Reynolds v. Alabama Dept. of Transp.

Decision Date23 January 1998
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 85-T-665-N.,Civ.A. 85-T-665-N.
Citation996 F.Supp. 1118
PartiesJohnny REYNOLDS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Ann K. Wiggins, Russell W. Adams, Abigail P. Van Alstyne, Kimberly C. Page, Scott Gilliland, and Kell A. Simon, Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, AL, for Johnny Reynolds, plaintiff, and Cecil Parker, Frank Reed, Ouida Maxwell, Martha Ann Boleware, Florence Belser, Peggy Vonsherie Allen, and Jeffrey W. Brown, intervenor-plaintiffs.

Claudia H. Pearson, Nakamura & Quinn, Birmingham, AL, for Robert Johnson, intervenor-plaintiff.

Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr., R. Scott Clark, J. Michael Cooper, Fitzpatrick, Cooper & Clark, Birmingham, AL, for William Adams, Cheryl Caine, Tim Colquitt, William Flowers, Wilson Folmar, George Kyser, Becky Pollard, Ronnie Pouncey, Terry Robinson, Tim Williams, intervenors.

Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr., R. Scott Clark, J. Michael Cooper, Fitzpatrick, Cooper & Clark, Birmingham, AL, for Michael Grant, John D'Arville, and Andrew McCullough, intervenors.

Thomas R. Elliot, Jr., Allen R. Trippeer, Jr., Lisa W. Borden, C. Dennis Hughes, London & Yancey, Birmingham, AL, and William H. Pryor, Jr., Atty Gen. for the State of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Alabama. Dept. of Transp., Alabama State Personnel Dept., Jimmy Butts, in his official capacity as Director for Alabama Dept. of Transp., Halycon Vance Ballard, in her official capacity as Director of the Alabama State Personnel Dept., and Fob James, in his official capacity as Governor of the state of AL, defendants.

William P. Gray, Jr., Gray & Jauregui, Montgomery, AL, for Fob James, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, defendant.

Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York, NY, for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., amicus.

Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, for The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, amicus.

ORDER AND INJUNCTION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, Chief Judge.

The issue presented, in this long-standing lawsuit in which African-American plaintiffs have charged defendants Alabama Department of Transportation and Alabama State Personnel Department with employment discrimination, is the approval and adoption of ¶ 4 of article XIII of a partial settlement reached by the parties in 1993 and submitted to the court in 1994. Paragraph 4 provides:

"Offers of reclassification of incumbent employees to GCE:

Black persons (a) who are employed as of the effective date of the Settlement Decree with the Highway Department in jobs other than PCE [professional civil engineer], GRE [graduate registered engineer], or GCE [graduate civil engineer], and (b) have a degree in Civil Engineering or Civil Engineering Technology will, within 90 days following the effective date of the Settlement Decree, be offered reclassification to the GCE job."1

The defendants and the Adams intervenors (who are non-black employees of the Transportation Department) object to ¶ 4. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that ¶ 4 should be approved and adopted.2

I. BACKGROUND

In this lawsuit, initiated in May 1985, the plaintiffs charged that the defendants discriminated against them in employment because they are African-Americans, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. The plaintiffs represent a class of African-American merit and non-merit system employees and unsuccessful applicants. The defendants include the Alabama Department of Transportation, the Alabama State Personnel Department, and several State officials. The jurisdiction of the court has been invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

The parties reached a full settlement of this case in 1988, but the court refused to approve the proposed consent decree in the face of numerous objections from the members of the plaintiff class. See Reynolds v. King, 790 F.Supp. 1101 (M.D.Ala.1990). Litigation then resumed.

A trial was held in 1992 that extended over several months, but ended before completion when the parties announced that they might be able to settle the litigation again. In 1993, the parties reached a second, albeit only partial, settlement. In the wake of this new partial settlement, the court allowed a group of non-class members — consisting mostly of white employees of the Department of Transportation and now commonly referred to as the `Adams intervenors' — to intervene and challenge any race-conscious provisions in the settlement. See Reynolds v. Roberts, 846 F.Supp. 948 (M.D.Ala.1994).

The new partial settlement was submitted to the court for approval in 1994. One part of the settlement was approved by the court and incorporated into what is now commonly known as "consent decree I."3 The court has reserved ruling on other parts of the settlement. Paragraph 4 is contained in those parts on which the court has reserved ruling.4

A.

