Reverse Mortg. Solutions, Inc. v. Rahman, s. 1-16-1035 and 1-16-1069 (cons.).
| Decision Date | 06 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1-16-1035 and 1-16-1069 (cons.).,s. 1-16-1035 and 1-16-1069 (cons.). |
| Citation | 82 N.E.3d 578,2017 IL App (1st) 161035 |
| Parties | REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rasheeda Najii Abdur RAHMAN, Individually; Unknown Heirs and Legatees of Harvey T. Collins, if Any; Unknown Owners and Non Record Claimants; William Butcher, Special Representative of Deceased; Gerald Nordgren, Special Representative of the Estate of Rosalind Wyatt Collins, Deceased, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James A. Roth, of Fidelity National Law Group, of Chicago, for appellant.
Timothy B. Newitt, of Johnson, Westra, Broecker, Whittaker & Newitt, P.C., of Carol Stream, for appellees.
¶ 1 In 1961, Harvey and Rosalind Collins bought a property in Chicago. In 1979, Harvey signed a quitclaim deed, conveying the property to Rosalind. Rosalind died, and Harvey then signed a mortgage, which eventually came into the hands of Reverse Mortgage Solutions (RMS). After Harvey's death, RMS tried to foreclose on the property, but the Collins's daughter, Rasheeda Rahman, fought the foreclosure.
¶ 2 We find that the 1979 quitclaim deed contains a sufficient description of the property to convey it from Harvey to Rosalind. But, after Rosalind died intestate, Harvey inherited some portion of the property through Rosalind's estate, which he was able to convey through the mortgage. We remand for further proceedings on RMS's complaint. We also affirm the trial court's denial of Rahman's request for sanctions against RMS.
¶ 4 In 1961, Harvey and Rosalind Collins, a married couple, purchased property at 1486 East 56th Street, Chicago, as joint tenants. Eighteen years later, in September 1979, Harvey executed a quitclaim deed on the property to Rosalind. The quitclaim deed contains a description of the property with skimpy detail, but notes that Rosalind resides at 1486 E. 56th Street. At the bottom of the quitclaim deed appears the "address of property" as 1486 E. 56th Street (while also stating that "the above address is for statistical purposes only and is not a part of this deed").
¶ 5 Rosalind died in May 2003. Harvey continued to reside at the property.
¶ 6 In 2006, Harvey executed a "home keeper" mortgage with All America Reverse Mortgage. Harvey received $323,927.68 in exchange for a mortgage on the property. The mortgage note attached and incorporated a legal description of the property. The mortgage was eventually transferred to Reverse Mortgage Solutions. In July 2011, Harvey died.
¶ 7 RMS filed a complaint to foreclose on the property. The complaint also included a count to reform the reverse mortgage Harvey had signed in 2006 because it contained the wrong legal description. The complaint stated that the reformed mortgage should use the property description from the 1979 quitclaim deed (which was attached to the foreclosure complaint).
¶ 8 Harvey and Rosalind's daughter, Rasheeda Rahman, moved to dismiss the foreclosure complaint. Rahman alleged that, due to the 1979 quitclaim deed, Harvey did not have title to the property to convey in the 2006 mortgage, and, accordingly, RMS lacked standing to foreclose.
¶ 9 RMS then filed an amended complaint for foreclosure and reformation and moved to quiet title, alleging that the 1979 quitclaim deed was a nullity because it did not sufficiently describe the property; thereafter, Harvey inherited the entire property after Rosalind's death. RMS included a count for an equitable lien, alleging that Harvey had represented that he had full title when he acquired the mortgage and RMS should have first claim on the property.
¶ 10 Again Rahman moved to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)), alleging that Harvey lacked full title to the property when he acquired the mortgage due to the 1979 deed. RMS replied by asserting the invalidity of the 1979 deed and arguing that, even if it was valid, Harvey still had a mortgageable interest and RMS was entitled to an equitable lien. The trial court granted Rahman's motion to dismiss, in part holding that the quitclaim deed's description, though incomplete, was legally sufficient. The trial court also held that RMS had alleged only theories, not facts, as to how Harvey had regained interest in the property. The trial court noted that probate law would not have automatically vested interest in real property to Rosalind's heirs, and if Harvey did not have an interest in the property, then he could not have promised that interest in the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the claim for an equitable lien with prejudice, and the counts to foreclose and quiet title without prejudice, while the reformation claim remained pending.
