Reynolds v. Florida Cent. & P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1900
• Citation: 28 So. 861,42 Fla. 387
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: REYNOLDS, Comptroller, et al. v. FLORIDA CENT. & P. R. CO.

28 So. 861

42 Fla. 387

REYNOLDS, Comptroller, et al. v. FLORIDA CENT. & P. R. CO.

Florida Supreme Court

June 26, 1900

Appeal from circuit court, Leon county; John F. White, Judge.

Bill by the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company against William H. Reynolds, comptroller, and John A. Pearce sheriff. Decree for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Taylor C.J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where, on an appeal in chancery, the decree is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions for the entry of a proper decree, and permission is given by the appellate court to apply to the chancellor for leave to file a bill of review of a part of the decree to be entered, the application, to the extent permitted, if made, must be governed by the general rules applicable to obtaining leave and filing bills of review.

2. Where, on an appeal in chancery, the decree is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions for the entry of a proper decree, and permission be given by the appellate court to apply to the chancellor for leave to file a bill of review of a several part of the decree to be entered, the authority to entertain the application is confined to the part of the decree as to which permission is given to apply for leave to file the bill, and the chancellor has no jurisdiction beyond this.

3. The filing of a bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence is not a matter of right, but leave to file the bill must first be obtained; and this rests in the sound discretion of the court, subject to review by the appellate court.

4. A bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence should allege that it is filed by leave of the court; must state the former bill and proceedings, including the final decree entered, and the particulars in which the party conceives himself aggrieved, and also state distinctly and specifically the evidence alleged to have been discovered and that it came to the knowledge of the party for the first time after the final decree, or too late to be used at the hearing, and that by the exercise of reasonable diligence it could not have been discovered sooner; and, further, it must appear that the new evidence is not merely cumulative or corroborative, but must be relevant and material, and likely to produce a different determination.

5. The allegation of the discovery of new matter, and that it could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered before the trial, required to be stated in a bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, is material and constitutes an essential equity in the maintenance of the bill, and, when put in evidence, must be established by clear and decisive proof.

COUNSEL

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for appellants.

T. L. Clarke, for appellee. In November, 1892, appellee filed a bill against the then comptroller of the state, William D. Bloxham, and John A. Pearce, sheriff of Leon county, to enjoin certain taxes for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881, assessed by the state, under acts of the legislature, on certain lines of railroad acquired by appellee. A decree was rendered in the case, on bill, exhibits, and answer, in November, 1893, by the Honorable John F. White, judge of the Third circuit, in place of the Honorable John W. Malone, judge of the Second circuit, who was disqualified. The pleadings in the cause, the decree of the circuit court, and the decision of this court on appeal are exhibited in the statement and report of the case. Bloxham v. Railroad Co., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902. In addition to what is shown by the report, it appears from the bill that it was signed, 'The Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company, by John A. Henderson, Vice President,' and was sworn to by him. The decision of the circuit court, as shown by the report mentioned, was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions; and, upon a return of the case to the circuit court, appellee obtained permission, and filed a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, to which a demurrer was interposed, and overruled by the circuit judge. On appeal this ruling was reversed, with directions to dismiss the supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, and to enter a decree in compliance with the mandate of this court under its former decision. This court held, on the appeal from the demurrer to the supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, that when the appellate court affirms the decree of the lower court, or when such decree is modified on appeal, either as to questions of law or fact necessarily involved, with directions for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, the lower court has no authority to open the case for a new trial, or to enter any other judgment than that directed to be entered, unless authority to do so be given by the appellate court. The proceedings on this supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, and the decision of this court on the appeal, are shown by the report in 39 Fla. 243, 22 So. 697. When this decision was made, no final decree had been entered by the circuit court, and further directions were then given to enter the decree, with permission to appellee to apply within 90 days after the entry thereof to the circuit court for leave to file a bill of review, to the extent of the line of railroad involved in the suit, from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee, and its branches.

The decree was entered, and within the time mentioned appellee applied, by petition to the circuit court, for leave to file a bill of review, and therein set out the original bill and substance of the answer filed thereto (shown by the case in 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902), the decree of the circuit court made therein, and the appeal therefrom, and decision of this court in reference thereto; that, before any decree was entered by the circuit court in compliance with the mandate of the supreme court, petitioner filed, by leave of the circuit court, a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, to which a demurrer was filed and overruled; that an appeal was taken to the supreme court, and the order overruling the demurrer was reversed, and a mandate (set out in full) was sent to the circuit court.

The petition alleged that, at the time of the rendition of the decree under the mandate, William D. Bloxham was not comptroller, but one William H. Reynolds had qualified and had been commissioned as comptroller of the state, and has continued as such.

The petition further proceeded as follows: 'Your petitioner further shows: That all the foreclosure proceedings, judicial sales, receiverships, and transfers of the several lines of railroad and railroad property mentioned and set forth in petitioner's original bill of complaint aforesaid were had in and under the authority of the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of Florida, and all the orders, decrees, receivers' accounts, and other papers and documents relating thereto or connected therewith were filed or recorded as a part of and among the records of said court. That before the filing of petitioner's said original bill, and, to wit, on the 29th day of May, A. D. 1891, the court house or building in Jacksonville, Florida, where said court was held and its records kept, was, together with all of said records, files, papers, and documents, lost and destroyed by fire; and your petitioner was thereby deprived of much of the valuable information and evidence necessary in the preparation of its said bill, and was forced to rely largely on the memory of individuals of long-past transactions and occurrences, hearsay, and some meager printed reports of some of the cases made in appellate courts, all of which was in many instances indefinite, incomplete, and unreliable.

'That your petitioner is a corporation that had no existence at the time of many of the transactions referred to, and was not created till several years after the making of the assessments complained of, but was formed to own and operate the said railroad properties that had been purchased by people at a judicial sale in 1887, who were unfortunate creditors of the previous owner, and who were entire strangers to the property prior to their purchase, so your petitioner was not informed of the real facts, as hereinafter stated, and was not advised of their materiality, nor put upon notice of the importance in value of a statement thereof as a deraignment of title by an issue raised in the pleadings, since the narrative of title in petitioner's original bill was only in explanation of the situation at the time of assessment, which justified the allegation in the bill of an entire change of ownership, for value, of the entire property before the date of such assessment, to which averments issue was made by defendants' answer, admitting the alleged conveyances, and denying, as upon demurrer to the bill, that petitioner acquired any immunity from taxation for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881.

'That the supreme court decided, in effect, that the state did not have the power to follow this property for the taxes of 1879 1880, and 1881 by assessment in 1885, if it had ceased to be in the possession and ownership of the persons to whom it belonged during the time for which such assessment was made, into the hands of innocent purchasers for value, and reached its conclusion that the railroad from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee river, with branches to Monticello and St. Marks, was owned and operated by Edward J. Reed and associates from September, 1879, to February, 1882, by a wholly mistaken view of the facts not in issue in the case or submitted, and upon an interpretation of the statements of the bill that is entirely at...