Reynolds v. Fed. Express Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 09-2692-STA-cgc,09-2692-STA-cgc
• Parties: MARIE ELAINE REYNOLDS and THEODORE HARRIS, III, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION d/b/a FEDEX EXPRESS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

MARIE ELAINE REYNOLDS and THEODORE HARRIS, III, Plaintiffs,

v.FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION d/b/a FEDEX EXPRESS, Defendant.

No. 09-2692-STA-cgc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

Date: March 31, 2012

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E.# 43), filed on May 4, 2011. Plaintiffs filed a Response (D.E. # 76) on March 5, 2012,¹ and a Supplemental Response (D.E. # 68) on November 14, 2011. Defendant filed a Reply (D.E. # 50) on July 1, 2011, and a Supplemental Reply (D.E. # 69) on December 1, 2011. Plaintiffs filed a Sur-Reply (D.E.# 55) on July 25, 2011, and a Supplemental Sur-Reply (D.E. # 72) on December 8, 2011. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Defendant employed Plaintiffs in its Airbus workgroup at the Federal Express ("FedEx") in Memphis, Tennessee. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for disparate treatment and retaliation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") for disparate treatment and retaliation, and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for failing to pay overtime compensation. (Compl. at 11-12.) After Defendant filed its Answer (D.E. # 4) on December 4, 2009, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' FLSA claim, which the Court granted on March 19, 2010 (D.E. # 15). Therefore, the claims remaining before the Court are Plaintiffs' § 1981 and Title VII claims.

After Defendant amended its answer on February 8, 2011 (D.E. # 41), it filed the Motion for Summary Judgment now before the Court (D.E. # 43) on May 4, 2011. After the parties completed briefing the Motion, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reopen Discovery, which the Magistrate Judge granted as to the issue of one of Defendant's employees being told not to incriminate a FedEx manager. (D.E. # 58, 66.) After the parties completed the additional discovery, they filed supplemental briefing with the Court. (D.E. # 68-69, 72.)

The following facts are undisputed for purposes of this Motion unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff Reynolds is a white female who worked for Defendant on two separate occasions: from 1995 to 2004 and from 2006 to 2008. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. # 43-2, at 1.) Plaintiff Harris is a black male who worked for Defendant on three separate occasions: for three months in 1999, from 2000 to 2002, and from 2005 to 2008. (Id. at 2.) From 2005-2008, Plaintiff Harris worked as a Senior Maintenance Planner.

Defendant's Employment Agreement and Policies

When Plaintiffs applied for a job with Defendant in 2005 and 2006 respectively, they signed an Employment Agreement. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. # 43-2, at 1-2.) Defendant submits that neither Plaintiff Reynolds nor Plaintiff Harris had questions about the Employment Agreement when they signed it. (Id. at 1-2.) The Employment Agreement provided to Plaintiff Harris contained the following statute of limitations: "To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against [Defendant], I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever comes first." (Id. at 1-2.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff Reynolds' Employment Agreement contained the same six-month statute of limitations as that found in Plaintiff Harris' Employment Agreement. (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiffs dispute this fact and point out that Plaintiff did not question the statute of limitations because she did not recall seeing the provision in the Employment Agreement. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 2.) Additionally, Plaintiff Reynolds' Employment Agreement appears to contain an eight-month statute of limitations provision instead of a six-month period. (Id.; Employment Agreement, D.E. # 46-3, at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff Reynolds and Plaintiff Harris were not asked if they had questions about the Employment Agreement, and Defendant did not allow Plaintiffs to keep a copy of the Employment Agreement. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff Reynolds stated that Defendant "is the largest airline in Memphis and the pay and benefits are superior to any other airline in Memphis." (Id. at 2.)

Both Plaintiffs were provided copies of Defendant's employee handbook, and they were familiar with Defendant's employment policies. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. #43-2, at 2.) Plaintiffs had experience with Defendant's attendance policy as well.² (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiffs were also aware of Defendant's internal grievance procedures which allowed employees to complain if they felt that they were the victims of discrimination or harassment. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs dispute the effectiveness of this internal procedure. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 4.)

