Rex Utilities, Inc. v. Gaddy

• Decision Date: 27 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 79-2141,79-2141
• Citation: Rex Utilities, Inc. v. Gaddy, 413 So.2d 1232 (Fla. App. 1982)
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: REX UTILITIES, INC. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Appellants, v. David L. GADDY, as Personal Representative of Karen Sue Gaddy, a deceased minor, for the benefit of the decedent's estate; David L. Gaddy, individually; and Merry A. Gaddy, individually, Appellees.

Page 1232

413 So.2d 1232

REX UTILITIES, INC. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Appellants, v. David L. GADDY, as Personal Representative of Karen Sue Gaddy, a deceased minor, for the benefit of the decedent's estate; David L. Gaddy, individually; and Merry A. Gaddy, individually, Appellees.

No. 79-2141.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

April 27, 1982.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1982.

Steven R. Berger, Miami, for appellants.

High, Stack, Lazenby, Bender, Palahach & Lacasa and Charles R. Stack, Coral Gables, for appellees.

Before HUBBART, C. J., and BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

HUBBART, Chief Judge.

The central issue raised by this appeal is whether a defendant in a negligence action arising out of a motorcycle accident is entitled to introduce evidence and argue to the jury as a comparative negligence defense that the plaintiff was not wearing protective headgear at the time the accident occurred in violation of Section 316.211(1), Florida Statutes (1977), where the defendant establishes that: (1) the plaintiff was of the class the above statute was intended to protect [i.e., a motorcycle rider], and (2) the injury suffered by the plaintiff in the accident was of the type the statute was intended to prevent [i.e., a head injury]. We hold that such a defendant is not so entitled to prove and argue such a statutory violation as a comparative negligence defense because the above showing, without more, fails to establish, as required by law, that the above statutory violation by the plaintiff was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's head injury. We, accordingly, affirm the final judgment under review.

I

The facts pertaining to the above issue are as follows. The plaintiffs' decedent Karen Gaddy died from a severe head injury when she was thrown from a motorcycle on which she was a passenger when the motorcycle ran over a hidden trench alongside the road. Suit was brought by the estate and parents of Karen Gaddy against the defendant Rex Utilities, Inc. [and its insurer, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.] for negligently perpetrating this hazardous condition.

At trial, the defendants sought to introduce in evidence and later argue to the jury as a comparative negligence defense that the plaintiffs' decedent was not wearing protective headgear when the accident occurred in violation of Section 316.211(1), Florida Statutes (1977). The only evidence adduced below on whether the above statutory violation was a proximate cause of the head injury sustained by the plaintiffs' decedent came from the treating neurosurgeon who testified below, outside the jury's presence, as follows:

"Q. Is there a possibility that it [wearing a helmet] would have prevented the death?

A. I have no way of knowing. In my experience I have seen patients who have been dead on arrival from head injuries with helmets on. I have seen other situations where patients came in and they have survived. It is an unpredictable thing.

* * *

* * *

Q. Do you feel that a helmet would have lessened the seriousness of that blow and it could have resulted in an injury but not death?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Can you explain that to me?

A. Yes. I can just draw a conclusion based upon my experience.

When I see a patient come into the emergency room dead on arrival with a head injury with a helmet on, the helmet is not doing anything.

The death is caused by a severe force of impact and not by a helmet. The helmet is designed to absorb just so much impact. I don't know that this particular force would have been prevented by this helmet overcoming the effects of the force. In such cases, the helmet is rendered useless.

Q. Let us not talk about your experience. Let us talk about this case.

A. I cannot draw any conclusions in this case."

Thereafter the trial court specifically invited the defendants to introduce further evidence on the proximate cause issue, but the defendants declined to do so. The trial court, accordingly, precluded the defendants from introducing evidence and arguing to the jury that the plaintiffs' decedent had violated the above statute when the accident occurred and was, therefore, guilty of comparative negligence; specifically, the trial court ruled that the defendants had failed to establish, as required by law, that the statutory violation in this case was a proximate cause of the head injury sustained by the plaintiffs' decedent.

