Reynolds v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1927
• Docket Number: No. 7753,7754.,7753
• Citation: 21 F.2d 958
• Parties: REYNOLDS v. IOWA SOUTHERN UTILITIES CO. (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

21 F.2d 958 (1927)

REYNOLDS v. IOWA SOUTHERN UTILITIES CO. (two cases).

Nos. 7753, 7754.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 9, 1927.

Robert J. Bannister, of Des Moines, Iowa (Harley H. Stipp, Eugene D. Perry, Vincent Starzinger, and Fred A. Little, all of Des Moines, Iowa, and R. H. Spence, H. C. Beard, and Grant L. Hayes, all of Mt. Ayr, Iowa, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

D. W. Higbee and E. F. McEniry, both of Creston, Iowa (Frank S. Payne, of Centerville, Iowa, and Frank F. Fuller, of Mt. Ayr, Iowa, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before KENYON, Circuit Judge, and MOLYNEAUX and JOHN B. SANBORN, District Judges.

KENYON, Circuit Judge.

These two cases, arising out of the same accident, were tried and determined as one.

Murlen Reynolds, mother of Wayne R. Reynolds, brings suit in one of the cases for loss of services and for the nursing of and caring for Wayne R. Reynolds, a minor, and in the other the minor, through his mother as next friend, asks damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in the town of Mt. Ayr, Iowa, on the 22d day of August, 1924, by coming in contact with electric transmission lines of defendant in error, the claim being that the wires of defendant in error passed in proximity to and through a large tree standing in a public street in the said town of Mt. Ayr, which tree was used as a play place by the boys of the neighborhood; that defendant in error failed to make adequate provision for the protection of the boys playing in said tree, and, because of the breaking of a limb thereof, said minor, while so playing, fell onto one of defendant in error's wires passing through the tree, resulting in serious burns. We confine our consideration to the writ of error in the personal injury case, as its determination is decisive of the writ of error in the other case.

At the close of plaintiff in error's testimony defendant in error moved for a directed verdict on a number of grounds, viz. that plaintiff in error was guilty of contributory negligence; that there was no construction or preparation of apparatus shown as constructed or prepared by defendant in error which would constitute an invitation to plaintiff in error to approach defendant in error's wires or put himself in place of danger; that plaintiff in error failed to show any knowledge on the part of the defendant in error of the condition of the electric light pole or tree as to crossbars or steps attached thereto at the time of the accident complained of; that the evidence failed to show any negligence on the part of defendant in error which could be construed as a proximate cause of the injury complained of; that the facts established did not entitle plaintiffs in error to the relief demanded, or to any relief. The court sustained the motion on the ground that no negligence was shown by the evidence.

The injured boy was 11 years old at the time of the injury, and, while he knew that the wires carried electricity, he did not have full knowledge of the effect which the electricity might have upon him. In view of his age, unquestionably under the testimony presented the question of contributory negligence was for the jury. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401, 21 L. Ed. 114; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262, 14 S. Ct. 619, 38 L. Ed. 434; McEldon v. Drew, 138 Iowa, 390, 116 N. W. 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 203; Hazlerigg v. Dobbins, 145 Iowa, 495, 123 N. W. 196; Long v. Ottumwa Railway & Light Co., 162 Iowa, 11, 142 N. W. 1008; Felton v. Aubrey (C. C. A.) 74 F. 350; Adams v. Southern R. Co. (C. C. A.) 84 F. 596.

The case seems to have been tried and determined on the attractive nuisance theory. The principal cases relied on to sustain the action of the court are New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Fruchter, 260 U. S. 141, 43 S. Ct. 38, 67 L. Ed. 173, and United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt et al., 258 U. S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed. 615, 36 A. L. R. 28. In the Fruchter Case, while the bridge where the boy was injured was a public bridge, the railroad company maintained the wires and bridge framework. The injured boy had climbed to the topmost girder of the bridge, and thence up a tower, where he touched a live wire and was injured. It was held the railroad company, which maintained the wires and bridge framework, could not be liable on the theory of invitation. In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, supra, the injured children had come upon the petitioner's land, had gone into certain water there standing, were poisoned, and died. The decision was based on the fact that the children were trespassers. Neither of these cases is in point, for the reason that in both of them the parties injured were trespassers.

It seems to us the doctrine of attractive nuisance is not applicable here at all. Plaintiff in error was not a trespasser. The tree through which the electric wires ran was in a public highway. The boy had a right to be in the tree. If plaintiff in error had climbed one of defendant in error's poles and touched the high-tension wire and been injured, the Fruchter Case might be urged as in point.

This case seems to be merely one based on negligence, and in view of another trial we refrain from any particular discussion of the evidence further than to say that there was evidence from which a jury could find that the tree was in a public street; that the defendant in error maintained along the street and through the tree a high-tension wire or wires over which a dangerous current of electricity was carried; that the boys of the neighborhood had made use of the tree as a play place for at least two years prior to the accident to plaintiff in error; that they had part of the time used ropes to get onto the branches, but could have gotten into the tree to play without the use of ropes or cleats; that for about three weeks before the accident, in order to more readily climb the tree, cleats had been nailed by some of the boys on the pole of the company, which was close to the tree, and passed up through its branches. Under these circumstances, it seems clear that the question of the knowledge of defendant in error as to the use of the tree as a play place for boys of tender years was for the determination of the jury.

Undoubtedly the company had been granted the legal right by the proper authority to transmit the dangerous electric fluid along the street, but it was unquestionably its duty, in dealing with this dangerous agency, if it had knowledge that the tree was used as a play place by children of tender years, to use a high degree of care in insulating its wires through the tree, and to use a similar degree of care in inspecting the same and keeping them properly insulated. There is no contradiction of authority as to the duty of those in control of wires conveying the dangerous agency of electricity to use a high degree of care in insulation and inspection thereof to protect those who may lawfully come in contact with said wires. The rule is concisely stated in Colusa Parrot Mining & Smelting Co. v. Monahan (C. C. A.) 162 F. 276, as follows: "At points or places where people have the right to go for work, business, or pleasure the insulation and protection should be made as nearly perfect as reasonably possible, and the utmost care used to keep them so." And in 20 Corpus Juris, p. 355, § 42: "The exercise of a sufficient degree of care requires a careful and proper insulation of all wires and appliances in places where there is a likelihood or reasonable probability of human contact therewith, and the exercise of due care to make and keep insulation perfect at places where people have a right to go on business or pleasure.

It is said that worn or insufficient insulation is worse than none, since it gives a false appearance of security, but this has been denied. The failure to insulate is not excused by the fact that it may be expensive, or that wires carrying similar currents are not insulated elsewhere. But the fact that the methods of insulation suggested involve a large expense is a matter to be considered in determining whether defendant exercised due care, under all the circumstances of the case, in not insulating its wires. It has been held that a company need not insulate its wires against electricity having its origin in the clouds or atmosphere. The duty to insulate does not extend to the entire system, or to parts of the line where no one could reasonably be expected to come in contact with it." Curtis, Law of Electricity, § 512, states: "An electric company, maintaining a dangerous wire through or near a tree is bound to anticipate that persons may lawfully climb the tree, and it is required to exercise due care to prevent injury to such persons from its wire. * * * The courts recognize that children are apt to climb trees, and impose upon electric companies the burden of using due care to keep their high tension wires insulated in places where children when climbing a tree will come in contact with them."

As stated in Joyce on Electric Law, § 445: "A company maintaining electrical wires, over which a high voltage of electricity...