Reynolds v. Board of Com'rs of Oneida County

• Decision Date: 28 December 1899
• Citation: 6 Idaho 787,59 P. 730
• Parties: REYNOLDS v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ONEIDA COUNTY
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

59 P. 730

6 Idaho 787

REYNOLDS v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ONEIDA COUNTY

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 28, 1899

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELEGATION OF POWER.-A power or function vested in one department body, board, or tribunal by express constitutional provision, cannot be delegated by such department, body board or tribunal to another department, body, board or tribunal.

SAME-FIXING SALARIES OF COUNTY OFFICERS.-Act of March 2, 1899, provides a uniform basis, reasonable compensation, throughout the state for the fixing of salaries of county officers; is general in its operation; does not delegate legislative functions, does not contravene the constitution, and is a valid act. Stookey v. Board of County Commrs., ante, p. 542, 57 P. 312 affirmed.

APPEAL from District Court, Oneida County.

Cause remanded.

D. W Standrod and J. W. Eden, for Appellants.

It is true that our supreme court has suggested in the case of Stockey v. Board of County Commrs., ante, p. 542, 57 P. 312, that an appeal would lie from these orders, the same as in other cases. The question of an appeal from an order of this character was not before the supreme court in that case, however, and we beg leave to submit that an appeal was not contemplated by the statute known as the "county salary bill," and that appeals from orders of this character have never been allowed by the courts, even under a statute so broad as the provisions of our Revised Statutes, section 1776, providing for appeals by "any person aggrieved." The power conferred upon the board of commissioners by the salary bill is in the nature of legislative--not in a literal sense legislative, but in the broader sense--and when the board under this statute fixes the salaries, it acts as a legislative body thus far and does not act judicially. The distinction between a judicial and legislative act is well defined. The one determines what the law is and what the rights of parties are, with reference to transactions already had; the other prescribes what the law shall be in future cases arising under it. (Throop on Public Officers, sec. 532; Mabry v. Baxter, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 682.) The action of the commissioners in fixing the salaries was essentially the exercise of a legislative power, because they established by their order what the law should be in the future, and not what any officer was entitled to for services already rendered. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 113; Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627; Stockey v. Board of County Commrs., ante, p. 542, 57 P. 312; Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal. 194, 8 P. 852.) The power to fix the salaries, being a legislative function, cannot be given by the legislature to the judiciary. (Norwalk St. Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 A. 1080, 38 A. 708, 39 L. R. A. 794; Shepherd v. City of Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635.) An appellant, to obtain a reversal in cases which involve the exercise of discretion must show the denial of a legal right. (2 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 410; Howell v. Mills, 53 N.Y. 322.)

George E. Gray and Dietrich, Chalmers & Stevens, for Respondents.

"Sec. 1776. An appeal may be taken from any order, decision or action of the board while acting in an official capacity, by any person aggrieved thereby, or by any taxpayer of the county when any demand is allowed against the county, or when he deems any order, decision or action of the board illegal or prejudicial to public interests." (Stookey v. Board of County Commrs, ante, p. 542, 57 P. 312.) But counsel say the expression of the court in Stookey v. Board etc. was unnecessary, and is mere obiter. In one sense possibly it was not necessary, but in no real sense is it obiter. Essentially it is a vital part of the decision. The court had under consideration the constitutionality of the act. The inference from a careful reading of the decision is irresistible that the court reached the decision that the act was not violative of the spirit of the constitution, upon the theory and condition, and not otherwise, that the power conferred upon the board was not absolute, unreasonable and despotic, but a discretionary power, to be exercised in good faith and in reason, and subject to review by the courts and to such theory and condition the court concluded it best to give definite expression.

QUARLES, J. Huston, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

OPINION

QUARLES, J.

At the general election in 1898, D. J. Reynolds was elected to the office of clerk of the district court, and ex-officio auditor and recorder, in and for Oneida county; P. C. Bingham was elected to the office of sheriff of said county; J. E. Dalley was elected to the office of superintendent of public schools of said county; and Alice Thews was elected to the office of treasurer of said county. At the April meeting, 1899, of the board of county commissioners in and for said county, said board made an order, under the provisions of the act of March 7, 1899 (Sess. Acts 1899, pp. 405-407), fixing the salaries of the different county officers in and for said county. The salaries of the officers in question were fixed by said order as follows, to wit: Clerk of the district court and ex-officio auditor and recorder, at the sum of $ 900 per annum; sheriff, at $ 900 per annum; superintendent of schools, at $ 500 per annum; and treasurer, at $ 500 per annum,--for 1898 and 1899. From said order four several appeals were taken by the officers above named, respectively, to the district court, and by stipulation it was agreed at the commencement of the hearing in the district court that said four appeals "might be tried together, and that the judgment entered by the court might modify or affirm the order of the board of commissioners appealed from so as to cover the amount of salary to be allowed the respective officers involved in said appeal, as though each appeal had been heard separately, and a separate judgment entered in each thereof." The district court rendered judgment that the said order of the board of county commissioners be modified as follows, to wit: "The decision of the court is that the order of the board of county commissioners hereto appealed from is remanded to said board with instructions that they modify said order by striking out from the salary of county treasurer the figures '$ 500,' and insert in lieu thereof the figures '$ 700'; strike out from the salary of sheriff the figures '$ 900,' and insert in lieu thereof the figures '$ 1,400'; strike out from the salary of the clerk of the district court the figures '$ 900,' and insert in lieu thereof the figures '$ 1,500'; strike out in the salary of the superintendent of schools the figures '$ 500', and insert in lieu thereof the figures '$ 800.' Each party to this action to pay his own costs." From said judgment of the district court the appellants, the board of county commissioners, appeal to this court.

The appellants contend that the judgment should be reversed on four different grounds, viz.: 1. Because the court erred in overruling the objection of the appellants to the introduction of any evidence; 2. Because there are no findings of fact that support the judgment; 3. That the power to fix the salaries in question is a legislative function, and therefore not reviewable by the courts; 4. That in making the orders appealed from the board of commissioners were exercising a discretionary power, and violated no law, and therefore the said orders could not be reviewed upon appeal. We will discuss the different questions involved without reference to the order in which they are stated.

It is a well-settled rule that a power or function vested solely in one department, body, board or tribunal by express constitutional provision cannot be delegated by such department, body, board or tribunal to another department body, board or tribunal. The legislature cannot delegate the functions expressly vested in it by the constitution to boards of county commissioners or to the judiciary. If, as contended by appellants, the act in question, popularly known as the "Salary Bill," delegates to the board of county commissioners in the various counties a legislative power in the matter of fixing the salaries of county officers, then the said act should be held unconstitutional and void. But we do not so consider the act. It does not vest or attempt to vest in the board of commissioners the power to make law. The act in question is of general and uniform operation throughout the state. It fixes the basis upon which the salary of county officers in each county in the state is to be fixed. That basis is the same in each, and is reasonable compensation for the services to be performed, taking into consideration the character of the services, amount of labor to be performed, and such surrounding circumstances as affect the cost of living and supporting one's self at the county seat of his county compatible with the dignity of the...