Reynolds v. Langlois, 1694

• Decision Date: 21 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 1694,1694
• Citation: 209 A.2d 237,99 R.I. 555
• Parties: Edwin H. REYNOLDS v. Harold V. LANGLOIS, Warden. M. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 237

209 A.2d 237

99 R.I. 555

Edwin H. REYNOLDS v. Harold V. LANGLOIS, Warden.

M. P. No. 1694.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 21, 1965.

Edwin H. Reynolds, pro se.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Corinne P. Grande, Special Counsel, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was brought to obtain the release of the petitioner from the allegedly unlawful custody of the respondent warden. He has been in the respondent's custody since April 11, 1951, when he was committed thereto pursuant to sentence of imprisonment for life imposed by a justice of the superior court under each of five indictments returned by the grand jury sitting within and for the county of Kent, charging him with murder in the first degree.

Accompanying the formal petition for the writ is a statement of facts, it being clearly petitioner's purpose to include these within the allegations of his petition. The respondent in his return admits custody of petitioner under a mittimus issued pursuant to sentence imposed by the superior court on each of said indictments and traverses all of the material allegations set out in the petition.

The petitioner alleges, in substance, that on August 30, 1950, shortly after the occurrence of a multiple slaying in Kent county, he was awakened at his home at about 12:30 a. m., taken to a police station, and there subjected to interrogation by four police officers for a period of four hours. During this interrogation, he alleges, he asked repeatedly to be allowed to contact counsel without success, being told that he was in a police station and not a courthouse. He concedes that at about 4:30 a. m. he signed a statement which contained information involving him in the slayings.

The petitioner alleges further that at no time during the interrogation was he informed that he had a right to remain silent or that any statement of an incriminatory nature that he might make could be used against him in court. To the contrary, he alleges that when he attempted to remain silent under interrogation he was threatened with physical violence, on one such occasion an interrogator threatening to shoot him.

The petitioner alleges also that he was arraigned in the district court at about 4:30 p. m. on August 30, 1950 and that he was bound over to the grand jury on a complaint charging murder in the first edgree arising out of the death of Fred Duza. According to petitioner's allegations, he was not provided with, nor allowed to consult, counsel until some twenty-four days after his arrest and detention. He does not, however, allege in express terms that he was without counsel at his arraignment on August 30, 1950. After arraignment a motion for a change of venue was granted by the superior court, and petitioner was subsequently tried on indictment No. 1471 in Providence county. After a trial, in which the defense of insanity was pressed, petitioner was found guilty by the jury of murder in the first degree.

The petitioner alleges that thereafter, being considerably disturbed by the jury's apparent disregard and rejection of 'pertinent medical testimony' as to his lack of mental capacity, he concluded that his situation was hopeless, instructed his counsel to withdraw his pending motion for a new trial, and waived his right to appeal. As a result of these actions and the entry of a plea of nolo contendere in each of the four indictments remaining untried, a sentence to imprisonment for life was imposed.

The petitioner relies on Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, in asserting that the denial of assistance of counsel during the extrajudicial interrogation violated his federally protected rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. The factual situation as alleged in his petition is substantially that set out in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, supra. His argument, as we understand it, puts into issue the voluntariness of the confession obtained from him through that interrogation, which, he contends, was the only substantial evidence adduced by the state to prove his guilt. He now seeks to have the judgment of conviction declared null and void because that confession was obtained in violation of his federal rights. Because the confession was used against him only during the trial under indictment No. 1471, the sole issue before us is the validity of the judgment of conviction in that case.

The primary question to be decided is whether we will entertain his petition for postconviction relief when, at the proper time, he did not assert a violation of his federal rights in an appropriate and available state procedure in that he did not prosecute an appeal, provisions for such an appeal being an integral part of the criminal procedure of this state.

In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the extent to which default in stat appellate procedures constituting an adequate state ground of decision would preclude an exercise by the federal courts of the habeas jurisdiction. The default in that case consisted of a failure to prosecute an appeal and to raise therein a federal question involving a coerced confession. The court held that even if the procedural default constitutes an adequate nonfederal ground for refusing to decide the federal question in a state proceeding for a writ of error coram nobis, it would not preclude a federal court from passing on the federal questions raised in an exercise of the habeas jurisdiction. The court, at page 434, 83 S.Ct. at page 846, rejected 'as unsound in principle, as well as not supported by authority, the suggestion that the federal courts are without power to grant habeas relief to an applicant whose federal claims would not be heard on direct review in this Court because of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent ground of state decision.' In short, it now appears to be settled that the...