Reynolds v. Justice
Decision Date | 06 November 1933 |
Parties | IN RE APPLICATION OF REX L. REYNOLDS AND WIFE TO REDEEM REAL ESTATE, APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM J. JUSTICE, RESPONDENT |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Jackson County.--Hon. James R. Page Judge.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Appeal dismissed.
R. C Southall for appellants.
Borders Borders & Warrick for respondents.
The appellants herein were, on February 28, 1932, the owners of Lot 9 of Block 12, Armour Hills, a subdivision of Kansas City, Missouri. The above real estate was subject to a first mortgage of $ 7,500 and a second mortgage of $ 1,000.
The second mortgage was foreclosed on February 28, 1933, and William J. Justice, respondent herein, became the purchaser. There is no claim as to irregularity of foreclosure proceedings and it is admitted that respondent was and is a representative of the holder of the mortgage debt.
The appellants proceeding under and by virtue of the provisions of Sections 3063 and 3064, Revised Statutes 1929, did in due time, in due form and with due notice file intention to redeem. In due time, appellants filed a redemption bond with I. L. and P. J. Holzman as securities. On March 7, 1933, and in due time, matter of approval of the bond was taken up and the following proceedings were had and entered of record:
"Now on this day petitioners file bond to redeem real estate in the sum of $ 1,000 with Rex L. Reynolds and Myrtle Reynolds as principals and I. L. Holzman and P. J. Holzman as sureties thereon, which said bond is by the court temporarily approved."
It appears that on March 20, 1933, appellants filed a new bond with Roy H. Gould as security. No action seems to have been taken on this bond. Prior to March 27, 1933, appellants file another bond with J. W. Cox as security. On March 27, 1933, the following proceedings were had and entered of record:
On March 31, 1933, appellants filed a motion for rehearing and the following proceedings were had and entered of record:
"
On April 1, 1933, appellants filed an application and affidavit for appeal, same being in words and figures as follows:
On the following day the following proceedings were had and entered of record:
"And now petitioner's petition for appeal is by the court denied."
Thereafter, under the provisions of Section 1023, Revised Statutes 1929, appellants made application to one of the judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals for an appeal, which was granted to this court by said judge on April 11, 1933.
On April 24, 1933, respondent filed in this court a motion to vacate and set aside the order of this court in allowing appeal. The respondent in his motion presents several grounds for his motion. The first ground presents the contention that no appeal lies from the action of refusing to approve a bond presented in an application to redeem real estate under the provisions of Sections 3063 and 3064 of Article 2, Chapter 22, Revised Statutes Missouri, 1929.
We give consideration of this question first, for the reason that if respondent's contention be right, we need not go further to determine the whole matter before this court.
To determine the matter presented, it becomes necessary to consider in connection with the above section the provisions of Section 1018 of Revised Statutes 1929, which reads as follows:
The provisions for redemption provided for in Sections 3063 and 3064, Revised Statutes 1929, are purely statutory. No such right existed at common law, and it follows that if appeal lies it must be by virtue of section 1018, set out above.
If an appeal lies the act of approval or disapproval of a redemption bond, under provisions of sections 3063 and 3064 above, must be construed to be a judgment of a circuit court in a civil cause.
In the text of 1 Corpus Juris, at page 930, this language is found:
"The precise meaning and application of the term must sometimes be determined not by its general definition, but according to the manner in which it is used in the particular case, for a proceeding may be in a general sense civil, and yet not within the application of certain laws relating to civil actions."
The appellate courts of Missouri, so far as we have been able to find, have never passed upon the issue that is presented in this case. We are unable to find any decision in Missouri that clearly defines just what is a civil cause within the meaning of section 1018 of Revised Statutes 1929.
Proceedings under sections 3063 and 3064 of our statutes constitutes what is commonly called special proceedings, wherein no appeal lies unless expressly provided.
It follows, as before stated, that unless the action of approving or disapproving a redemption bond be construed to be a judgment of the circuit court in a civil cause, no appeal lies.
The act for redemption of real estate sold under mortgage as it stood prior to the legislative act of amendment Laws 1917, pages 209, 210 and 211, provided that in vacation the clerk of the circuit court pass upon the bond. It follows that the act as it stood before amendment made the question of approval of bond a ministerial act and it is well settled that appeal does not lie from such an act. It thus follows that the legislative intent as expressed in the original act must stand, unless there is expressed in the amendment a legislative intent to change the act of approval so as to make the same judicial instead of ministerial.
The section as amended contains this language:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McIlvain v. Kavorinos
... ... Schwoerer v. Christophel, 64 Mo.App. 81; ... State ex rel. Morris Building & Inv. Co. v. Brown, ... 228 Mo.App. 760, 72 S.W.2d 859; Reynolds v. Justice, ... 228 Mo.App. 246, 66 S.W.2d 169; Downing v. La Shot, ... 202 Mo.App. 509, 212 S.W. 30; Secs. 2898, 2899, R.S. 1939 ... ...
- In re Reynolds v. Justice