Reyes v. Wilson Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. C-3-93-187.,C-3-93-187.
• Citation: 102 F.Supp.2d 798
• Parties: Florencio REYES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. WILSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Page 798

102 F.Supp.2d 798

Florencio REYES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. WILSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

No. C-3-93-187.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

September 21, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Firooz Taghi Namei, McKinney & Namei Co. LPA, Cincinnati, OH, for Florencio Reyes, MD, plaintiff.

Neil Frank Freund, Freund Freeze & Arnold, Dayton, OH, Robert Forrest Cowdrey, Jenks, Surdyk & Cowdrey Co., Dayton, OH, Stanley Robert Evans, Sidney, OH, for Wilson Memorial Hospital, defendant.

Robert Forrest Cowdrey, Jenks, Surdyk & Cowdry Co., Dayton, OH, for Bruce Urbanc, Michael Stark, Philip Edwards, Fred R. Haussman, Randall Welsh, Enrique C. Montana, defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 77); SAID MOTION SUSTAINED IN REGARD TO COUNTS THREE AND SEVEN; SAID MOTION SUSTAINED IN REGARD TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING IN COUNTS ONE, FIVE, SIX, AND EIGHT, TO THE EXTENT SAID CLAIMS ARE PREMISED ON ACTIVITIES RELATING TO A PROFESSIONAL REVIEW ACTION; SAID MOTION SUSTAINED IN REGARD TO THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES CONTAINED WITHIN COUNT FOUR, TO THE EXTENT SAID CLAIM ARISES UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION; SAID MOTION OVERRULED IN REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, TO THE EXTENT SAID REQUEST DOES NOT ARISE UNDER COUNTS THREE OR SEVEN; SAID MOTION OVERRULED IN REGARD TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS CONTAINED WITHIN COUNTS TWO AND FOUR; SAID MOTION OVERRULED IN REGARD TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN COUNTS ONE, FIVE, SIX, AND EIGHT, TO THE EXTENT SAID CLAIMS DO NOT RELATE TO PROFESSIONAL REVIEW ACTIONS; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY (DOC. # 85) OVERRULED; CONFERENCE CALL SET

RICE, Chief Judge.

This case arises from circumstances surrounding the restriction of the staff privileges of the Plaintiff, Dr. Florencio Reyes, at Defendant Wilson Memorial Hospital in April, 1992; the subsequent summary suspension of his privileges; and the alleged breach of a later agreement reached between the Plaintiff and the Hospital. In his Complaint (Doc. # 1), Plaintiff brings suit against the Hospital and six physicians, each of whom practices at the Hospital: Bruce Urbanc, D.O.; Michael Stark, D.O.; Phillip Edwards, D.O.; Fred R. Haussman, M.D.; Randall Welsh, M.D.; and Enrique C. Montana, M.D.

Plaintiff alleges the following claims for relief: conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Plaintiff of his medical practice, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, as codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (Count One); deprivation of his property right to membership on the Hospital's staff, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count Two); state-law claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel (Counts Three and Seven); deprivation of his right to due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Ohio Constitution (Count Four); state-law claims of tortious interference with contract and business relationships (Counts Five and Eight); and a state-law claim of defamation (Count Six).¹

This Court has federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over the federal claims asserted in Counts One, Two and Four. The Court may properly exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over the state-law claims alleged in Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight, as these claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Pending before the Court are two Motions. First, the Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 77), by which they seek the dismissal of all of the Plaintiff's claims against them on the grounds that they enjoy an immunity to damages from the Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152. Second, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(f) (Doc. # 85).

Because the resolution of the Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion turns upon legal aspects of the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will first discuss the background law. The Court then analyzes the merits of the Defendants' Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court determines that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is meritorious, at least in part, based on the present state of the record. The Court then examines the Plaintiff's Motion to determine whether the evidence sought by the Plaintiff would alter the record such that a different result would be reached on the merits of the Defendants' Motion, and to determine whether the Plaintiff should otherwise be permitted the extension of time requested in his Motion. Again, for reasons set forth below, the Court determines that Plaintiff is not entitled to such an extension of time.

I. Standard for Summary Judgment

The Court will first set forth the relative burdens of the parties once a motion for summary judgment is made. Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Of course, [the moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991) (The moving party has the "burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.") (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987)). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, "[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial." Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994) ("The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff"). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the non-moving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied "[i]f there are ... `genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992). Of course, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe, by determining which parties' affiants are more credible; rather, credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2726.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), "[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). See also, L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.1993); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.) ("Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment ...."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). Thus, a court is entitled to rely, in...