Reynolds v. Hussey

• Decision Date: 30 July 1886
• Citation: 5 A. 458,64 N.H. 64
• Parties: REYNOLDS v. HUSSEY.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

5 A. 458

64 N.H. 64

REYNOLDS

v. HUSSEY.¹

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 30, 1886.

Reserved case from Belknap county.

Case for knowingly keeping a vicious horse, and for negligently caring for a horse, whereby the plaintiff was injured. Trial by jury.

October 28, 1884, the defendant's driver left the horses and wagon, unattended and unhitched, headed towards the platform of the depot at Alton Corner, about 12 feet from it. The plaintiff passed in front of the horses, when one of them reared, squealed, struck forward with his fore feet, hit the plaintiff's knee, and did the injury complained of to the joint. The plaintiff's evidence tended to prove instances of the horse's striking in a similar manner at persons previous to the plaintiff's injury, but there was no direct evidence that the defendant knew of it. Subject to the defendant's exception, the plaintiff was allowed to give evidence showing that the horse had a vicious disposition, and an inclination to injure mankind, and that he was a notorious kicker; the knowledge of which fact the defendant did not dispute, but he did deny all knowledge of the horse's rearing and striking with his forward feet.

The defendant requested the court to charge the jury that he was not liable unless he had, at some time previous to the accident, known or heard that the horse had struck with his forward feet in a manner substantially similar to that in which the jury found the plaintiff was struck. The court so charged, with this modification: that if they should find that the horse had a vicious disposition, and was inclined to injure mankind, so that the plaintiff knew, as a reasonable man, that he would be disposed to commit acts similar to the one sued for, it would be such knowledge as might make him liable for the injury done to the plaintiff; and the defendant excepted.

Mr. Whipple and Jewell & Stone, for plaintiff.

E. A. Hibbard and E. S. Shannon, for defendant.

BLODGETT, J. The owner of domestic animals not being liable, except by statute, for injuries committed by them unless he is shown to have knowledge of their tendency to commit such injuries, the evidence excepted to as to the propensity of the defendant's horse to injure mankind, and to his knowledge, was so obviously legitimate that, unaided by brief or argument, we find no ground for its exclusion.

The exception to the charge stands no better. It is not necessary that the vicious acts of a domestic animal, brought to the notice of the owner, should be precisely similar to that upon which the action against him is founded. If it were, there would be no actionable redress for the first injury of a particular kind committed by such an animal, because its owner would necessarily be exempt from all liability until it should commit another injury of exactly the same kind. It is enough to say that the law sanctions no such absurdity.

Neither is it necessary, in order to fasten a...