Reynolds v. Macfarlane

• Decision Date: 13 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20121000–CA.,20121000–CA.
• Citation: 757 Utah Adv. Rep. 29,322 P.3d 755
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Parties: John REYNOLDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bret MacFARLANE, Defendant and Appellee.

322 P.3d 755

757 Utah Adv. Rep. 29

John REYNOLDS, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Bret MacFARLANE, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20121000–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 13, 2014.

Randall Lee Marshall, for Appellant.

Craig T. Jacobsen, for Appellee.

Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.¹

Memorandum Decision

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 John Reynolds appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his intentional tort claims against Bret MacFarlane. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court.

¶ 2 On August 5, 2009, MacFarlane walked into the break room at his workplace where his coworker, Reynolds, was standing in front of the microwave oven.² Reynolds was holding a ten dollar bill somewhat loosely in his hand. Reynolds was unaware of MacFarlane's presence. MacFarlane approached Reynolds from behind and, without touching Reynolds, quickly snatched the ten dollar bill. Reynolds immediately spun around and faced MacFarlane. MacFarlane then stated, “That was too easy,” and returned the ten dollar bill to Reynolds. As MacFarlane began to walk away, Reynolds struck MacFarlane, splitting his lip. MacFarlane asked why he hit him. Reynolds replied, “You pissed me off.” Shortly after this incident, the two interacted with a larger group of employees outside, and the employees joked around and completed their break. The two men were together at an offsite employee lunch some days later, and on multiple occasions after the incident Reynolds sought out and voluntarily spoke with MacFarlane in MacFarlane's work area.

¶ 3 Nevertheless, the incident was reported to the parties' supervisor. During the ensuing investigation, Reynolds reported to the supervisor that the incident was “nothing” and that any contact between the parties was accidental. Reynolds was ultimately punished with a one-day suspension without pay for striking another employee. Thereafter, Reynolds received medical treatment for anxiety, which Reynolds explained to his physician had resulted from difficulties at work.

¶ 4 Nearly one year later, Reynolds filed a complaint against MacFarlane, alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At a bench trial, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Reynolds's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but Reynolds moved to amend his complaint to include a claim for battery. The court granted Reynolds's motion. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found MacFarlane “to be more credible in that [his] testimony was more consistent and was corroborated by multiple parties.” Accordingly, the court based its findings of fact largely on MacFarlane's testimony. The trial court concluded that Reynolds had not met his burden of proof to show that MacFarlane had committed an assault or a battery against him and then dismissed the case with prejudice. Reynolds appeals.

I. Assault

¶ 5 Reynolds challenges the trial court's conclusion that he failed to prove assault. As an appellate court, we give great deference to the trial court's role as a fact finder and will review its findings of fact only for clear error. Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837. We review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382.

¶ 6 To the extent that Reynolds challenges the trial court's findings of fact, he merely reargues the evidence in favor of his position and does not adequately marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings as required by our rules of appellate procedure. SeeUtah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) ( “A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.”). Because of this failure to marshal, we accept the facts as articulated by the trial court. See Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App 162, ¶¶ 29–30, 280 P.3d 425.

¶ 7 Under Utah law, “[a]n assault is an act ‘(a) ... intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other ... or an imminent apprehension of such a contact’ by which ‘(b) ... the other is ... put in such imminent apprehension.’ ” Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503 n. 3 (Utah 1996) (omissions in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)). The trial court concluded that Reynolds could not prevail on his assault claim for three reasons. First, the trial court determined that Reynolds failed to establish that he was in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact because he was not aware of MacFarlane's presence until after he spun around to find out who had taken his ten dollar bill. Second, the trial court ruled that even though MacFarlane intended to take the ten dollar bill, MacFarlane did not intend to cause imminent apprehension of harmful contact in Reynolds by doing so. Third, the trial court ruled that Reynolds suffered no injury or damages as a result of MacFarlane's actions. Reynolds challenges each of these conclusions. We need address only Reynolds's first challenge because it is dispositive to our conclusion that the trial court correctly determined that Reynolds failed to prove that an assault occurred.

¶ 8 Reynolds concedes that a plaintiff complaining of assault “must be aware of the defendant's act.” See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 10, at 44 (5th ed.1984) (“Since the interest involved is the mental one of apprehension of contact, it should follow that the plaintiff must be aware of the threat of contact, and that it is not an assault to aim a gun at one who is unaware of it.”). In Reynolds's view, this requirement is satisfied in this case because he “was keenly aware of what happened to him” “the moment the money was snatched from his hand.”

¶ 9 However, a plaintiff complaining of assault cannot be in apprehension of harmful or offensive contact unless he is aware of such contact before the threat of the contact is accomplished or has dissipated. “The plaintiff's subjective recognition or apprehension that [he] is about to be touched in an impermissible way is at the core of [an] assault claim.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 38, at 97 (2d ed.2011). As section 22 of the Restatement explains, “An attempt to inflict a harmful or offensive contact or to cause an apprehension of such contact does not make the actor liable for an assault if the other does not become aware of the attempt before it is terminated.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 22 (1965); see also id.§ 22 cmt. a (“[T]he defendant is not liable if his efforts to inflict the bodily contact have been abandoned or frustrated before the other is aware of them, since in such case the other is not put in the required apprehension.”). Reynolds has directed us to no authority to the contrary.

¶ 10 As a result, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Reynolds was not in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact because he was not aware of MacFarlane's presence until after MacFarlane took the ten dollar bill from Reynolds's hand. In other words, Reynolds could not have been in apprehension of a physical contact without having been aware of MacFarlane's impending action to grab the ten dollar bill before MacFarlane completed the act of taking the bill. Accordingly, Reynolds did not prove that MacFarlane committed an assault against him, and the trial court correctly dismissed his assault claim.

II. Battery

¶ 11 Reynolds also challenges the trial court's determination that he failed to establish the elements of a battery. We review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. See In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382.

¶ 12 Utah has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts to define the elements of the intentional tort of battery. Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 599. Consequently, an actor is liable for battery if “ ‘(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other ... or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965)).

¶ 13 In this case, the trial court found that MacFarlane did not touch Reynolds when he grabbed the ten dollar bill from Reynolds's hand. Because “MacFarlane never touched or came into contact with Reynolds,” the trial court concluded that Reynolds did not meet his burden of proof to show that a harmful contact resulted from MacFarlane's action.³ Reynolds asserts that the trial court's conclusion is erroneous because MacFarlane's grabbing of an object—the ten dollar bill—from his hand was sufficient contact with his person to constitute a battery.

¶ 14 For the intentional tort of battery, harmful or offensive contact “includes all physical contacts that the individual either expressly communicates are unwanted, or those contacts to which no reasonable person would consent.” Id. ¶ 51. But “it is not necessary that the plaintiff's actual body be disturbed.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 cmt. c (1965). Rather, “[p]rotection of the interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contacts with the plaintiff's person extends to any part of the body, or to anything which is attached to it and practically identified with it.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 9, at 39 (5th ed.1984) (footnote omitted). “Thus, if all other requisites of a battery against the plaintiff are satisfied, contact with the plaintiff's clothing, or with a cane, a paper, or any other object held in the plaintiff's hand, will be sufficient” to support a battery claim because the “interest in the integrity of [a] person includes all those things which are in contact or connected with the person.” Id. § 9, at 39–40 (footnotes omitted); see also Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So.2d 510, 511 (1941) (“...