Reyes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

Decision Date28 June 2019
Docket NumberNo. 1-18-0593,1-18-0593
Citation435 Ill.Dec. 452,139 N.E.3d 123,2019 IL App (1st) 180593
Parties Federico REYES and Rosa Reyes, Individually, and as Plenary Guardians of S.R., a Legally Disabled Adult, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, a/k/a The Chicago Public Schools; Lisa Rago, an Individual; Lubirtha Sharp, an Individual; Laidlaw Transit, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Laidlaw International Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Victoria Lynn, an Individual; and Transpar Transportation Management Services, LLC, Defendants (The Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Lisa Rago, and Lubirtha Sharp, Defendants-Appellees).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Bhavani Raveendran, of Romanucci & Blandin LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.

Stephen H. Pugh, Kathleen Pasulka-Brown, and Seth Mann Rosenberg, of Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees.

JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Federico Reyes and Rosa Reyes, the parents and plenary guardians of S.R., appeal the circuit court's dismissal of their second amended complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)). Defendants, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board), also known as Chicago Public Schools (CPS), as well as Lisa Rago and Lubirtha Sharp, had asserted that plaintiffs' claims were barred by certain sections of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2014)). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the sections of the Act raised by defendants do not apply to plaintiffs' claims. Finding that the Act immunizes defendants for only some of plaintiffs' claims, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The record reveals that A.V., a minor male student, sexually assaulted S.R., a disabled female student, on a special needs school bus on May 5, 2005. At the time, Sharp was the bus aide and Rago was S.R.'s teacher at the John Coonley School. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against defendants in 2009, but the matter was voluntarily dismissed on January 5, 2016. Plaintiffs refiled the action on December 23, 2016, and filed a first amended complaint on May 11, 2017. Defendants moved to dismiss three counts of the first amended complaint under section 2619(a)(9) of the Code.1 In part, defendants contended that, under sections 2-103 and 2-205 of the Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-205 (West 2014)), they were immune from plaintiffs' claims that they failed to follow various laws and policies. Defendants further asserted that they were immune under section 4-102 of the Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2014) ) for any alleged failure to protect S.R. from sexual assault. Defendants also maintained that, under section 2-201 of the Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2014) ), they were broadly immunized for their policy decisions.

¶ 4 After plaintiffs filed a response, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. In a written order, the court stated that to the extent that plaintiffs' claims "[were] based on the failure to follow, enforce, or enact any laws, policies or procedures," defendants were immune from liability under sections 2-103 and 2-205 of the Act. The court also characterized plaintiffs' claims as a failure to prevent and/or stop the alleged sexual abuse, which was in effect an allegation that defendants failed to provide police protection services and prevent a crime. Thus, section 4-102 of the Act immunized defendants as well. The court further found that plaintiffs' allegations with regard to defendants' decisions about student transportation, placement, and discipline all involved both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion, which made defendants immune under section 2-201 of the Act. Plaintiffs were granted one opportunity to amend the pleading to allege claims outside the governing immunities.

¶ 5 On December 20, 2017, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, which is the complaint at issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs alleged in part as follows. Rago, the teacher for the special education/developmentally disabled class at S.R.'s school, and Sharp, the bus aide, both had the duty to supervise and protect the physical safety of students at Coonley School at all times. The Board was responsible for providing safe and effective bus transportation for qualified students, including those with special needs.

¶ 6 Plaintiffs described policies that were in place when S.R. was sexually assaulted. Under the Board's sibling transportation policy, a nonspecial needs student who was the sibling of a special needs student could be eligible to ride the special needs bus only upon written application and approval and under two conditions: (1) the Bureau of Student Transportation received and approved a written request for the nonspecial needs sibling to ride the special needs bus, and (2) the nonspecial needs sibling was allowed to ride the special needs bus only so long as the special needs sibling was a student at the school and continued to ride the special needs bus. According to the Coonley School principal, general education students who would be dropped off at the same address as a special needs student could ride the bus as long as the special needs student's parents filled out a form. On information and belief, the Board developed the sibling transportation policy, and only the chairman of the Board could change the policy about who could ride the special needs bus.

¶ 7 Plaintiffs also stated that the "Guidelines for Principals Served by CWAs/Bus Aides" required school bus aides to report any behavioral problems to the principal or his designee and to "insist that children wear a seat belt at all times when the bus is in motion." Also, CPS described the essential functions of bus aides as including fastening seat belts around students and referring misbehaving students to the school principal.

