Reyes v. State
| Decision Date | 15 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-03336,92-03336 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D467 Abel Oliveros REYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Abel Oliveros Reyes pleaded no contest to possession of cannabis. The trial court withheld adjudication and placed him on probation for five years. Mr. Reyes appeals the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress evidence and the imposition of certain conditions of probation and court costs. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. We further affirm condition 12 of Mr. Reyes' written probation order because that condition is statutorily mandated, Sec. 948.03(1)(i), Fla.Stat. (1991), and is reasonably related to his rehabilitation. We strike special conditions of probation numbers 4 and 10, and that portion of condition 6 that prohibits the use of alcohol to excess, because they are not statutorily mandated and were not orally pronounced at sentencing. See Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Labar v. State, 584 So.2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Although Mr. Reyes contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to obtain a high school diploma as a special condition of probation, our review of the sentencing transcript and the written order of probation reveals that no such condition was imposed.
The court granted rehearing en banc in this case because the panel opinion had implicitly approved an oral lump sum imposition of costs on the same day that such a procedure was disapproved by a different panel in Sutton v. State, 635 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Upon careful review of the costs assessed in this case, we have determined that this lump sum approach to costs does not allow for proper assessment of discretionary costs and presents serious difficulties for the clerks of court. For practical as well as legal reasons, the requirements described in Sutton are essential to the proper imposition of costs.
So long as the statutes establish a complex system of mandatory and discretionary costs, coupled with fines and restitution to various victims, all discretionary costs must be individually announced by the trial judge at sentencing to give the defendant an opportunity to object to the specific imposition. Written cost orders must assess both mandatory and discretionary costs with adequate disclosure of the statutory authority supporting the assessment so that the defendant, the appellate court, and those responsible for collecting and remitting payments of costs and restitution will be able to identify the basis for the assessment.
We renew en banc our holding that costs of prosecution under section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1991), must be expressly requested by a specific agency with adequate supporting documentation. Sutton, 635 So.2d 1032; Tennie v. State, 593 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). An award of such prosecutorial costs must be a case-specific decision that is announced by the trial judge on the record after consideration of the factors contained in the statute. Trial courts have no statutory authority to assess standard amounts as costs of prosecution to unspecified agencies without any record request, documentation, or hearing.
We further hold that there is no legal basis for the assessment of amounts payable to the Hillsborough County Court Improvement Fund. Although that fund undoubtedly serves a useful public purpose, costs must be authorized by a state statute, not by a county ordinance. No statute appears to authorize an assessment to this fund as either a cost or fine.
Finally, we hold that there is a legal basis for assessments to the Hillsborough County Drug Fund in cases involving drug offenses. Future cost orders, however, must describe this fund with reference to the statute and ordinance supporting its existence.
Accordingly, we strike the costs imposed in this case, with the exception of the $100 to the drug fund. On remand, the state may seek to reimpose appropriate costs.
Mr. Reyes and Mr. Sutton had virtually identical sentencing hearings on similar drug offenses. Both defendants entered open pleas in 1992 before the same circuit court judge. Their adjudications were withheld and they were placed on probation. In each case, the trial court orally announced that the defendant would be obligated to pay $600 as "court costs," and $100 to the Hillsborough County Drug "Education" Trust Fund. In Sutton, the costs were expressly described as a special condition of probation, while in this case that status was implied but never expressly stated. Neither defendant objected in the trial court to the lump sum imposition of costs, and neither requested an itemization of these costs.
In both cases, the trial court entered a form order of probation that has been used frequently in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, but which varies somewhat from the form in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e). Significantly, the local form does not contain a delineation of charges/costs/fees comparable to the form in the present version of rule 3.986(c). In Mr. Reyes' case, the form reflected $235 in "court costs," $250 for the court improvement fund, $115 as cost of prosecution, and $100 for the "Hillsborough County Drug Fund." Mr. Sutton's order is identical, except the court costs are $240, and the cost of prosecution is $110. Neither order contains references to any statutory authority for these assessments. Neither record contains any written or oral request for specific costs of prosecution by any agency entitled to such costs, nor any documentary support for such an award.