¶ 11 RMS filed a third amended complaint to quiet title and for foreclosure, reformation, a declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, equitable lien, and accounting. Rahman moved to dismiss the quiet title, foreclosure, reformation, and declaratory judgment counts, and answered the other counts. In responding, RMS included an affidavit from Richard Bales, a lawyer for a title company. Bales stated that he had reviewed the relevant documents, and based on his review, "the 1979 deed conveyance is ambiguous on its face." The trial court dismissed the quiet title, foreclosure, reformation, and declaratory judgment counts with prejudice. The trial court held that the 1979 quitclaim deed was effective, and that the Bales affidavit was "self-serving." The court also held that RMS had not alleged enough facts showing that Harvey had regained an interest in the property.
¶ 12 Rahman petitioned for sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. July 1, 2013)), alleging that RMS's complaints had not been well-grounded in fact or law; the trial court denied the petition. RMS eventually voluntarily dismissed the remaining counts.
¶ 13 Rahman filed a timely notice of appeal as to the trial court's denial of sanctions; RMS filed a timely notice of appeal as to the dismissal of its claims.
¶ 15 We review the trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619de novo . Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough , 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 13, 378 Ill.Dec. 778, 5 N.E.3d 158. A section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but argues that some defense or affirmative matter defeats the claim. Ball v. County of Cook , 385 Ill. App. 3d 103, 107, 324 Ill.Dec. 548, 896 N.E.2d 334 (2008).
¶ 16 We review the trial court's denial of a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Lake Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold , 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 16, 396 Ill.Dec. 166, 39 N.E.3d 992.
¶ 18 The Quitclaim Deed Was Legally Sufficient.
¶ 19 RMS first asserts that due to an incomplete legal description of the property, the 1979 quitclaim deed was invalid.
¶ 20 A quitclaim deed must include a description of the real estate conveyed. 765 ILCS 5/10 (West 2014). We presume that, in executing the deed, the grantor intends to convey the property he or she owns. City of Virginia v. Mitchell , 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 32, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936. If the land cannot be located from the description in the deed, the deed is void for uncertainty. Id . The purpose of this description is to identify the deed's subject matter, and the description is sufficient if it allows a competent surveyor to identify it with reasonable certainty. Brunotte v. De Witt , 360 Ill. 518, 528, 196 N.E. 489 (1935). Further, a deed will not be declared void for uncertainty "if it is possible, by any reasonable rules of construction, to ascertain from the description, aided by extrinsic evidence, what property it is intended to convey." Id .
¶ 21 Though the description in the 1979 quitclaim deed is truncated, it is not inaccurate. Instead of the full description used in the 1961 deed, it omits several lines. This is a harder case than City of Virginia , where the deed referred to the property's address as on a "road" instead of a "street" and was not void for an insufficient description. 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 33, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936. But, like in City of Virginia , no one disputes that the property existed and Harvey owned it (with Rosalind) when he executed the deed in 1979. In light of the presumption that Harvey intended to convey the property he owned (and the extrinsic evidence of the 1961 deed containing the full legal description of the property), we find that the quitclaim deed incorporates a sufficient legal description and is not void for uncertainty.
¶ 22 That Harvey continued to reside at the property after 1979 does not change our conclusion. Since he and Rosalind remained married until her death, it is not probative of his intent in the quitclaim deed that he lived with his wife and stayed in the home after she died. We also are not convinced that Harvey's representation to the mortgage company that he owned the property in fee simple means that he had not intended to execute a quitclaim deed almost 30 years earlier. It seems far more likely that Harvey, a layman, assumed he had inherited the property outright after his wife's death.
¶ 23 RMS relies heavily on the affidavit of an attorney for a title company, Richard Bales. The affidavit, however, contributes nothing to the factual record. Bales has no knowledge about the making the 1979 deed or the 2006 mortgage that would help us ascertain Harvey's intent in executing either document. And, Bales's legal opinion that the 1979 deed is ambiguous adds no substance to the analysis, as the trial court recognized.
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