Reynolds v. Kanzler

• Decision Date: 17 July 1928
• Citation: 126 Or. 245,269 P. 230
• Parties: REYNOLDS ET AL. v. KANZLER, JUDGE.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

269 P. 230

126 Or. 245

REYNOLDS ET AL. v. KANZLER, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Oregon

July 17, 1928

Department 2.

Original proceeding in mandamus by James A. Reynolds and another against Jacob Kanzler, Judge of Department No. 1 of the Circuit Court for Multnomah County. Writ granted.

This is an original proceeding in mandamus, brought to require Hon Jacob Kanzler, as judge of department No. 1 of the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Multnomah county, to enter and record and pronounce judgment upon the verdicts rendered in case No. M 6387, wherein Richard P. Landis and Mabelle E Landis are plaintiffs, and James A. Reynolds and Minerva D Reynolds are defendants. One of the verdicts, omitting title and venue, is as follows:

"Verdict.

"We the jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the issues in the above-entitled case, do hereby find as follows, to wit:

"On plaintiffs' first cause of action we find that plaintiffs, Richard P. Landis and Mabelle E. Landis, are entitled to recover of and from the defendants, James A Reynolds and Minerva D. Reynolds, damages in the sum of $2,854.49.

"On plaintiffs' second cause of action we find that plaintiffs, Richard P. Landis and Mabelle E. Landis, are entitled to recover of and from the defendants, James A. Reynolds and Minerva D. Reynolds, damages in the sum of $ none.

"[Signed] William P. Lacy, Foreman."

The other reads:

"Verdict.

"We, the jury impaneled to try the above-entitled action, find for the defendants in the sum of $2,975."

This verdict was signed by each member of the jury.

These findings were read by the presiding judge in open court, in the presence of counsel for both parties and the jury. The polling of the jury was waived. The court, being in doubt as to the validity of the verdicts and considering them conflicting, directed a mistrial of the cause, and ordered that the jury be discharged, but retained and preserved the verdicts.

Floyd D. Moore and Roy F. Shields, both of Portland, for plaintiffs.

E. Earl Feike, of Portland (M. B. Meacham, of Portland, on the brief), for defendant.

BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

When the findings recorded above are read in the light of the pleadings, there is neither uncertainty, ambiguity, nor indefiniteness therein. Each party to the litigation alleged certain causes of action against the other; and these verdicts represent the expressed intention of the jury. In the plaintiffs' first cause of action, the jury decided, according to the verdict, that plaintiffs were entitled to recover from defendants the sum of $2,854.49. In the accompanying verdict covering the defendants' cause of action, the jury manifestly intended to find that defendants were entitled to recover from plaintiffs the sum of $2,975. So that, according to these verdicts, the defendants are entitled to recover of and from the plaintiffs the amount remaining after deducting $2,854.49 from $2,975. Forest Products Co. v. Dant & Russell, 117 Or. 637, 244 P. 531; Whiteley Malleable Castings Co. v. Bevington, 25 Ind.App. 391, 58 N.E. 268; Beaumont Rice Mills Co. v. Campbell (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 S.W. 971; Crow v. Crow, 134 Ga. 10, 67 S.E. 400; 25 Stand. Ency. of Proced. 974. On this point, 22 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 915, states that if, from data contained in the findings returned, the amount recoverable is determinable by a mere mathematical calculation, the findings are sufficient. The same volume, at pages 955-960, in language following, promulgates a rule sustained by leading authorities:

"In the construction of a verdict, the first object is to learn the intent of the jury, and, when this can be ascertained, such effect should be allowed to the findings if consistent with legal principles, as will most nearly conform to the intent. The jury's intent is to be arrived at by regarding the verdict liberally, with the sole view of ascertaining the meaning of the jury, and not under the technical rules of construction which are applicable to pleadings. * * *

"In the construction of a verdict, resort may be had to the pleadings to ascertain its true intent. * * *

"The findings of a jury are viewed with great leniency, and all reasonable presumptions are made to sustain a general verdict. * * * In the construction of a verdict, the inclination of the court will always be in favor of its validity, no matter what requisite may be apparently lacking, and the verdict will be supported if, from the terms of the finding and the

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