¶ 8 Further, plaintiffs excerpted the CPS sexual harassment policy, which defined sexual harassment and outlined the procedure for addressing complaints. The sexual harassment policy stated that any person, such as a teacher, who receives a complaint "must refer it in writing, using the Sexual Harassment Information Form, to the Sexual Harassment Officer or designee no later than the end of the third business day following receipt of the complaint." The policy also provided that "[f]ailure to timely refer such complaints can be the basis for disciplinary action." Sworn policy statements, including one signed by Rago, required employees to sign off on the following: "I am required to report or cause a report to be made to the child abuse Hotline number whenever I have reasonable cause to believe a child known to me in my professional or official capacity may be abused or neglected."

¶ 9 Plaintiffs averred that A.V., who was not a student with physical or developmental disabilities and committed the assault, rode the special needs bus with his brother, allegedly under the sibling transportation policy. However, defendants did not receive, approve, or possess a written request from A.V.'s parents requesting that A.V. ride the bus with his brother, and the Board did not approve or issue an authorization for A.V. to ride the bus or create a route sheet granting A.V. permission to ride the bus with his brother. A.V. was not listed on the bus route roster checked by Sharp that would have allowed him to ride the bus, and Sharp never reviewed an annual parent authorization form for A.V. Further, A.V.'s brother left the Coonley School and stopped riding the bus no later than November 7, 2004, which ended any eligibility A.V. had to ride the bus. On May 5, 2005, the date of the final assault, A.V. should not have been on the bus, and neither Sharp nor the principal had the discretion to continue to allow A.V. to ride the bus. Moreover, Sharp and the principal directly violated CPS policy by allowing A.V. to keep riding the bus for months after his brother was taken off the route, when a parent should have been notified within a week.

¶ 10 Plaintiffs further alleged that Sharp failed to keep A.V. seat-belted in his assigned seat on the special needs bus and allowed him to roam around the bus at will. Numerous times, Sharp slept on the bus while functioning as a bus aide. Another student observed Sharp asleep on the bus, falling off her seat, and with her eyes closed on multiple occasions. This student would wake up Sharp when Sharp had to help a student off the bus and observe Sharp fall asleep until the next location. S.R. observed that Sharp was asleep when A.V. touched S.R.'s buttocks and put a pencil in her vagina at least once before May 5, 2005. Sharp advised S.R. that "you don't touch that part," indicating her private areas, and was required to report the behavior problems caused by A.V. S.R. informed her father that Sharp was sleeping on the occasions she was abused. S.R.'s father was informed by a second bus driver that Sharp slept on his bus as well.

¶ 11 Plaintiffs further alleged the details of incidents that happened before May 5, 2005. Two or three months before that date, S.R. came home from school with her hair and clothes disheveled and complained to her parents that a boy named A.V. or Alejandro was pulling her hair and grabbing her breasts and buttocks on the bus. Shortly afterwards, S.R.'s parents met with Rago twice, stating that a boy named A.V. or Alejandro was sexually and physically assaulting and bullying S.R. by pushing and kicking her, trying to touch her breasts and buttocks, and pulling her hair and shirt. When S.R.'s father requested that Rago and the school stop A.V.'s behavior, Rago responded that she did not have a student named A.V. or Alejandro in her class and she did not supervise any such student. According to plaintiffs, Rago did not...

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6 cases
  • Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 24 Marzo 2020
    ...whether and in what situations local governmental units are immune from civil liability." Reyes v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi. , 435 Ill.Dec. 452, 139 N.E.3d 123, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, the Board relies primarily on Sections 2-103, 2-205, and 4-102 of the Act, which p......
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    ...not willful and wanton failures to supervise activities or the use of public property)). Reyes v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2019 IL App (1st) 180593, 435 Ill.Dec. 452, 139 N.E.3d 123, is an instructive counter-example demonstrating this point. In that case, which involved ......
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    ...that failure to enforce them would qualify as conduct governed by Sections 2-103 and 2-205. See Reyes v. Bd. of Educ. , 435 Ill.Dec. 452, 139 N.E.3d 123, 133-35, 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (finding no immunity under §§ 2-103 and 2-205 for failure to enforce transit and sexual harassment polic......
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