All costs, whether mandatory or discretionary, must be authorized by statute. "It is well settled that independently of special statutory authorization, the court has no power to award costs against a defendant on conviction." Lindsey v. Dykes, 129 Fla. 65, 67, 175 So. 792, 793 (1937). Thus, it is not the judiciary's role to establish categories of taxable costs, but merely to impose those costs that the legislature has approved for use either in all cases or in selected cases.
In a simpler world, a legislature might impose a single mandatory cost that would be assessed in all cases, collected by the clerk of the court from every criminal defendant, and remitted immediately to the state treasurer. But we do not live in simple times. The costs of crime are high, and they are spread among many governmental agencies and many private victims. Some crimes have special victims or warrant special crime prevention efforts. Most criminal defendants are not wealthy. In response, the legislature has increasingly enacted more complex cost statutes, created more crime-related trust funds, and given broader restitution rights to more citizens. 1
Anyone involved in the process of imposing and collecting costs and restitution should understand that an order imposing these items is only the first step, albeit a vital step, in a complicated economic reimbursement system. After a judge imposes $700 in total costs and restitution, it is unlikely that the costs will be paid in full immediately. Indeed, it is altogether possible that the costs will never be entirely paid. 2 The payments must be remitted to different governmental entities and to private victims. 3 Similar to a bankruptcy proceeding, some costs are given priority and others must wait in line. 4 Thus, the process of accurately collecting cost payments, remitting to the proper party in the proper amount, and maintaining accurate accounting records is no small task for the clerk of court and other parties involved in this process.
If the trial court does not adequately consider these complications at the inception of this process by conducting a thorough hearing on discretionary costs and by preparing an order accurately identifying each cost item, the whole process breaks down and ceases to have accountability. This problem has caused this court to insist that trial courts provide the statutory basis for every cost item imposed. Sutton, 635 So.2d 1032. This problem of accountability can be greatly alleviated by using the form prescribed in rule 3.986(c).
It is not uncommon for a criminal defendant to have caused injury that far exceeds his or her ability to pay. This is not a problem that should invoke much sympathy for the defendant. On the other hand, an order that imposes costs and restitution well beyond the defendant's ability to pay may have two undesirable results. First, a discretionary cost may have statutory priority over a victim's opportunity to collect restitution. 5 Second, an overwhelming burden of costs and restitution may directly or indirectly cause a defendant on probation to commit acts that result in a violation of probation. If there is actually a chance that a defendant can be rehabilitated through probation, then there is reason for society to forgive some costs. These policy concerns have caused the legislature to enact many discretionary costs that can only be imposed after case-specific consideration. Accordingly, this court has insisted that trial courts orally announce discretionary costs at sentencing hearings not only to avoid possible problems with due process, but also for other valid policy reasons.
Statutory costs that are truly "mandatory"...
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State v. Phillips
...all applicable mandatory costs will be imposed by virtue of the rendition of judgment and pronouncement of sentence." Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111, 116 (Fla.App.1995), superceded by statute as stated in Cook v. State, 896 So.2d 870 (Fla.App. 2005). Applying this rationale, we will consider......
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McNeil v. State
...that are truly ‘mandatory’ must be imposed in every judgment against every defendant convicted of a similar offense.” Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111, 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Waller v. State, 911 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Sectio......
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Mitchell v. State, 95-2671
...trial court was not required to announce these specific amounts orally. State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139 (Fla.1991); Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc). Because the remaining $100.00 (for "CLDA") 1) was not clearly described at sentencing, 2) lacks a specific statutor......
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Johnson v. State, 96-02641
...probation. We strike the $100 imposed for investigative costs. See Mickler v. State, 682 So.2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). On remand, the State may seek reimposition of this cost item after complying with section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1995),......