The remedial provision in ¶ 4 of article XIII of the new settlement was based on evidence presented at trial in 1992, which reflected that the Transportation Department had intentionally refused to hire African-Americans as GCEs because of their race. The evidence was, in substance, as follows.

For the first three-quarters of this century, the State of Alabama and its agencies excluded African-Americans, because of their race, from employment other than in low and menial positions, and throughout the last quarter of this century, despite outstanding court orders, the Transportation Department manipulated, or even circumvented, State personnel procedures to avoid hiring and promotion of African-Americans into responsible and non-menial jobs.

Frazer Litigation: In the late 1960s, the United States brought an action against the Alabama State Personnel Department challenging personnel practices which it contended intentionally discriminated against African-American applicants and employees. In 1970, in United States v. Frazer, 317 F.Supp. 1079 (M.D.Ala.1970), this court agreed with the United States, and found that agencies of the State of Alabama had engaged in a State-sanctioned policy of manipulating and circumventing the State's personnel procedures to avoid the hiring and promotion of African-Americans.5 317 F.Supp. at 1084-87. The court found intentional, pervasive, systematic exclusion and avoidance of black employees and applicants throughout numerous State departments.

The evidence demonstrated that racial discrimination was accomplished in several ways, many of which involved manipulations of personnel practices and procedures to exclude eligible and qualified black employees from competing for jobs. The evidence over-whelmingly showed refusals to hire, or even to interview, African-Americans who had qualified and appeared on the certificates of eligibles, despite an urgent and constant need to fill positions. Id. at 1087. It also showed that agencies maintained racially segregated facilities in their buildings. Id. Indeed, John S. Frazer, director of the Personnel Department, testified to his belief that the race of applicants was a legitimate factor for consideration in selecting employees. Id. at 1085.

The court found that "defendants' systematic refusal to appoint Negro applicants and their preference for lower-ranking white applicants constitute unlawful race discrimination[,] ... a clear violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1089-91. The court entered similar findings on the defendants' recruitment and advertising practices.

The court entered an order broadly prohibiting State officials from "engaging in any employment practices, including recruitment, examination, appointment, training, promotion, retention, or any other personnel action, for the purpose or with the effect of discriminating against any employee, or actual or potential applicant for employment, on the ground of race or color." Id. at 1090. The court further imposed what has come to be known as the `no-bypass rule,' which provides that State officials "shall not appoint or offer a position to a lower-ranking white applicant on a certificate in preference to a higher-ranking available Negro applicant, unless the defendants have first contacted and interviewed the higher-ranking Negro applicant and have determined that the Negro applicant cannot perform the functions of the position, is otherwise unfit for it, or is unavailable." Id. at 1091.

Six years later, in the same litigation, similar allegations were again before the court. The United States charged that State personnel practices were systematically and deliberately manipulated to prevent blacks from competing with white applicants for jobs and promotions. In an order entered August 1976, the court found a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in employment in the Transportation Department (then known as the Highway Department). See United States v. Frazer, civil action no. 2709-N, 1976 WL 729 (M.D.Ala. Aug. 20, 1976).

Specifically, the court found that the new defendants, including the Transportation Department, "avoided compliance with the decrees in this case by examining job registers maintained by the Personnel Department of the State of Alabama and by requesting certificates of eligibles only at times when no blacks were available for certification." Id. at *4. The court also pointed out other evidence of discriminatory practices, including maintaining registers on a non-continuous basis (establishing a register and not adding any persons until that register is exhausted and another exam is administered),...

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6 cases
  • Reynolds v. Alabama Dept. of Transp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • April 13, 1998
  • Reynolds v. McInnes
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • July 22, 2003
    ...court, except for one paragraph of Consent Decree II that the district court approved and adopted in Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 996 F.Supp. 1118, 1119-20 (M.D.Ala.1998). We reversed its order doing so in Reynolds III, holding that the court erred in sua sponte entering an injunction......
  • Reynolds v. Alabama Dept. of Transp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • June 25, 1998
    ...23, 1998, the court entered an order adopting ¶ 4 of article XIII, which was part of consent decree II. See Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 996 F.Supp. 1118 (M.D.Ala. 1998) (Doc. no. 2413). The remainder of consent decree II and all of consent decree III are still under submission wit......
  • Reynolds v. Butts
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • May 23, 2001
    ...plaintiff classes, and the individual members thereof, with respect to its hiring and promotion decisions. See Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 996 F.Supp. 1156 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (memorandum opinion explaining the basis for the entry of judgment on April 16, 1997). The Department and the A......
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