Reynolds v. George Cnty. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:19-cv-426-TBM-RPM |
| Parties | KIMBERLY REYNOLDS, PARENT AND NEXT BEST FRIEND OF J.R., a minor PLAINTIFF v. GEORGE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Kimberly Reynolds brings this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Act on behalf of her minor son J.R against the George County School District. J.R. has severe autism with an IQ of 42, and his mother contends that an independent hearing officer erred when it found that the District provided J.R with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) under this law. Specifically, Reynolds alleges that the District deprived J.R. of a FAPE during the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years when it responded to his negative behavior by removing him from a standard classroom and eventually reducing his time in a school setting to one hour per day for four days a week. Though Reynolds initially sought substantive relief for J.R., she now only seeks attorneys fees.
While it is not the function of this Court to insert its views for those of the District, the Court finds that J.R. was denied a FAPE from the period of October 25, 2017-when physical education was eliminated from J.R.'s curriculum-until the filing of Reynolds' due process complaint. Furthermore at some point after J.R.'s school week was reduced to one hour per day for four days a week and J.R. was confined to the assistant principal's office for the duration of his school time, the District was not providing J.R. a FAPE academically either. The Court is not required, nor able, to determine the exact point at which the District was no longer providing a FAPE from an academic standpoint.
J.R. is now roughly sixteen years old but was between eleven and thirteen years old during the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years. During those school years he was a student in the District. [8-4] at 312. Under the policies required by the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“the Act”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, the District recognized that J.R was autistic with intellectual disabilities and thus qualified for special education services. [8-4] at 312. A. The Act's Framework
The Act “offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free appropriate public education'-more concisely known as a FAPE-to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 137 S.Ct. 743, 748, 197 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). “As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises ‘special education and related services'-both ‘instruction' tailored to meet a child's ‘unique needs' and sufficient ‘supportive services' to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.” Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 748-49 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29)). “An eligible child, as [the Supreme Court] has explained, acquires a ‘substantive right' to such an education once a State accepts the financial assistance.” Id. at 749. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984)).
In short, states and schools receive federal funds and the benefit of the bargain for the public is a guarantee that a free, quality education will be provided by state-sponsored entities. The Act ensures that children with disabilities have available to them a “[FAPE] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living[.]” Keith G. ex rel. C.G. v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 Fed.Appx. 816, 818 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). The Act places a premium on the local, collaborative efforts of professionals and parents in addressing the needs of a disabled child. See R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 607 F.3d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, a school district is required to: (1) provide a FAPE to each disabled child within its boundaries, and (2) ensure that the FAPE is offered, to the greatest extent possible, in the least restrictive environment consistent with the student's needs. Cypress Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (5).
The FAPE provided must be developed to each disabled student's needs through an “individualized program of education” in the form of an individualized education plan. Renee J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.Supp.3d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (Renee J. I) ). These plans are “written statement[s] prepared at a meeting attended by a qualified representative of the school district, a teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child himself.” Michael F., 118 F.3d at 247 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(20)). “The [plan] must be ‘reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.'” Woody, 865 F.3d at 309 (quoting Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017)). “[T]oward that end, the [plan] must be ‘appropriately ambitious,' and [t]he ‘reasonably calculated' qualification reflects a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by school officials.” E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 765 (5th Cir. 2018) (E.R. I) (quoting Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 999-1000) (citations omitted).
The Act does not require that the plan “be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the child's educational potential; rather, it need only be an education that is specifically designed to meet the child's unique needs, supported by services that will permit him ‘to benefit' from the instruction.” Michael F. 118 F.3d at 247-48 (citing Bd. of Edu. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)); see Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 999 (). Still, the educational benefit which the Act contemplates, and to which a plan must be geared, cannot be “a mere modicum or de minimus” benefit. Michael F., 118 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted). Instead, the plan must be “likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.” Id.
When parents and educators do not agree about what a child's individualized education plan should contain, parents may turn to dispute resolution procedures established by the Act. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 994. “The parties may resolve their differences informally, through a ‘[p]reliminary meeting,' or, somewhat more formally, through mediation.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e), (f)(1)(B)(i)). “If these measures fail to produce accord, the parties may proceed to what the Act calls a ‘due process hearing' before a state or local educational agency.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (f)(1)(A), (g)). “The hearing is generally limited to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or to determining whether the child received a FAPE.” Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)).
Finally, “at the conclusion of the administrative process, the losing party may seek redress in state or federal court.” Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 994 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(A)). “When a parent challenges the appropriateness of [a plan] a reviewing court's inquiry is twofold.” Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009). The court must consider (1) whether the district complied with the procedural requirements of the Act; and (2) whether “the [plan] developed through such procedures was ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'” Juan P., 582 F.3d at 583 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07). Under the Act, a district court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate. Michael Z, 580 F.3d at 292 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (i)(2)(B)(iii))).
While Reynolds raised procedural challenges before the hearing officer, she has not alleged any on appeal; therefore she has forfeited these claims. See Douglas W. ex rel. Jason D.W. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 210 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998). B. The Michael F. Factors and the Act's Substantive Requirements
“To meet its substantive obligation under [the Act], a school must offer [a plan] reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 999. The Act “contemplates that this fact-intensive exercise will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the input of the child's parents or guardians.” Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 999 (internal citations omitted). “Any review of [a plan] must appreciate that the question is whether the [plan] is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Id.
The Supreme Court has not adopted a bright-line standard for determining what “appropriate” progress looks like from case to case. Id. at 1001. But the Fifth Circuit has identified four factors to use to determine if a child was denied a FAPE. See Michael F., 118 F.3d at 253. Under this four-factor test, the district court considers: (1) whether the program was individualized on the basis of the student's assessment and performance; (2) whether the program was administered in the least restrictive environment; (3) whether the services were provided in a...
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