Reyes, In re

• Decision Date: 30 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1773,86-1773
• Citation: 814 F.2d 168
• Parties: 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 272, 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 54, 106 Lab.Cas. P 34,901, 7 Fed.R.Serv.3d 405 In re Margarito REYES, et al., Petitioners.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 168

814 F.2d 168

28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 272, 28 Wage & Hour

Cas. (BN 54,

106 Lab.Cas. P 34,901, 7 Fed.R.Serv.3d 405

In re Margarito REYES, et al., Petitioners.

No. 86-1773.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 30, 1987.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing June 16, 1987.

Viviana S. Patino, Randall C. Marshall, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., Farm Div., Hereford, Tex., for petitioners.

Ricardo H. Hinojosa, U.S. Dist. Judge, Brownsville, Tex., Allee & Garcia, Edinburg, Tex., for respondent.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Before POLITZ, WILLIAMS and JONES, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Margarito Reyes and other petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to withdraw a discovery order. Petitioners have brought suit claiming rights under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1801, et seq. (AWPC) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 201 et seq. (FLSA). Petitioners also claim breach of contract of employment under Texas law. Petitioners as migrant farm workers are represented by the Texas Rural Legal Aid, a legal services corporation recipient within the meaning of the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2996 et seq. (LSCA).

As part of a discovery order the district court directed petitioners to respond to the following questions:

Are you a citizen of the United States? If so, were you born in the United States? If so, please state where you were born and your birthdate. If you are a naturalized citizen of the United States, please state where and when you became a citizen of the United States. If you are not a citizen of the United States, please state your immigration status.

The district court granted discovery as to these matters on two grounds. First, a legal services corporation is not entitled to represent undocumented aliens, and second, there is an issue of coverage of undocumented aliens under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

First, the issue as to whether a legal services corporation under the LSCA can represent undocumented aliens is not an issue which is subject to litigation in this case. Congress was clear, precise, and adamant with respect to this issue. It provided in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(b)(1)(B):

No question of whether representation is authorized under this subchapter, or the rules, regulations or guidelines promulgated pursuant to this subchapter shall be considered in, or affect the final disposition of, any proceeding in which a person is represented by a recipient or an employee of a recipient.

There is no authority, therefore, to inquire into the documentation of aliens to determine whether the Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., Farm Worker Division, has authority to represent the petitioners in this case. In holding that the inquiry was relevant for this purpose, the district court was in error.

Second, it is well established that the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is documented or undocumented is irrelevant. An employee is "any individual employed by an employer." FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 203(e)(1). The same thing is true with respect to claiming the benefits of the AWPA. The statute covers "an individual" employed in agricultural work, AWPA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1802(8)(A), unless the aliens involved are in that class of aliens referred to as "H-2" workers, as defined under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii). H-2 workers constitute a very narrow class of aliens under a specific work program. There is no issue raised in this case concerning the possibility that petitioners are H-2 workers. The district court, therefore, was also in error in concluding that inquiry into the documentation of alien petitioners for purposes of determining coverage under the FLSA and AWPA was warranted.

A discovery order generally is not appealable. Honig v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 404 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.1968). The district court, however, in this case ordered discovery as to information which was completely irrelevant to the case before it and was information that could inhibit petitioners in pursuing their rights in the case because of possible collateral wholly unrelated consequences, because of embarrassment and inquiry into their private lives which was not justified, and also because it opened for litigation issues which were not present in the case.

A writ of mandamus is justified as requested by petitioners under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a), since its purpose here is "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction...." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943). As we said en banc in United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir.1979), "[W]hen the writ of mandamus is sought from an appellate court to confine a trial court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, the court should issue the writ almost as a matter of course." Schlazenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964), stands for the proposition that "there has been a general loosening of the federal attitude toward mandamus and the discovery cases are not unaffected by this." Wright & Miller, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Sec. 2006. See also Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914, 95 S.Ct. 1573, 43 L.Ed.2d 780 (1975), which held that a writ of mandamus was appropriate to vacate a discovery order in an antitrust case. The order required plaintiffs to disclose current financial statements as well as fee arrangements with attorneys. The writ was issued on the ground that the order went beyond a Supreme Court decision and interfered with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on class actions. If mandamus lies in such an antitrust context, there is much stronger justification in this case where there is no possible relevance and the discovery could place in jeopardy unrelated personal status matters.

The procedural requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 21 having been fully met in this case, it is ORDERED that a writ of mandamus issue directing the district court to withdraw that portion of its discovery order requiring petitioners to answer questions concerning citizenship and alienage, including alienage status as documented or undocumented.

In issuing the writ of mandamus we do not undertake to foreclose in any way consideration on the merits of whether these petitioners are entitled to claim coverage and benefits under the FLSA and the AWPA.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority takes the extraordinary step of granting a writ of mandamus on a discovery matter because it considers the plaintiffs' citizenship status "completely irrelevant to the case." Cf. In re Sessions, 672 F.2d 564 (5th Cir.1982); Kerr v. U.S. District Court, 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.1975), affirmed, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976) (refusing to issue mandamus on discovery matters). Mandamus should issue only "to compel the performance of a legal duty which is free of doubt." Winningham v. HUD, 512 F.2d 617, 620 (5th Cir.1975). Because I disagree that such information is without a shred of relevancy and that the...