Reyes v. Outdoor Detail, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:15-cv-00086-SLC |
| Parties | JOSE REYES, Plaintiff, v. OUTDOOR DETAIL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Jose Reyes filed this case against his former employer, Defendant Outdoor Detail, Inc. ("Outdoor Detail"), in Allen Superior Court on March 2, 2015, advancing a claim of national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and a state-law retaliation claim for asserting his rights under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act, that is, a Frampton claim.1 Outdoor Detail removed the case here under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the basis of Reyes's § 1981 claim.2
Now before the Court is Outdoor Detail's motion for summary judgment (DE 16), together with a supporting memorandum (DE 17), filed on April 19, 2016, asserting that Outdoor Detail is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of Reyes's claims. Reyes filed a response in opposition to the motion (DE 20) on June 3, 2016, together with his affidavit insupport (DE 20-1). Outdoor Detail timely filed a reply brief (DE 25), together with supplemental evidence (DE 26), and Reyes later submitted supplemental case law to the Court (DE 28; DE 29).3 The motion for summary judgment is ripe for ruling.
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Outdoor Motion's motion for summary judgment as to Reyes's § 1981 discrimination claim. The Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reyes's Frampton claim and will remand the case to state court.
Reyes, who is Hispanic and has brown skin, filed this case against Outdoor Detail in Allen Superior Court on March 2, 2015, alleging that Outdoor Detail discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin in violation of § 1981, and that Outdoor Detail retaliated against him for asserting his rights to worker's compensation benefits in violation of Indiana law.5 (DE 2). On April 14, 2015, Outdoor Detail removed the case here on the grounds that Reyes's § 1981 discrimination claim created federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (DE 1).
Reyes worked for Outdoor Detail on a seasonal basis for several months in each 2011, 2012, and 2013. (DE 16-1 at 1-2 ¶¶ 5, 8-12, 15; DE 20-1 at 1 ¶ 2; DE 26). His job duties included installing sprinklers, fitting pipes, general labor, driving, and performing some demolition. (DE 20-1 at 1 ¶ 3).
Reyes was first hired by Outdoor Detail on April 11, 2011. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 5). Within a few months, Reyes was reprimanded after being caught smoking on a hospital work site that had a no-smoking policy on its grounds. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 7). Once reprimanded, Reyes walked one-half mile off the property to smoke on a public road. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 7). Outdoor Detail terminated Reyes's employment when he returned to work on July 5, 2011, for walking off the job site. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 7).
In September 2012, Reyes begged the owner of Outdoor Detail, Kevin Mullendore, to give him another chance and rehire him. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 8). Mullendore decided to do so and rehired Reyes. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 8). In December 2012, as work began to slow down for the season, Reyes notified Outdoor Detail that he had other work to do, and he stopped showing up for work. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 9).
On March 12, 2013, Reyes returned to work at Outdoor Detail for the season. (DE 16-1 at 1 ¶ 10). On April 10, 2013, Reyes fell on the job, injuring his back, shoulder, and other parts of his body. (DE 20-1 at 2 ¶ 7). "Shortly after" being injured, Reyes reported the injury to Outdoor Detail (he does not say to whom specifically) and asked to use his worker's compensation insurance. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 8).
On April 24, 2013, Mullendore walked into a warehouse and found Reyes not workingand talking to another employee, hindering that employee from performing his tasks. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 12). Reyes was told to find work to do but that sweeping the floor was not an option. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 12). Reyes started sweeping the floor, and a foreman told him: "[Mullendore] did not want you sweeping, find something productive to do." (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 12). Reyes and the foreman exchanged words, after which Reyes stormed into the office and began yelling at Mullendore that he needed to go see a doctor and that Outdoor Detail needed to pay for it.6 (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶¶ 12-13). When Mullendore questioned him about that, Reyes continued to curse and to claim that he was injured at work two weeks earlier. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 13). Mullendore responded that Reyes was not permitted to use his worker's compensation insurance. (DE 20-1 at 1 ¶ 9). Mullendore then terminated Reyes's employment and banned him from the property. (DE 20-1 at 2 ¶ 10).
Mullendore considered Reyes's employment terminated as of April 24, 2013, because he had walked off the job. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 15). After Reyes left on April 24, 2013, Mullendore called the police to report the threatening nature of Reyes's comments and actions toward him and Outdoor Detail. (DE 16-1 at 2 ¶ 14).
Reyes generally claims in his affidavit that throughout his employment with Outdoor Detail he "was forced to do more difficult work than non-Hispanic white employees and denied workplace benefits offered to non-Hispanic white employees including paid time off, holiday pay, pay raises, and off-season unemployment insurance." (DE 20-1 at 1 ¶¶ 4-5). He furtherattests that "[t]here were non-Hispanic white employees who received these workplace benefits and had not worked a full continuous year."7 (DE 20-1 ¶ 5). Reyes also attests that he and other Hispanic employees were "called racially offensive names, including 'tomato pickers' and 'wetbacks.'" (DE 20-1 at 2 ¶ 6).
Reyes, however, does not describe how his work was more difficult than other non-Hispanic employees or provide an instance in which he was required to do more difficult work. Nor does he describe the circumstances in which, or the frequency with which, he and other Hispanic employees were subjected to derogatory language targeting their national origin or otherwise expressing a bias against Hispanics. Likewise, Reyes does not identify with specificity any similarly-situated non-Hispanic individuals who were assigned easier work tasks or who were given paid vacation days, holiday pay, off-season unemployment insurance, or pay raises despite having worked at Outdoor Detail for less than one full year. (See DE 20-1).
Summary judgment may be granted only if there are no disputed genuine issues of material fact. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court "may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder." Id. (citations omitted). The only task in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is "to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 507 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)). If the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770.
A court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and avoid "the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true," as "summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants." Id. (citations omitted). However, "a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Id. at 771 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
Outdoor Detail seeks summary judgment in its favor on Reyes's § 1981 discrimination claim. As already explained, Reyes claims that Outdoor Detail discriminated against him on the basis of his Hispanic national origin when it assigned him more difficult work tasks than non-Hispanic employees; denied him paid vacation days, holiday pay, off-season unemployment insurance, and pay raises; and subjected him to derogatory language targeting his Hispanic national origin.
"Section 1981 bars employers from discriminating and retaliating against employees based on the employee's race or national origin."8 Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 n.4 (7th Cir. 2006))."Race and national origin discrimination claims can be established in one of two ways: the direct and indirect methods of proof." Id. (citing Naficy v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2012)). Thus, the same analysis applies to theories of liability whether under Title VII or § 1981. See Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
The direct method requires the plaintiff to provide either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or national origin by the decision-maker. Tank, 758 F.3d at 805. "Direct evidence requires an admission of discriminatory intent." Id. (citing Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 2014)). Circumstantial evidence typically includes:
(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior toward, or comments directed at, other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class received systematically better treatment; or (3) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.
Id. (citing Alexander, 739 F.3d at 979).
The indirect method, that is, the...
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