The jury subsequently found for the plaintiffs in this cause and a final judgment was entered thereon. The defendants appeal.

II

The law is well-settled that it is "negligence per se" for a defendant in a negligence action to violate a statute "which establishes a duty to take precautions to protect a particular class of persons from a particular injury or type of injury." deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 281 So.2d 198, 201 (Fla.1973). Section 316.211(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which requires motorcycle operators and riders to wear protective headgear, ¹ clearly is such an above-stated statute as its sole purpose is "to preserve the life and health of the cyclist" against head injury, State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489, 490-91 (Fla.1969); as such, the statute establishes "a duty to take precautions [i.e., wear protective headgear] to protect a particular class of persons [i.e., motorcycle operators and riders] from a particular injury or type of injury [i.e., a head injury]." deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 281 So.2d at 201. It does not follow, however, that a violation of this type of statute by itself constitutes a case of actionable negligence. "It must also be established by a plaintiff that he is of the class the statute was intended to protect, that he suffered injury of the type the statute was designed to prevent, and that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of his injury." deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 281 So.2d at 201; see also Stanage v. Bilbo, 382 So.2d 423, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 710 (Fla.1978); Duncan v. Monark Boat Co., 330 So.2d 843, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Moreover, this established law applies with equal force to both a plaintiff who seeks to establish a case of actionable negligence as well as a defendant, as here, who asserts a comparative negligence defense. W. Prosser, Torts 202-03 (4th ed. 1971); compare Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d 375 (Fla.1954).

III

Turning to the instant case, we have no problem in concluding that the trial court was eminently correct in precluding the defendants from introducing evidence and later arguing to the jury that the plaintiffs' decedent was guilty of comparative negligence in this cause by failing to wear protective headgear at the time of the subject accident in violation of Section 316.211(1), Florida Statutes (1977), because no evidence was adduced below, as required by law, that the violation of the above statute was a proximate cause of the head injury sustained by the plaintiffs' decedent. Indeed, the expert testimony adduced in the trial court below established that it was impossible to determine whether the failure of the plaintiffs' decedent to wear protective headgear in any way contributed to the head injury sustained by the plaintiffs' decedent; moreover, the defendants below declined the trial court's specific invitation to introduce any further evidence on the proximate cause issue. As such, the trial court had no alternative but to exclude the subject evidence and argument for failure of the defendants to establish, as required by law, that the violation of the above statute was a proximate cause of the head injury sustained by the plaintiffs' decedent.

The defendants, however, argue that they were entitled to introduce evidence and argue to the jury the above statutory violation as a comparative negligence defense upon a two-step showing that: (1) the plaintiff injured was of the class the statute was intended to protect [i.e., a motorcycle rider], and (2) the injury suffered by the plaintiff was of the type the statute was designed to prevent [i.e., a head injury]; it is urged that the proximate cause element is implicitly established as a permissible jury inference upon this two-step showing. [Appellant's main brief, pp. 19-21]. Although the above two elements were absolute prerequisites under the law for admitting proof of the statutory violation herein and were, as urged, clearly established in this case, we cannot accept the defendants' ultimate conclusion that proof of these two elements, without more, implicitly establishes the third element of proximate cause. Indeed, to accept this position is, in effect, to read out the proximate cause element altogether as established by prior decisional law in cases of this nature. We specifically decline to do so. Moreover, we are totally unconvinced that State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla.1969), requires us to reach a contrary result.

We have carefully considered the remaining contentions urged by the defendants upon this appeal and find them to be without merit. The final judgment under review is, accordingly,

Affirmed.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge, dissenting.

The statute sought to be argued by Rex, Section 316.211(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides:

"No person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle unless he is properly wearing protective headgear securely fastened upon his head which complies with standards established by the department."

The trial court held that a party claiming a right to introduce the statute to prove negligence (here the comparative negligence of Karen Gaddy) must first show that (a) the person injured is of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect, (b) the injury suffered was of the type the statute was designed to prevent, and (c) the violation of the statute was a proximate cause of the injury. See deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 281 So.2d 198 (Fla.1973...