Reynolds v. City of Dayton

• Decision Date: 04 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. C-3-81-569.,C-3-81-569.
• Citation: 533 F. Supp. 136
• Parties: Richard L. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DAYTON, Ohio, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

533 F. Supp. 136

Richard L. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v.CITY OF DAYTON, Ohio, et al., Defendants.

No. C-3-81-569.

United States District Court, S. D. Ohio, W. D.

January 4, 1982.

Dwight D. Brannon, Vic Hodge, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Thomas Petkewitz, City Atty., J. Anthony Sawyer, Dayton, Ohio, for defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISSPLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TO STRIKE CERTAIN DOCUMENTS FROM FILE

RICE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court pursuant to the Motion of all Defendants herein to dismiss the Complaint, to dismissthe Plaintiff's Request for a Preliminary Injunction, and to strike certain documents from the file.In support of their Motion to dismiss the Complaint, Defendants have submitted a Memorandum, in which they contend that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present action.In addition, certain procedural irregularities have been objected to by Defendants in part A of their Memorandum.Plaintiff has submitted a brief Memorandum in Opposition, which addresses the substantive arguments of the Defendants, but does not comment upon the procedural issues raised by them.

Briefly, the relevant background of this action, as stated in the Complaint, and accepted as true for the purpose of ruling upon this motion, United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,342 U.S. 371, 373, 72 S.Ct. 350, 351, 96 L.Ed. 417(1952), is as follows.The Plaintiff, Richard Reynolds, is employed by the City of Dayton as a police officer in the City of Dayton Police Department.On June 28, 1978, the City of Dayton enacted OrdinanceNo. 25558(hereinafter Residency Rule), which specifies, inter alia, that those persons living in the city as of the effective date of the ordinance shall remain resident therein as long as they remain in the classified service and that those persons living outside of the City of Dayton, but who are residents of Montgomery County, shall continue to maintain that status as long as they remain in a classified service.The Residency Rule further provides that violations shall be grounds for dismissal in accordance with the City Charter.At the time the Residency Rule took effect, Reynolds was residing outside the Dayton City Limits.Thereafter, on July 14, 1978, Reynolds moved into the City, and at some later date, undisclosed by the Complaint, moved out of the City, to Centerville, Ohio.On October 6, 1981, Plaintiff was notified that he was charged with breaching Rule 18,Section 2(F) of the Civil Services Rules of Dayton, Ohio, for which discharge is merited, because he had not complied with the Residency Rule.Plaintiff then filed a Complaint herein, on November 18, 1981, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982,1983,1985,1988, and2000a et seq., alleging as a jurisdictional basis, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331and1343.Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the City had violated his right to equal protection by selectively enforcing the Residency Rule.Plaintiff further claimed that similarly situated employees had been treated in a dissimilar fashion, because some employees had been dismissed for violating the Residency Rule, while others had received lesser sanctions.

On November 24, 1981, Plaintiff filed a Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, which was granted by this Court on November 25, 1978, upon a finding that Plaintiff's First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association, i.e., his participation in a pending Fraternal Order of Police election, would be irreparably harmed by the disciplinary hearing which was scheduled for November 30, 1981.In particular, the Court reasoned that later reinstatement pursuant to administrative or court action could not restore to Plaintiff his right to participate in that election.

In an entry filed November 30, 1981(Doc. # 20), the Court set forth a schedule of events leading up to the oral hearing on Plaintiff's Request for a Preliminary Injunction, which was to have been held on Monday, December 14, 1981.To this end, Defendants were directed to file a motion to dismiss by Tuesday, December 1, 1981, with a contra memorandum being due from Plaintiff by Monday, December 7, 1981.If further reply was deemed necessary by Defendants, said reply was to be filed by Wednesday, December 9, 1981.The Court further indicated that a decision would be rendered on the matters raised, without oral hearing, by Friday, December 11, 1981.On that date, the Court briefly communicated to counsel its oral decision on the pending motions, without advancing its reasons therefor.This opinion will set forth this Court's basis for overruling the Defendants' motions.The parties filed memoranda as directed, and the matter now comes before the Court for determination.With the above background in mind, the Court now turns to consideration of the issues presented by the Defendants' motions.

I.THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

The Defendants base their motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint on three grounds, to wit: res judicata, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and abstention.

A.Res Judicata

Defendants have contended that this action must be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata because the constitutionality of the Residency Rule has been upheld in two Ohio cases, one of which, Dayton Public Service Union Local 101 v. City of Dayton,No. 79-558(Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County, Dec. 16, 1980), involved the same ordinance which is at issue herein.In addition, Defendants have indicated that Plaintiff was a party to that action by virtue of his membership in the class certified therein.Plaintiff has not disputed that he was a party to that action, but has argued that res judicata is not applicable to this action, which involves different issues than those which were previously litigated.

In Commissioner v. Sunnen,333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898(1948), the Supreme Court stated that:

The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause of action ....The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."

Id. at 597, 68 S.Ct. at 719, quoting fromCromwell v. County of Sac,94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195(1876).Applying this standard herein, this Court is in agreement with the Defendants that the constitutionality of the Residency Rule may not be relitigated in this action, and therefore, the following portions of the Complaint must be dismissed: ¶ 20; that portion of ¶ 25 which refers to enactment, as opposed to enforcement, of the Residency Rule; the Fourth Cause of Action, i.e., ¶ 28 and ¶ 29; and, the Fifth Cause of Action, i.e., ¶ 30 and 31.¹

However, the Court has also concluded that the issue of unequal application of the Residency Rule is not barred from determination herein either by res judicata or by collateral estoppel, since there is no indication that the potential application of the Residency Rule as alleged herein, was ever an issue in the actions cited to this Court.In fact it does not appear possible that such an issue could have been raised previously, in light of the fact that Plaintiff was not notified of his alleged violation of the Residency Rule until October, 1981, well after the termination of the prior litigation.Thus, there appears to be no basis for applying res judicata or collateral estoppel to the issue of the allegedly unequal enforcement of the Residency Rule. 333 U.S. at 598, 68 S.Ct. at 719.Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the remaining portions of the complaint, under the doctrine of res judicata, must be denied.

B.Exhaustion of Remedies

As a second argument for dismissal, Defendants have claimed that a civil rights action is barred where other remedies, such as administrative remedies, are available and have not been exhausted.The Plaintiff has responded by indicating that exhaustion is not required when the remedy is inadequate, or where the hearing body is biased.In Gibson v. Berryhill,411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1691, 36 L.Ed.2d 488(1973)(Gibson), the Supreme Court noted that generally, where state administrative proceedings are pending, "the exhaustion doctrine would require the Court to delay action until the administrative phase of the state proceedings is terminated, at least where coverage or liability is contested and administrative expertise, discretion or fact-finding is involved."Id. at 574, 93 S.Ct. at 1695.However, the Court also stated that:

This Court has expressly held in recent years that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal courtplaintiff states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. at 574, 93 S.Ct. at 1695.(citations omitted).The Sixth Circuit has also explicitly held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required in a § 1983 action.Jones v. Metzger,456 F.2d 854, 856(6th Cir.1972)(Jones).Therefore, this Court concludes that the exhaustion requirement does not apply herein,² since Plaintiff has stated an otherwise good cause of action under § 1983.³

C.Abstention

As a third ground for dismissal, Defendants have maintained that this Court should not interfere with pending state proceedings.Although Defendants have not specifically characterized the theory to which they are referring, the Court assumes that Defendants have requested that this Court refrain or abstain from considering the claims herein, either under the Younger doctrine, Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669(1971)(Younger), or under the Pullman...