Reynolds v. Higginbottom

Decision Date23 March 2022
Docket Number19-cv-5613
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
PartiesMEL REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. ELZIE L. HIGGINBOTTOM, ROBERT MUGABE, CHRISTOPHER MUTSVANGWA, EAST LAKE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT, INC., ELH-HHH, LLC, BURLING BUILDERS, INC., WILCAR, LLC, TURTLE CREEK MINING & TRADING COMPANY, INC., WALTER MZEMBI, MARTIN MUNAGATIRE, HENRY MUNAGATIRE, HAPPYTON M. BONYONGWE, MONICA MUTSVANGWA, ARTHUR MUTAMBARA, JOHN GIRZADES, and GLORIA SCARDINO, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Steven C. Seeger, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Mel Reynolds, a former Congressman, sued the former President of Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe) and a collection of Zimbabwe security officials, plus a group of Chicago businesspeople and their companies. He claims that he planned to blow the whistle on a bribery scheme involving the sale of blood diamonds from Zimbabwe. And when he refused to keep quiet the defendants conspired to have him arrested and tortured.

Reynolds sued the defendants under the Torture Victim Protection Act. That statute authorizes claims against individuals who acting under authority or color of law of any foreign nation subject another person to torture.

The Chicago Defendants moved to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. See Lett v City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 398, 399 (7th Cir. 2020). The Court “offer[s] no opinion on the ultimate merits because further development of the record may cast the facts in a light different from the complaint.” Savory v Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 2020).

At the outset, this Court offers one overarching observation. The allegations of the complaint are not your everyday, run-of-the-mill sort of allegations. The thrust of the case involves a former Congressman who was arrested and tortured for ratting out an illegal diamond operation in Zimbabwe. The story is pretty far out there.

A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plausibility is not about the probability of success. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Plausibility is about including enough facts so that the claim is not conclusory. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .” Id. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (“To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of respondent's allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations.”). Plausibility is about putting meat on the bone, from a factual standpoint.

“And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.' See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting). One wonders where the little-green-men line is.

Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction. And here, the nature of the claim invites unusual facts. The complaint includes claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act, and it is hard to imagine how a plaintiff could bring a claim under that statute without including facts that seem pretty far out there. So this Court will take the well-pleaded facts at face value, and assume that they are true.

Defendant Elzie Higginbottom is a Chicago businessman who was interested in doing business in Africa. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 7, 27-28 (Dckt. No. 48).[1] Plaintiff Mel Reynolds is a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives who fostered relationships with African leaders during his career in public service. Id. at ¶¶ 23-26. He has a number of federal criminal convictions to his name.

In 2010, Higginbottom hired Reynolds to do consulting work in Africa. Id. at ¶ 28. The idea was that Reynolds would introduce Higginbottom to key African leaders, and hopefully open the door for his business ventures. Id. at ¶ 31.

Reynolds's consulting work for Higginbottom took him to Zimbabwe numerous times over the next few years. Id. at ¶ 29. The trips supported several different business ventures for Higginbottom, including providing disposable medical examination gloves to the Zimbabwean health care system. Id.

Reynolds delivered on his consulting promises: he introduced Higginbottom to Robert Mugabe, the (former) President of Zimbabwe. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 30. Reynolds also introduced Higginbottom to Happyton M. Bonyongwe, the head of the Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organization (“CIO”). Id. at ¶¶ 10, 30. And finally, Reynold introduced him to Christopher Mutsvangwa, an “organizing member” of the Zimbabwe CIO, among others. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 30.

But soon, Higginbottom started making moves that put Reynolds on edge.

First, Higginbottom began paying money to Zimbabwean officials under the table. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34-35, 39, 45. Higginbottom made some of the payments in private meetings, without Reynolds around. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 39. But on other occasions, Reynolds saw Higginbottom hand over the money, including one meeting where Higginbottom gave a check to then-President Mugabe. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 45. Reynolds confronted Higginbottom about the payment to Mugabe, warning that such payments would violate United States law. Id. at ¶ 36. Higginbottom angrily told Reynolds that he would do what he wanted with his money. Id.

Second, Reynolds found out that Higginbottom was trying to get a diamond mine concession in Zimbabwe. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, 37-42. A diamond mine concession is essentially permission to mine, extract, and sell diamonds.

That attempt concerned Reynolds. Zimbabwe diamonds are on the United States sanctions list, and doing business in Zimbabwean diamonds violates federal law. Id. at ¶ 42. Reynolds wanted no part of any diamond mining deal in Zimbabwe. As Reynolds saw it, Higginbottom had dragged him into an illegal business without his knowledge or approval. Higginbottom exploited Reynolds's Zimbabwean political contacts with key figures like President Mugabe and Mutsvangwa - who was chairman of a Zimbabwean government department that controlled mineral transactions - to obtain an illegal diamond mine concession. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 35, 39, 42.

Reynolds confronted Higginbottom about his diamond mine concession in the summer of 2013. Id. at ¶ 42. At the time, Reynolds was living in a hotel in Zimbabwe, working on an unrelated business project. Id. During a phone call, Reynolds told Higginbottom that he had to call off the diamond mine deal, or else Reynolds would expose everything to the authorities in the United States. Id.

Higginbottom responded that he was sending Mutsvangwa to talk things over with Reynolds, and pressed Reynolds to consider the “deal” that Mutsvangwa would propose. Id. at ¶ 43. The “deal” was a bribe. Speaking on Higginbottom's behalf, Mutsvangwa offered Reynolds $500, 000 in cash, along with a new home for Reynolds in Zimbabwe or South Africa, as long as Reynolds stayed quiet about the diamond deal. Id. Reynolds refused. Id.

But that wasn't the end of it. Mutsvangwa and Reynolds stayed in close contact, and in November 2013, Mutsvangwa sweetened the deal. In exchange for his silence, Higginbottom offered to pay Reynolds $1, 000, 000 in cash, plus a separate pot of money to buy property in Africa and a $600, 000 home for Reynolds and his three children in Chicago. Id. at ¶ 44. Reynolds again refused. Id.

Mutsvangwa then threatened Reynolds, telling him that if he didn't play ball, Higginbottom would use his political connections in the United States to have Reynolds charged with federal crimes and “locked up” when he returned to the United States. Id. Still, Reynolds refused.

A few months later, the Zimbabwean CIO and police officers barged into Reynolds's hotel room in Harare, Zimbabwe, with AK-47's drawn. Id. at ¶ 49. They arrested him for immigration visa violations. Id. They didn't have a warrant. Id.

Mutsvangwa later admitted in a news article that he pre-planned and staged his arrest. Id. And Mutsvangwa had help. Higginbottom worked with Mutsvangwa to plan and fund Reynolds's arrest and charges. Id. at ¶ 57.

Once in jail, Reynolds suffered beatings, sleep deprivation, and unsanitary conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 50-51. He was not allowed to sleep at night, and he was awakened each time he started to doze off. Id. at ¶ 50. He stayed in the Zimbabwean jail for six days. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 53.

The complaint alleges that Reynolds was “verbally abused” by “other inmates and prison guards.” Id. The complaint also alleges that...

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