Plaintiffs' Schedules and Time Worked

Plaintiffs' workgroup coordinated the maintenance of Defendant's Airbus aircraft and composed the schedules and routes of Defendant's Airbus fleet so that the planes could undergo required maintenance while still ensuring that Defendant could service its delivery network. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. # 43-2, at 3.) During the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiffs worked from approximately 10:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. (Id.) Plaintiff Harris worked Tuesday through Saturday, and Plaintiff Reynolds worked Sunday through Thursday. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff Harris was off on Sunday and Monday, and Plaintiff Reynolds was off Friday and Saturday. (Id.) They worked together on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. (Id.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs could cover each other's routing duties at the Airbus desk on one of those overlapping days, thereby allowing each of them to have a three-day weekend. (Id.)

Plaintiffs add that Defendant required them to arrive at work ten minutes prior to the start of their shift for a meeting, and Kurt Schafer ("Schafer"), the Airbus planning manager ofPlaintiffs' department, would review the work schedule approximately ten times a day. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 5.) As a manager, Schafer was required to know whether his subordinates attended work when they were supposed to. (Id. at 5-6.) Defendant points out that Schafer worked from approximately 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and he did not always notice which employees manned the Airbus computers when he arrived each morning. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. # 43-2, at 4.) He might not notice that a night shift employee was absent, on a break, or had left fifteen or thirty minutes early. (Id.) Plaintiffs dispute this fact because Schafer would attend the shift change meeting promptly at 6:00 a.m. and review the schedule frequently during his shift. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 6-7.) During the night shift, a duty manager was present at the facility, but he oversaw all of the employees working on the night shift. (Id. at 7.) The duty manager was not responsible for managing the work schedule of the Airbus workgroup or monitoring employee attendance. (Id.)

Defendant gave its Airbus group employees "comp time" for working on their normally scheduled off-days. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, D.E. # 43-2, at 4.) The employees could use the comp time to schedule time off at a later date or they could sell it back to Defendant and receive additional pay. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs' workgroup maintained a schedule on an Excel spreadsheet, and Schafer assigned Plaintiff Reynolds and one other employee the task of updating the schedule to reflect employees' use of vacation or comp time. (Id.) Plaintiff Reynolds regularly made changes to the schedule. (Id.) Plaintiffs add that every employee in the Airbus workgroup had access to the schedule and could freely make changes. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 6.) They point out that Tina Matney ("Matney"), arouter/scheduler working under Schafer, characterized the spread sheet as a "toxic document" which changed constantly and was not trustworthy. (Id.) Matney stated that the schedule was "not managed by the manager. It was just a free-for-all amongst the employees." (Dep. of Matney, D.E. # 46-14, at 14.)³

Alleged Improper Conduct

In mid-June of 2008, Plaintiff Harris approached Schafer with Roger Nallick ("Nallick") and informed Schafer that Nallick was racially harassing him by referring to him as a "scab, piece of shit scab, [and a] scab mother f----r." (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 8.) Nallick had also referred to Plaintiff Harris as "you people" previously and frequently stated that "you people should not be working here." (Id. at 9.) These references to Plaintiff Harris as "you people" occurred for the six to eight months prior to June of 2008. (Dep. of Harris, D.E. # 46-8, at 26-27.) Plaintiff Harris and Nallick stated that Nallick did not deny making these statements during a June 2008 meeting with Schafer. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 8-9.) However, Schafer stated that Nallick denied calling Plaintiff Harris a scab at the mid-June 2008 meeting. (Id. at 9.)

Greg Williams ("Williams"), a white employee who had worked with Plaintiff Harris at another location, crossed the same picket line as Plaintiff Harris, but Nallick never called Williams a scab. (Id.) However, Defendant points out that Nallick did not know Williams' employment background or whether he had crossed a picket line. (Dep. of Nallick, D.E. # 46-17, at 12-13, 42-43.) Nallick has referred to a white coworker as a scab. (Id. at 59.) Additionally,when Schafer told Nallick that Defendant did not tolerate discrimination and that Plaintiff Harris should "let it go," Plaintiff Harris felt threatened and believed that Schafer did not intend to do anything about the report. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Facts, D.E. # 46-1, at 16.) One week...