Reynolds v. Marsden
| Decision Date | 14 February 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 7844.,7844. |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. MARSDEN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Herbert L. Carpenter, Judge.
Will contest by John R. Reynolds against Thomas E. Marsden, executor of the will of Sarah E. Reynolds, deceased. On the exceptions of John R. Reynolds to a decision granting a motion for a directed verdict sustaining the will.
Exceptions sustained, and case remitted for a new trial.
Percy W. Gardner, Ada L. Sawyer, and Edward W. Day, all of Providence, for appellant. Michael F. Costello, of Pawtucket, and McGovern & Slattery and James A. Higgins all of Providence, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the probate court of the city of Cranston admitting to probate the will of Sarah E. Reynolds. In the superior court, the trial justice directed the jury to return a verdict sustaining the will, and the case is before us solely on appellant's exception to the decision granting the motion for a directed verdict.
The appellant is the husband of the testatrix and the appellee is her son by a former marriage, and her only child. The will in question was executed in Providence on January 28, 1931. By its terms it leaves her entire estate of upwards of $35,000 to her son, the appellee, and makes no reference of any kind to her husband, the appellant. The testatrix died on July 7, 1935, at the age of eighty-two.
The record herein shows that the testatrix and the appellant, who was nine years younger than his wife, were married in 1892; it being the second marriage for both parties. At this time neither of them had money. Later, the testatrix inherited about $2,800 from members of her family, which money she kept for herself. During the forty-three years while she was married to the appellant, she performed no work, other than her household duties.
The appellant, after being employed for a few years as a mechanic, established and operated a box factory, and from the profits of this business he acquired real estate, the title to which he put in the names of himself and wife as joint tenants. The income from this property, which is unincumbered, is approximately $60 a month. When the factory was destroyed by fire in 1922, the appellant retired from active business, and he and his wife lived on the income from this property and from his savings.
The evidence shows that relations between the husband and wife were good. Except for occasional instances of jealousy on the part of the wife, who did not like her husband to pay attention to any other woman, whether stranger or relative, and an occasional reference by her to his use of liquor, lest it injure his health, they enjoyed a normal, happy life together. There was no evidence introduced of any real impropriety on the part of the husband in either of the above respects. He turned over to his wife from $15 to $25 a week and paid substantially all other household expenses, including the hiring of extra help whenever she so desired, and she ran the house under this arrangement to his satisfaction. Also, he gave her money and some shares of stock on at least two occasions. She apparently was of a saving disposition and secretive as to her financial affairs.
The appellee, who was about twenty-one years of age when his mother married the appellant, did not live with her thereafter. However, his relations with them both were friendly and cordial throughout their married life. The appellee was successful in business and apparently became quite wealthy.
According to the evidence for the appellant, the health of the testatrix was good until 1927 or 1928, when she had a fall, causing a head injury which confined her to her bed for some time. Later, she lost the sight of one eye and gradually became more feeble, taciturn, and indifferent in her general attitude toward life.
In January, 1931, the appellant, with his wife's approval, went to Bermuda for a short vacation, she saying to one of the witnesses that he had worked hard and deserved it. While he was away on this trip, the will in question was executed in the office of George C. Clinton, a member of this bar, to which place the testatrix was taken by the appellee, according to the lawyer's testimony. He testified that he had known the appellee for a number of years and, at various times, had acted as his attorney; that he did not know the testatrix prior to her coming to his office; and that the appellee introduced her to him, saying that she wanted to talk with him, whereupon "she turned to her son and smiled," and he, the attorney, without asking what she wished to discuss with him, asked the appellee to come back in half an hour; that the testatrix first requested him to draw a will leaving $50 to the appellant, and the rest of her estate to the appellee; but that she then directed him to strike out the legacy to the appellant and leave everything to the appellee; that he asked the testatrix no questions about her property or family relations, but merely made a rough draft of what she desired and asked her to return in a day or two to execute the will; and that the testatrix shortly thereafter left his office with the appellee.
This witness further testified that the testatrix returned to his office as agreed; that, on this occasion, his impression was that she came alone; that she looked over the will and apparently read it, and that he was not called upon to either read or explain it to her, and upon her saying that it was all right, the will was then executed; and that shortly thereafter she left, taking the will with her. He stated that he was under the impression that no one was with her when she left his office, although he could not be definitely sure of this fact.
From the evidence, it would appear that the testatrix thereafter made no mention to her husband or to any one else of having made a will. In fact, one of appellant's witnesses, who had known the testatrix for over forty years and who had been on friendly terms with her until she died, testified that within three years of her death the testatrix had told her that she had not made a will. From appellant's testimony it appeared that, in various conversations between himself and the appellee during the testatrix's last illness, the appellee stated that he did not know anything about his mother's affairs.
Shortly after the death of the testatrix, the appellant consulted his attorney, Miss Sawyer, respecting his wife's estate. She testified that he told her that to his knowledge his wife had not made a will, but as he had with him...
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Larmore v. Fleet National Bank, No. 2003-1063 (R.I. Super 11/9/2006)
...influence was in fact applied, is insufficient for a finding of undue influence. Caranci, 708 A.2d at 1324; Reynolds v. Marsden, 60 R.I. 91, 97, 197 A. 193, 196 (1938). A finding of undue influence cannot be based on "mere suspicion, surmise or conjecture." Caranci, 708 A.2d at 1327 (quotin......
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Lawton v. Higgins, C.A. No. PP: 05-2341 (R.I. Super 6/13/2008)
...beyond the existence of opportunity to support a finding of undue influence. See Caranci, 708 A.2d at 1324; Reynolds v. Marsden, 60 R.I. 91, 97, 197 A. 193, 196 (1938) (finding that the opportunity to exert influence, without a showing that impermissible influence was, in fact, applied, is ......
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Lomastro v. Hamilton
...by evidence either direct or circumstantial that such influence was exercised. Talbot v. Bridges, 54 R.I. 337, 173 A. 72; Reynolds v. Marsden, 60 R.I. 91, 197 A. 193. The appellees denied that they influenced their father to leave them his interest in the property involved. In fact it was t......
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Marsh v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Co., 8316.
...as by direct evidence. See Young v. Young, 56 R.I. 401, 405, 185 A. 901; Heroux v. Heroux, 58 R.I. 79, 85, 191 A. 265; Reynolds v. Marsden, 60 R.I. 91, 97, 197 A. 193. These cases are here cited, not because of any similarity to the instant case in their facts, but because of the general pr......