Reyes v. Dart
| Decision Date | 29 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | 17 C 9223 |
| Parties | WILBERT REYES, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS DART, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, and SABRINA RIVERO-CANCHOLA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Wilbert Reyes, a detainee at Cook County Jail from May 28, 2017 to August 3, 2018, brought this suit against Cook County, Illinois, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart in his official capacity, and Sabrina Rivero-Canchola under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Doc. 1. The official capacity claims against Dart are functionally against the Cook County Sheriff's Department, which operates the Cook County Department of Corrections, which in turn operates the Jail, see DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cnty., 209 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989), so this opinion will refer to "Dart" and the "Jail" interchangeably.
With discovery completed and a jury trial set for June 3, 2019, Doc. 116, Reyes moves for partial summary judgment as to liability on the ADA and RA claims, Doc. 100, and Defendants cross-move for summary judgment on all claims, Docs. 104, 106. Reyes acquiesces to summary judgment on his § 1983 claims against all Defendants and on all his claims against Rivero-Canchola. Doc. 120 at 1. On the remaining ADA and RA claims, Reyes's motion is denied, Dart's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Cook County's motion is granted.
When considering Reyes's summary judgment motion, the facts are construed as favorably to Cook County and Dart as the record and Local Rule 56.1 permit, and when considering Cook County's and Dart's motions, the facts are construed as favorably to Reyes as the record and Local Rule 56.1 permit. See Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). The court does not vouch for the accuracy of any party's asserted facts. See Donley v. Stryker Sales Corp., 906 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2018). The court overrules Dart's and Cook County's hearsay objections to certain evidence submitted by Reyes, Doc. 121 at ¶¶ 66-67; Doc. 124 at ¶¶ 26, 32, 66, to the extent that the challenged out-of-court statements are offered not for their truth, but to prove that Defendants knew about Reyes's disability and need for an accommodation or to show how they responded when confronted with his complaints. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 801(c)(2); Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 735-36 (7th Cir. 2016) ().
Reyes has suffered from hearing loss since childhood. Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 2. He cannot hear out of his left ear, but can hear out of his right ear using a sound amplifying device like an Assistive Listening Device ("ALD") or a hearing aid. Ibid. Reyes used a hearing aidprior to his arrest, though he did not always wear it. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. Reyes did not have his hearing aid with him while in the Jail. Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 26.
Reyes knows some American Sign Language ("ASL") but is not fluent. Doc. 117 at ¶ 35; Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 3. The parties agree that Reyes has some lip-reading capability but dispute the details; Reyes asserts that "it's hard" for him to read lips "because ... everyone's lips are different," while Dart asserts that Reyes can read lips well. Doc. 117 at ¶¶ 60, 72; Doc. 118 at ¶¶ 14, 20. Reyes can speak, though he has "a problem with [his] voice" due to his hearing disability. Doc. 117 at ¶ 37; Doc. 118 at ¶ 11. (Reyes's objection to Dart's assertion that he spoke rather than signed during his deposition, Doc. 117 at ¶ 37, is overruled because the assertion correctly characterizes the record materialcited by Dart.) Reyes can read faces and gestures and can communicate in writing. Id. at ¶¶ 59-60. There is no evidence in the record concerning whether Reyes can hear others speak when they use voice amplifying devices.
Reyes asserts that his preferred communication method is using sign language while hearing sound. Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 4. Dart asserts that Reyes prefers to speak and read lips. Doc. 117 at ¶ 72.
Dart has "custody and care" of Cook County Jail. See 55 ILCS 5/3-6017; Doc. 124 at ¶ 5; Doc. 118 at ¶ 7. Reyes was booked into the Jail on May 28, 2017. Doc. 117 at ¶ 6; Doc. 118 at ¶ 8. Reyes contends that he told many officers during intake that he was deaf or hard of hearing, but that no ASL interpreter or ALD was provided to him and no medical alert about his disability was issued. Doc. 117 at ¶¶ 7-8; Docs. 121, 124 at ¶¶ 26-27. Dart asserts that Reyes did not alert the Jail's intake staff to his disability. Doc. 117 at ¶¶ 7-8; Doc. 124 at ¶ 26.
From May 29 until June 9, 2017, Reyes was housed in Division 9, Tier 1B. Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 29. He then was moved to Division 9, Tier 2E, where he remained until July 24, 2017. Id. at ¶ 31. Reyes asserts that he repeatedly notified correctional officers in Tier 2E that he was hearing impaired and requested accommodations, but that the officers just laughed in response. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 32. A medical alert notifying Jail staff that Reyes was hearing impaired was issuedon July 17, 2017, and a second medical alert classifying him as deaf was issued on July 26, 2017. Doc. 117 at ¶ 9; Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 30. At some point in July 2017, Division 9 staff notified Rivero-Canchola, the Jail's ADA coordinator, Doc. 117 at ¶ 21; Doc. 118 at ¶ 6, that Reyes might have a hearing disability. Doc. 117 at ¶ 12.
On July 24, 2017, Reyes was moved to the Residential Treatment Unit ("RTU") in Division 8. Id. at ¶ 15; Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 49. (Cook County's objection to Reyes's assertion concerning the dates he was housed in the RTU, Doc. 121 at ¶ 49, is overruled because the record material cited by Reyes supports the assertion.) Rivero-Canchola met with Reyes in the RTU before the end of July 2017. Doc. 117 at ¶ 14. Dart asserts that Reyes communicated effectively with and appeared to understand Rivero-Canchola at the July 2017 meeting. Ibid. Reyes disputes this account, pointing to his deposition testimony that he could not understand Rivero-Canchola and asked her to bring an interpreter to their next meeting. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25, 58; Doc. 102-2 at 46. . Reyes also asserts that he requested ALD access at the July 2017 meeting, but Dart asserts that Reyes did not request auxiliary aids at that meeting. Doc. 117 at ¶ 24.
Rivero-Canchola and Reyes met again in August 2017. Id. at ¶ 27. Rivero-Canchola brought an interpreter at Reyes's request. Id. at ¶ 32; Doc. 102-2 at 46. Rivero-Canchola arranged for Reyes's transfer to Division 10, which occurred on August 16, 2017. Doc. 117 at ¶ 18; Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 71. In an August 22, 2017 email, Rivero-Canchola told Jane Grubster, a director at the Jail, that Reyes was "partially deaf" and that his "main form of communication is ASL, but he can speak a bit and read lips." Docs. 121, 124 at ¶ 53. Rivero-Canchola addedthat if Reyes were put on a "group based tier we can get the [ALD] for him to use in groups." Ibid.
On November 16, 2017, Reyes was sent to the "hole" as a disciplinary measure. Doc. 117 at ¶ 19. On January 1, 2018, he was transferred back to Division 10, where (apart from a brief stint in the...
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