Rexroat v. State
Decision Date | 04 April 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02–1107–CR–594.,49A02–1107–CR–594. |
Citation | 966 N.E.2d 165 |
Parties | Ronald REXROAT, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Darren Bedwell, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Ronald Rexroat appeals his convictions for two counts of child molesting, as Class C felonies, and the sentence imposed following a jury trial. Rexroat presents the following issues for review:
We affirm.
Julie and Delbert Ray Ledbetter have three children, a daughter S.L. born on March 28, 2001, and two sons D.L. and C.L. For several months in 2008 and 2009, the Ledbetter family rented the upstairs of a two-story house from Rexroat, their longtime friend and the home's first-floor tenant. The children referred to Rexroat as "Uncle Ronnie," and Rexroat spent time alone with the children, including S.L. Transcript at 100. In early 2009, when S.L. was eight or nine years old, the Ledbetter family moved to another home, but they continued to see Rexroat several times a week.
During 2008 and 2009, Rexroat occasionally took S.L. places without taking her brothers along. For example, he took her to visit a common friend Donna Smitley or to McDonald's to buy chicken nuggets. When S.L.'s parents became suspicious of Rexroat in late 2009, Julie questioned S.L. S.L. had been taught that there are three places on her body that others should not touch her: the places she uses to pee, her "butt," and her chest. Transcript at 64. S.L. told Julie that on three separate occasions Rexroat had "touched" her with his finger in the place she "use[ ] to go pee" and made circles with his finger while touching her. Id.
On December 21, 2009, Julie reported the abuse of S.L. to the Department of Child Services ("DCS").1 DCS interviewed S.L. on December 22, but the recording equipment did not work. DCS interviewed S.L. again on March 17, 2010. And on April 6, the State charged Rexroat with two identically worded counts of child molesting, as Class C felonies.2 Following a trial on June 1, 2010, the jury found Rexroat guilty on both counts. The trial court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and sentenced Rexroat to six years on each count, to be served concurrently, with three years suspended to probation. One of the conditions of Rexroat's probation is that he Appellant's App. at 82. Rexroat now appeals.
Rexroat contends that his double jeopardy rights under the federal and state constitutions were violated when the State charged him with two identically worded counts of child molesting, as Class C felonies. Specifically, he argues that his convictions violate both the same elements test under the United States Constitution as well as the statutory elements test and the actual evidence test under the Indiana Constitution. We address each contention in turn.
Generally, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under the Federal or Indiana Constitution prohibits a person from being punished twice for the same offense. Our supreme court has explained the purpose of that right:
Prohibitions against double jeopardy protect against: (1) reprosecution for an offense after a defendant has already been convicted of the same offense in a previous prosecution; (2) reprosecution of a defendant after an acquittal; (3) multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial; (4) reprosecution of a defendant after the conviction has been reversed for insufficient evidence; (5) criminal reprosecution of a defendant in limited circumstances following a previous civil prosecution; (6) reprosecution of a defendant in limited circumstances after a mistrial has been declared.
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 37 n. 3 (Ind.1999) (citations omitted). Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a pure question of law, which we review de novo. See Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. 5. Double jeopardy protection under the Constitution is evaluated under the "same elements" test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). That test provides: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. In other words, the Blockburger test contemplates whether a defendant can be convicted for conduct in a single incident under two separate statutory provisions. See id. The same elements test does not apply in cases where multiple offenses based on separate acts, especially on separate dates, have been charged under the same statute. See id.
717 N.E.2d at 49–50 (emphases in original).
Under the statutory elements test, the objective "is to determine whether the essential elements of separate statutory crimes charged could be established hypothetically."3 Id. at 50. Thus, "the charged offenses are identified by comparing the essential statutory elements of one charged offense with the essential statutory elements of the other charged offense" by "inspecting the relevant statutes and the charging instrument to identify those elements which must be established to convict under the statute." Id. "Under this test, the second charge must be for the same identical act and crime as [the first offense]." Id. at 50 n. 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, like the same elements test under the United States Constitution, the statutory elements test does not apply where multiple charges are based on a single statute.
Under the second prong of Indiana double jeopardy analysis, the actual evidence test, "the actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts." Id. at 53. To show that two challenged offenses constitute the "same offense" under that prong, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the factfinder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense." Id.
Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ind.1984) ( )(citations omitted).
Here, Rexroat first contends that his federal right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when the State charged him with two identically worded counts of child molesting, as...
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