Reyes v. State

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: TOM GRAY
• Citation: Reyes v. State, 422 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 12 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 10–12–00205–CR.,10–12–00205–CR.
• Parties: Juan Jose REYES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

422 S.W.3d 18

Juan Jose REYES, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 10–12–00205–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

Oct. 31, 2013.

Rehearing Overruled Nov. 20, 2013.

Discretionary Review Refused Feb. 12, 2014.

John Kuchera, Waco, for Appellant.

Abel Reyna, Dist. Atty., Alex Bell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Waco, for Appellee.

Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice DAVIS, and Justice SCOGGINS.

OPINION

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice.

Juan Jose Reyes was convicted of Burglary of a Habitation and sentenced to 90 years in prison. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2011). Because the evidence is sufficient to support Reyes's conviction as a principal to the offense, Reyes was not charged as a party to the offense, and Reyes was not harmed by the trial court's error in denying Reyes's request for a mistake of fact instruction to the jury, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Background

Virginia Marquez lived in an apartment in Waco, Texas with three of her children. Reyes lived in the same apartment complex. On January 5, 2009, the Marquez family was away from their apartment from 1:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Virginia's youngest daughter arrived home from school at about 4:30 p.m. that day to find that the apartment had been burglarized. Entry was made through a kitchen window. Tires were piled up under the kitchen window and the security screw in the window had been removed. Missing from the apartment were a Seiko watch, some miscellaneous jewelry, some DVDs and a red, digital camera. Pawn tickets introduced into evidence showed that at about 3:00 p.m. that same day, Reyes pawned the Seiko watch at a shop in Waco and that at about 2:00 p.m. the next day, Reyes pawned the jewelry and digital camera at a shop in Lacy Lakeview. When the property was located at the pawn shops, it was returned to Virginia and an arrest warrant was issued for Reyes. Reyes was arrested in California on October 31, 2010.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Reyes contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction as a principal actor in the burglary. Specifically, he contends 1) there was no evidence that he personally possessed the stolen property; 2) the State did not demonstrate that Reyes's trial explanation for possession of the property was false or unreasonable; and 3) there was no evidence of flight from the crime scene.

At trial, Reyes testified that his former girlfriend, Rita Munoz, had items she wanted to pawn because she needed to raise gas money for Reyes to take her to the neighboring town of West. Reyes testified that he ultimately pawned the items for Rita because she did not have any identification which was necessary to be able to pawn items. He further testified that he did not know the items he pawned for Rita were stolen. Rita did not testify.

Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). This “familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex.Crim.App.2011).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has also explained that our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). And if the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Further, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Finally, it is well established that the factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person enters a habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or an assault. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2011). Direct evidence of entry is not required; that element may be established by inference, just as inferences may be used to prove the elements of any other offense. Poncio v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). A defendant's unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary permits an inference that the defendant is the one who committed the burglary. Id. Further, an appellant's exclusive and unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary in conjunction with the fact that he pawned the property very close to the burgled home are sufficient to support a burglary of a habitation conviction. Id.

It is not subject to reasonable dispute that the evidence discussed is thus legally sufficient to support the conviction for burglary unless, as Reyes argues, the State must also disprove the explanation Reyes gave to explain his undisputed possession of recently stolen property.

False or Unreasonable Explanation

Because it disposes of his other arguments under this issue, we first discuss Reyes's argument that the State had the burden to show that Reyes's trial explanation, that his former girlfriend, Rita, lawfully possessed the property and that he only pawned it for her because she had no identification, was false or unreasonable and that the State failed to carry that burden. Generally, if a defendant offers an explanation for his possession of the stolen property, the record must demonstrate that the explanation is false or unreasonable. Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Whether a defendant's explanation for possession of recently stolen property is true or reasonable is an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. The falsity or unreasonableness of an explanation may be shown by circumstantial evidence. See id. Reyes acknowledges a line of cases which hold that a defendant's explanation must be refuted in the record only if the explanation is made before trial.¹Espinosa v. State, 463 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (explanation given at trial only); see Valdez v. State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (op. on rh'g) (same); Grant v. State, 507 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (same); Simmons v. State, 493 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (same).

Reyes argues, however, that we should follow a different line of cases which hold that to relieve the State of its burden,² the defendant must first be given an opportunity to explain his possession of the stolen property prior to trial but failed to give one. He relies on an 1887 opinion by the Texas Supreme Court and two courts of appeals opinions issued in the 1990's. See Moreno v. State, 24 Tex.App. 401, 6 S.W. 299 (1887); Price v. State, 902 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no pet.); ³Hood v. State, 860 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, no pet.). Because, his argument continues, there was no evidence that Reyes was given the opportunity to explain his possession of the property prior to trial, the State still bore the burden to show Reyes's trial explanation to be false or unreasonable.

This particular argument has been previously raised in and rejected by the Eastland Court of Appeals. See Foster v. State, No. 11–04–00252–CR, 2005 WL 2401882, *2–3, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 8123, *6–7 (Tex.App.-Eastland Sept. 29, 2005, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); see also Caraveo v. State, Nos. 11–09–00082–CR & 11–09–00083–CR, 2010 WL 2862631, *2–3, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 5891, *6 (Tex.App.-Eastland July 22, 2010, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). After reviewing the opinions cited, we agree with the reasoning given by the Eastland Court:

Foster asserts that, in order to support an inference that he was guilty of burglary, the State had the burden to show that he was given the opportunity but failed to give a reasonable explanation for his possession of the stolen property, primarily relying upon Price v. State, 902 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no pet'n), and Hood v. State, 860 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, no pet'n), which in turn relied upon Moreno v. State, 24 Tex.App. 401, 6 S.W. 299 (Tex.1887). These opinions support Foster's assertion and would appear to be in conflict with this opinion. However, to the extent that those opinions might be in conflict with our holding, we choose to follow Hardesty, in which the record was silent as to whether the defendant had given a reasonable explanation for his possession of the stolen property, because it is an opinion of the Texas Court of [Criminal] Appeals and a more recent opinion than Moreno, a decision of a predecessor court. See Hardesty v. State, [656 S.W.2d 73,] 75 [ (Tex.Crim.App.1983) ]. We overrule Foster's second issue.

Foster, 2005 WL 2401882, *2–3, 2005...