FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Petitioner Justin Glenn Reynolds, at the time a Texas prisoner, filed in the Eastern District of Texas a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning his Navarro County conviction for possession of a controlled substance, asserting that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective and that his trial was constitutionally deficient. See Dkt. Nos. 1 & 2.
After the resulting habeas case was transferred to this district, see Dkt. No. 5, it was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn.
The State filed a response opposing relief. See Dkt. No. 17. And Reynolds filed an out-of-time reply brief. See Dkt. Nos. 20-25.
The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny Reynolds's request for federal habeas relief.
"The jury convicted Justin Reynolds of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court assessed punishment at 25 years confinement." Reynolds v. State, No. 10-15-00124-CR, 2016 WL 1394644, at *1 (Tex. App. - Waco Apr. 7, 2016, no pet.); see also State v. Reynolds, No. C35736-CR (Cnty. Court at Law, Navarro Cnty., Tex.).
This version of the facts underlying his conviction are from his appellate brief:
Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his wife, Jennifer Reynolds .... The vehicle, a white Chevy Tahoe, was registered in the name of Appellant and his wife. Trooper Grauzer stopped the vehicle early in the morning for failure to signal a left hand turn. At the outset of the traffic stop, which was recorded in its entirety on the Trooper's dash-cam video, Mrs. Reynolds requested to be able to step out and speak to the trooper. She informed him that she believed she had warrants and that she did not have a valid license. She provided him with a story as to why she was on the road at that time with no license that he found suspicious. She told him her baby, which was in the back seat, was not breathing right and was turning purple. However, Trooper Grauzer had observed the baby asleep in a car seat in the back and the baby appeared to be completely fine and in no distress. Mrs. Reynolds had a red rash all over her face and arms. She was anxious and talking very fast. She did not know the name of a friend in the back seat who she said was at her house working on the computer. As she sat in the patrol car with Trooper Grauzer, she talked about her prior involvement with drugs and her stress level. Trooper Grauzer received a radio communication from a Navarro County Sheriff Deputy Shane Richards that indicated that Mrs. Reynolds was involved in narcotics and the deputy advised he was on route. The deputy further asked Trooper Grauzer to identify the passengers. This advice could have been for further investigation or as a warning regarding the safety of the situation. It was confirmed that Mrs. Reynolds had an invalid license. Mrs. Reynolds informed the trooper that both passengers had been drinking that night. Trooper Grauzer wrote Mrs. Reynolds a citation, and allowed her to get back into the vehicle while he identified the passengers. He allowed her to think that he was going to "cut her loose"because he was afraid of the situation and he felt he needed back up to continue to investigate the situation which included assessing if anyone had a valid license and was not impaired. Although he told her he was "cutting her loose" he had no intention of doing so at that time. The trooper returned to the vehicle to ask the passengers for ID. The back seat passenger was identified as Joshua Black. The dispatcher reported that there were warrants for Mr. Black and he was removed from the vehicle. As trooper Grauzer talked with Black outside the vehicle about the warrants, Deputy Richards arrived and located a black bag on the ground near the back passenger door. The bag was retrieved and opened and it contained drug paraphernalia. Mr. Black claimed the bag and its contents. The officers then began a full search of the Tahoe. During the search, officers first discovered pills near Mrs. Reynolds purse. Mrs. Reynolds and Appellant indicated to officers that there was more methamphetamine tucked up under the console. Officers then discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine stuffed up into the bottom of the dashboard near the steering column. Appellant told officers that Black had passed the bag from the back seat to Mrs. Reynolds and told her to hide it there. He pointed out a [trail] of loose crystals that indicated that methamphetamine had been passed between the driver's seat and the back seat where Mr. Black had been sitting. Also, they discovered a small baggie of methamphetamine on the driver's floorboard.
Additionally, Appellant alerted officers to a gun in the backseat that was also claimed by Mr. Black. Testimony from Joshua Black and Jennifer Reynolds support the State's argument that Appellant knew the drugs were in the car because he helped load his things into the car and had seen all of the methamphetamine, that the three of them had made an agreement for the Appellant and his wife to drive Mr. Black to Houston in exchange for 14 grams of methamphetamine, that they had driven him around to do his narcotics business on prior occasions, that they had all smoked meth from the same large bag that was found earlier in the day, and that on that very night, Black had weighed out amounts from the stash on his digital scale for both Appellant and Mr. Black to effectuate drug sales, which they in fact carried out that night. Further, both Black and Mrs. Reynolds testified that the three of them discussed where to hide the drugs and who was going to take the blame while waiting inside the car for the trooper to come back. Finally, Black testified that Appellant had driven the Tahoe earlier that night as they transported the drugs from Lancaster to North Dallas to Corsicana and up until the first stop in Corsicana where Jennifer took the wheel for the remainder of the journey. The Tahoe was registered in both Mrs. Reynolds and Appellant's names.
Dkt. No. 16-11 at 6-9 (record citations omitted).
Reynolds's criminal judgment was affirmed after his court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), expressing her opinion that Reynolds's appeal was frivolous, and Reynolds failed to file a pro se appellate brief. See Reynolds, 2016 WL 1394644, at *1.
While Reynolds did not petition the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") for discretionary review, he did pursue state habeas relief. See Ex parte Reynolds, C-35736 (Cnty. Court at Law, Navarro Cnty., Tex.). And the CCA denied his habeas application without written order on findings of trial court without hearing. See Ex parte Reynolds, No. WR-86,861-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017) [Dkt. No. 16-17; Dkt. No. 16-21 at 110-12].
"Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and caselaw authority." Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district court, this process begins (and often ends) with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), under which "state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and a high standard of review." Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted). And, under AEDPA, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 ("Once state remedies are exhausted, AEDPA limits federal relief to cases where the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' or was 'based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.'" (citation omitted)); see also Allen v. Vannoy, 659 F. App'x 792, 798-99 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (describing Section 2244(d) as "impos[ing] two significant restrictions on federal review of a habeas claim ... 'adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings'").
A state court adjudication on direct appeal is due the same deference under Section 2254(d) as an adjudication in a state post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g., Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (a finding made by the CCA on direct appeal was an "issue ... adjudicated on the merits in state proceedings," to be "examine[d] ... with the deference demanded by AEDPA" under "28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)").
And "[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); see also Sanchez v. Davis, 936 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[T]his is habeas, not a direct appeal, so our focus is narrowed. We ask not whether the state court denial of relief was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable - whether its decision was 'so lacking in justification' as to remove 'any possibility for fairmindeddisagreement.'" (citation...
