Reyes-Feliciano v. Marshalls

• Decision Date: 09 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 14–1234 (PAD)
• Citation: 159 F.Supp.3d 297
• Parties: Lizanne Reyes–Feliciano, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Marshalls, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

159 F.Supp.3d 297

Lizanne Reyes–Feliciano, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Marshalls, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 14–1234 (PAD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed February 9, 2016

Juan Ramon Rodriguez–Lopez, Rodriguez Lopez Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Javier G. Vazquez–Segarra, Vicente J. Antonetti, Cenia M. Mercado–Santana, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Delgado–Hernández, District Judge.

Plaintiff Lizanne Reyes–Feliciano initiated this action against her employer and current supervisor—Marshalls and Mr. Radamés López—under various Federal and Puerto Rico statutory provisions (Docket No. 1).¹ Her son joined in the action, claiming to have suffered damages on account of his mother's suffering. Id. at ¶ 24. Before the court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 31), which plaintiffs opposed (Docket No. 45). For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED and the case DISMISSED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)

. The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is need for trial. Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)

. A factual dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)

. It is “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case in light of applicable law. Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). As to issues on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, the movant need to no more than aver absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Mottolo v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 43 F.3d 723, 725 (1st Cir.1995).

Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting facts that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for trial. LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co ., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993)

. All reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir.2013).

To resist summary judgment, the nonmovant must do more than show some metaphysical doubt as to a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Inds. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)

. Conclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative will not suffice to ward off a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Nieves–Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1st Cir.2013). Careful record review reflects absence of genuine dispute as to the facts identified in the section that follows. Based on those facts, Marshalls is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Position and Responsibilities

Reyes was born on August 9, 1960. See, Docket No. 31–2, Defendant's “Statement of Uncontested Material Facts” (“SUMF”) at ¶ 1. She started working for Marshalls in 1977. SUMF at ¶ 2. She is assigned to the Rexville store, which opened in June 2012. Since that point, she has been the Store Manager. SUMF at ¶ 4. Co-defendant Radamés López is the District Manager for District # 1307, the district Reyes' store is assigned to. SUMF at ¶ 6. He has been Reyes' immediate supervisor since 2004. SUMF at ¶ 7.

B. Medical Leave

Reyes suffered a severe depression for reasons not related to her job and, thus, was on medical leave from March 11, 2013 to April 29, 2013. SUMF at ¶ 8. Upon returning from leave, she discussed her medical condition with López; Socorro Fontánez, Field Associate Relations Manager; and Dana Bullock, Regional Human Resources Manager from Region thirteen, assuring them that her medical condition was not caused by or related to her job. SUMF at ¶ 9.

C. Changes in Sunday Work Schedule

On April 29, 2013 Reyes requested that Marshalls exempt her from Sunday work to take care of her ailing mother. SUMF at ¶ 10. She was informed that her request would be discussed with the Regional Office. In the meantime, she was allowed to take Sundays off, provided that her assistant managers handle her work load. Id. Reyes did not work Sundays between April 29, 2013 and June 26, 2013. SUMF at ¶ 12.²

D. Performance Issues

During the second week of May 2013, Reyes received a visit from Bullock and Fontánez. SUMF at ¶ 13.³ Two (2) weeks later, she received a visit from David Loustin, Loss Prevention Regional Manager; Elizabeth Cruz, Loss Prevention District Manager; and López. SUMF at ¶ 14. On June 26, 2013, she was asked by López to meet with him at Marshalls District Office in Carolina, Puerto Rico, for a formal counseling related to the deficiencies found in her store during the May 2013 visits. SUMF at ¶¶ 15–16.⁴

López handed Reyes a “Corrective Action” because merchandise did not satisfy presentation standards; merchandise was in backroom even though there was room in sales floor; and Reyes had to set clear expectations to her team (Docket No. 31, Exh. 6). Reyes acknowledged the deficiencies highlighted therein and explained the steps taken to work on them. Id. at p. 2. At no point during the meeting Reyes informed López that she was not feeling well. SUMF ¶ 17.⁵

E. Hospitalization and Leave of Absence

On June 26, 2013, Reyes had what she described as a “small stroke

,” as a result of which she was hospitalized. SUMF ¶ 19. Socorro Fontánez, Field Associate Relations Manager for Marshalls visited her at the hospital on June 27 and June 29, 2013. Reyes informed Fontánez that her hospitalization had nothing to do with her conversation with López. SUMF ¶ 20.⁶

After being on medical leave for one (1) year due to her stroke, Reyes returned to work on June 26, 2014, without need for any special accommodation. SUMF ¶ 21. During her leave she requested and was granted short-term and long-term disability benefits. SUMF ¶ 22. She is currently an active employee at Marshalls, and has no claims related to the post-leave period. SUMF ¶ 24–25.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Disability

Reyes alleges that defendants discriminated against because of disability in violation of ADA and Law 44 (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 1; Docket No. 45 at ¶ 5.C).⁷ The ADA makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees because of disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(1)

.⁸ To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she (1) was disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) was qualified; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action. Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2012). If the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. Id. Should defendant meet this burden, the plaintiff must show that defendant's reason is mere pretext, cloaking discriminatory animus. Freadman v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir.2007).

Reyes has not satisfied the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendants concede that she is a disabled individual within the meaning of the ADA. And because there is no indication that Reyes is unable to undertake or carry out the essential functions of the Store Manager position she has been assigned to since 2012, she may be considered qualified. See, Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2001)

(noting that to be considered qualified, the employee must show, among other things, that she is able to perform the position's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation). But the record shows no adverse action.

An adverse action is one that is materially adverse in that it carries tangible consequences. At bottom, it involves—or is relied on to support—a material change in terms and conditions of employment such as termination, suspension, failure to promote, demotion, or materially disadvantageous transfers or reductions in compensation. Blizzard v. Marion Technical College, 698 F.3d 275, 290 (6th Cir.2012)

; Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir.2001). Whether an employment action is materially adverse, is gauged by an objective standard. Morales–Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2010) (citing

Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir.1996) ). An employee's displeasure at an action, standing alone, does not render it materially adverse. Gómez–Pérez v.

Potter, 452 Fed.Appx. 3, 8 (1st Cir.2011).

Reyes complains of unjustified verbal reprimands, counseling and biased inspections (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 13). Employer criticism is an ordinary and appropriate feature of the workplace. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.2001)

. It can prompt an employee to improve her performance, and thus lead to a more constructive employment relationship. Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir.2001). For that reason, counseling, reprimands, and warnings are a proper instrument for management to focus employees' attention on the need to correct some workplace behavior that the employer perceives as needing correction. Fernández–Ocasio v. Walmart Puerto Rico, Inc., 94 F.Supp.3d 160, 173 (D.P.R.2015). Performance improvement plans serve much the same...