Lake City was still in the case with the firearm.
About twenty minutes later, several Port Authority officers, including Officer Erickson, escorted Revell to an area away from other passengers where they questioned him about the firearm and ammunition. Revell explained that he had declared his weapon and ammunition, and that he was merely passing through New Jersey en route to Allentown, Pennsylvania. He also showed the officers his Utah concealed firearm permit and his driver's license. When Erickson questioned Revell about why he had the firearm, Revell explained that he was traveling to Pennsylvania to pick up a car to bring back to Utah and that "he was going to need the weapon for protection" as he drove the car home. (App. at 33.) Revell also informed Erickson that, upon missing his flight the day before, he had taken possession of his bag with the firearm in it and had gone to a hotel in Newark to stay for the night. Erickson asked Revell whether he had authority to carry the firearm in Pennsylvania, but Revell did not respond.3
Erickson arrested Revell for possession of a handgun without a permit in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(b) and for possession of hollow-point ammunition in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-3(f).4
Revell was handcuffed, held overnight at the Port Authority jail, and then transferred to the Essex County, New Jersey, Jail, where he was incarcerated for three days until he was released on bond. Four months later, on August 2, 2005, the Essex County prosecutor administratively dismissed all of the charges against him. However, Revell's firearm, ammunition, holster, locks, and hard cases, which were seized at the time of his arrest, were not returned until July 24, 2008, more than two years after the ill-fated trip and approximately a year after he filed his amended complaint in this action.
Understandably troubled about his and his property's treatment, Revell brought the present § 1983 case, alleging that the Port Authority and Erickson had violated his rights under § 926A of FOPA.5 In essence, § 926A allows a person to transport a firearm and ammunition from one state through a second state to a third state, without regard to the second state's gun laws, provided that the traveler is licensed to carry a firearm in both the state of origin and the state of destination and that the firearm is not readily accessible during the transportation.6 18 U.S.C. § 926A. Revell also alleged that the appellees violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaining his firearm, holster, locks, containers and ammunition, thereby depriving him of his property without due process. He sought damages and an injunction requiring the Port Authority to return his property.
Erickson moved to dismiss Revell's claims and the Port Authority moved for judgment on the pleadings.7 They argued, among other things, that probable cause existed for the arrest because § 926A was inapplicable, given Revell's overnight stay in New Jersey. They also argued that Erickson was entitled to qualified immunity.
The District Court noted that its first task was to "determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 926A created an enforceable personal right, " an issue of first impression. (App. at 44.) The Court answered that question by holding that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), Revell was required to frame his § 1983 claim in terms of the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to § 926A, because he sought damages for an allegedly improper arrest. In other words, the Court concluded that, "|b]ecause individuals already have a method of recovering damages pursuant to § 1983 if they are arrested or charged without probablecause, [i.e., a claim under' the Fourth Amendment,] it is unnecessary and, indeed, improper'... to conclude that § 1983 provides a separate or-alternative remedy ibr a violation of § 926A." (App. at 49.) The Court thus dismissed Revell's § 1983 claim for-the alleged violation of S 926A, but it granted him leave to file an amended complaint stating a Fourth Amendment claim.
The Court also dismissed Revell's procedural due process claims for damages and injunctive relief.8 The Court, relying on Patratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), explained that, if constitutionally adequate state procedures were available to remedy the deprivation of Revell's property, he could not succeed on his due process claim. Since Revell neither' availed himself of state law remedies nor explained why those remedies would be futile or-constitutionally inadequate, the Court dismissed that claim. However, it granted Revell leave to amend his complaint to allege that "the Port Authority's postdeprivation remedies for the return of seized property are constitutionally inadequate." (App. at 53.)
On June 29, 2007, the District Court entered an order dismissing Revell's complaint and allowing him leave to amend pursuant to the memorandum opinion.
Not long after, on July 13, 2007, Revell filed an amended complaint against the Port Authority and Erickson. In the first count, he asserted that his arrest and the seizure of his property violated his Fourth Amendment rights...
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